Japanese defence policy : the prewar origins of Japanese popular pacifism, and the influence of pacifism on Japan's postwar defence policy by McAlister, Susan Jean
JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY 
The prewar origins of Japanese popular 
pacifism, and the influence of pacifism 
on Japan's postwar defence policy 
by 
Susan Jean McAlister 
1 
JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY 
Sub-thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts 
(International Relations), Department of International 
Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, May, 1991. 
This sub-thesis is my own work, and all the sources 
used have been acknowledged. 
~ 
2 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
The Legacy of History 
CHAPTER II 
Ignoring the Legacy of History 
CHAPTER III 
Remembering the Past 
CHAPTER IV 
The American Alliance: A Legacy 
of Different Histories 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
Comprehensive Security: 
The Pros and Cons 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Note on the text: 
Throughout this paper Japanese names 
are rendered in the Japanese fashion, 
with the family name first and the 
personal name second. 
3 
page 4 
page 10 
page 32 
page 62 
page 88 
page 123 
page 147 
page 151 
INTRODUCTION 
Decisions made by ... governments ... reflect 
the overall balance of internal forces ... They 
also reflect the gravitational pull of what might 
be termed loosely the 'accumulated legacy of 
history' ... 
.. . By and large, historical traditions emerge 
through a process of natural selection. Those 
which have produced satisfactory results are 
remembered. Those which have proved disastrous, 
or which seem irrelevant to contemporary pr~blems, 
are gradually, but not entirely forgotten. 
In 1960, hundreds of thousands of Japanese took to the streets 
of their major cities to protest against the signing and 
ratification of a revised security treaty between Japan and the 
United States. The revised treaty was intended to guarantee Japan 
protection under the American "nuclear umbrella", assistance from 
U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack on Japan, and removal 
of provisions in the earlier version of the treaty which were 
considered to compromise the independence of the Japanese nation. 
Despite the intention of the new treaty to afford greater 
security and sovereignty to Japan, the public disturbances its 
ratification caused were of such magnitude, and parliamentary and 
press opposition so vociferous, that the Prime Minister of the 
day was forced to resign, and a visit to Japan by the President 
of the United States was cancelled. 
preface. 
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In 1981, a Japanese Prime Minister, during a visit to 
Washington, referred to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as an 
"alliance" rather than the customary "partnership". The public 
outcry in Japan was sufficient to force the Prime Minister to 
deny that his use of the term imbued the treaty with any special 
or augmented military significance, and, when that failed to 
mollify the press and public, the Foreign Minister took 
responsibility for the affair and resigned. 
In the mid-1980s, a Cabinet-imposed upper limit on Japanese 
defence spending of one percent of GNP was officially broached. 
Even though the increase still left Japan's defence budget the 
smallest, in proportion to its GNP, of any major Western power 
and, indeed, one of the smallest in the world, the Cabinet 
decision to authorise the increase came only after months of 
political manoeuvring, and was made in defiance of the wishes of 
some seventy percent of the Japanese people, supported by the 
parliamentary opposition and the newsmedia. 
In 1991, Japan pledged several billions dollars in economic 
aid as its contribution to the United Nations-sponsored operation 
to remove Iraqi military occupation forces from Kuwait: when this 
failed to silence condemnation of its response by sections of the 
U.S. Congress and the Western media, and less strident but 
insistent pressure from the U.S. government, the Japanese 
government dispatched Maritime Self Defence Force minesweepers 
and crews to the Persian Gulf, again in defiance of the wishes of 
a majority of the Japanese civilian population and Self Defence 
Force personnel. 
More than four decades after its defeat in the Pacific War, 
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Japanese public opinion is still preventing revision of the 
"alien" postwar Constitution, which includes, in Article IX, the 
renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential and the 
rejection of the right of belligerency of the state; and, members 
of the Japanese Self Defence Force are still discouraged from 
appearing in public in uniform. 
Whence comes this powerful aversion to all things military 
which characterises the Japanese people today? They are, after 
all, a people most frequently perceived in other nations as heirs 
to the feudalistic legacy of the famous, or infamous, warrior 
code of bushido; a people who, little more than a one hundred 
ago, emerged from eight centuries of largely isolationist 
military rule only to embark on a half century of largely 
expansionist military rule, the legacy of which for many of 
Japan's neighbours is continued suspicion and dislike of the now 
economically powerful state on the mountainous archipelago 
northeast of the Eurasian landmass. 
This paper seeks to explain the strength and durability of 
Japanese popular resistance to full re-armament 1 , domestic 
1. The term "re-a.rrrarrent" as used in this paper means an upjated version of 
Japerl's prewar military capability, which included a substantial force 
projection capacity, and a large standing Arrrw and Navy. The Japanese public 
has accepted their country's present need to defend itself, but with a 
comparatively small Self Iefence Force, which is without an independent force 
projection capability, thereby emphasising its purely "defensive" role. 
"Pacifism" is used primarily to indicate opposition to acts of aggression 
against other states, and, domestically, to indicate an aversion to perceived 
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militarism and the deployment of defence personnel abroad, and 
fears about the implications of the American alliance, which 
together constitute a pervasive pacifism which has been one the 
major influences on the evolution of post-war Japanese defence 
policy. For most of the postwar period, this strong pacifist 
influence has coincided with pressure, most notably from Japan's 
ally, the United States, for Japan to rearm and acquire a 
significantly increased military capability, one more in keeping 
with Japan's status as an economic "superpower". It is evident 
that these are contradictory influences and therefore liable to 
produce conflict, in particular in a relationship already 
... Continued ... 
signs of "militarism". The ];X)pular rejection of things which are, or seem to 
00 obviously of a military nature stems in part from outright "pacifism" or 
"civilian-ism", but also from Japanese not wanting to be reminded that the SDF 
exists, rather than op];X)sition to the SDF re.r 5.e, because although the public 
has come to accept that the SDF may playa constructive role in society, 
principally through disaster relief work, there are still doubts about its 
legality and constitutionality. Although the subject of this paper is 
"];X)pular" pacifism, this should not be taken to mean that the pacifist views 
of the ordinary people of Japan are not shared by many of its political, 
bureaucratic, or industrial leaders, nor by members of the SDF itself; quite 
often, they are, and for the same reasons -- including the legacy of JalJanese 
history. 
"Militarism" as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, means "undue 
prevalence of military spirit or ideals". In this paper, it rreans in 
particular a policy or ideology which promotes territorial expansionism as the 
primary rreans of advancing the national interest, as opposed to diplomacy or 
trade. Internally, "militarism" signifies extreme or ultra-nationalism, 
xenophobia, the glorification of war, the prevalence of a military-industrial 
complex, and a tendency to blur the distinction ootween the functions of the 
armed forces and the police. It further signifies military dominance of those 
areas of national life which in democracies are usually under civilian 
control, such as Cabinet ministries, including, of course, the defence 
ministry. There is, however, no defence minister in postwar Japan: the head of 
the SDF is a civilian, the Director General of the Defense Agency. which is 
part of the Prime Minister's Office. 
In the domestic context the opposite of "militarism" is, strictly speaking, 
"civilian-ism", but "pacifism" is rrore comrronly used, and therefore appears 
more frequently as the antonym. in theory and in practice, of "militarism" in 
this paper. 
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rendered difficult to manage because of popular and Congressional 
resentment in the U.S. over Japan's massive surplus in bilateral 
trade, and its increasing ownership of American companies and 
property. 
This is not to say that there has been an absence of calls from 
within Japan for an augmented national defence effort, nor that 
American demands for a Japanese military buildup have been 
unremitting or unquestioned within the United States. However, 
given the very different historical experience of both nations, 
including Japan's defeat by the U.S. in the Pacific War, it becomes 
evident why misunderstandings and disputes have arisen between 
the two nations in recent decades, in particular over the 
American perception that Japan is taking a "free ride" at the 
expense of its ally. 
It is argued in this paper that the reluctance of a majority 
of Japanese to have their nation assume a larger military role at 
the behest of domestic military proponents or of the United 
States cannot be solely attributed to Japan's devastating defeat 
in 1945 and subsequent sheltering under the American security 
umbrella, or to an aversion to increased defence expenditure 
simply for economic reasons. It can also be attributed to Japan's 
long prewar history, which ill-prepared the nation for the role 
of a traditional "Great Power". For, despite its centuries of 
civil war and rule by military dictators, and the popular foreign 
perception of it as a belligerent nation, Japan exhibited no real 
aptitude for external armed aggression until less than a century 
ago. Nor, until some two decades ago, did it possess sufficient 
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economic power to exert a strong influence on developments 
overseas by the disposition of its foreign trade. investment or 
aid. 
Japan has been cautious in its post-war approach to the game 
of power politics 1, a game from which it has customarily been 
somewhat aloof, but which, when it has played, it has for the 
most part played ineptly and even disastrously. Since the end of 
the allied occupation, Japan has instead been diligent in 
utilising its long-proven assets, principally its ability to 
adapt foreign ideas and technologies and the industry of its 
people, to become a trading state ~ excellence. 
It is the contention of this paper that Japan's continuing 
slowness in rebuilding its military strength and its parallel 
reluctance to assert itself in international political and 
economic regimes are an appropriate and unsurprising continuation 
of several of the dominant features and trends of the country's 
long pre-war history, which have been reinforced by its defeat in 
the Second World War and the strategic realities of the postwar 
era. 
1. The term "pJwer pJli tics", Machtrolitik, is used frequently in this paper 
in preference to its synonym, II international politics", because the 
connotations of the former are nnre appropriate in the context of a paper 
dealing mainly with the threatened or actual use of force in Japan ' s relations 
with other states. 
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CHAPTER 
THE LEGACY OF HISTORY 
Synopsis 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that while both 
Japan and the United States wanted and duly acquired Pacific 
empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
their experience of power politics prior to this time and the 
initial impetus for expansion differed between the two nations. 
For most of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries, Japan was a closed, homogeneous and feudalistic 
society which maintained a defensive posture ~ a ~ other 
states, whereas the United States was the product of mass 
migration, revolution and seemingly unstoppable territorial 
expansion. Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, the 
Japanese and American experience of external aggression prior to 
the twentieth century was widely divergent, for whereas the 
United States was itself the product of westward territorial 
expansion from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, and had 
emerged triumphant from war with some of the Great Powers of the 
day, Japan's attempts to extend its political influence and 
territory overseas by force of arms had largely been failures. 
Even the Japanese victories over China and Russia in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century were deceptively sound 
and fateful, in that they encouraged Japan to adopt a program of 
10 
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empire-building, which represented a marked departure from the 
country's customarily peaceful relations with neighbouring 
states, and the sustainment of which was eventually to prove 
beyond Japan's military or industrial capabilities. The contest 
for Pacific hegemony brought the U.S. and Japan into armed 
conflict during the first half of the twentieth century, and 
resulted in Japan's devastating defeat. This experience served to 
induce and maintain a Tokugawa-like aversion to involvement in 
postwar power politics, though not to trade, on the part of a 
majority of Japanese. The unprecedented level of political 
liberalism, domestic prosperity and international prestige which 
has accompanied Japan's adherence to the role of a peaceful 
trading state has reinforced the high level of popular resistance 
to an augmented Japanese military capability. 
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Japan as aggressor: a study in failure 
Unlike the United States, with its belief in "manifest 
destiny" and long record of successful territorial conflicts, 
Japan seemed destined until the mid-nineteenth century to be 
frequently uninterested in the outside world and doomed to 
failure whenever it attempted to expand its political power 
overseas by armed force. It also seemed destined to experience 
internal political and social upheaval during those times when it 
opened itself up to external influence. 
It is important to examine in detail the long-established 
patterns associated with Japanese external aggression, overseas 
trade and internal instability because they are still discernible 
today, and help render the strength of Japanese pacifism and the 
peculiarities of Japan's defence posture as both appropriate to 
the nation and comprehensible to non-Japanese. 
One of the earliest major engagements of a Japanese military 
force in what would now be termed an international war was a 
failure of such magnitude that no similar enterprise was 
attempted by Japan for almost one-thousand years. In 663 A.D., 
the Japanese state of Yamato sent a great naval force to assist 
its ally, the powerful Northeast Asian state of Koguryo, against 
the forces of T'ang Dynasty China and its Silla allies. The 
crushing defeat suffered by the Japanese at Paekchongang "served 
only to reinforce the deeply isolationist sentiments of the 
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Japanese ruling classes". 1 
However, if complete isolation from involvement in power 
politics was untenable, the ruling classes evidently decided that 
it would be better henceforth to be involved on the side of the 
dominant power; apart from any other considerations, this would 
give Japan access to the superior military technology and 
techniques of the T'ang and Silla. Thus, the Chinese triumph over 
Japan did not result in any loss of contact between Yamato and 
the rich, powerful and culturally brilliant T'ang state. Japan 
aligned itself with its stronger neighbour and Chinese influence 
in Japan was encouraged and duly increased, resulting, among 
other things, in the spread of Buddhism and associated arts and 
crafts, the creation of an official written history, the 
development of centralised government and the modelling of 
Yamato's first "capital city", Nara .1 on the T'ang capital, 
Ch'ang-an. Yet, despite these benefits flowing to Japan, Japanese 
leaders remained wary of supplying any reciprocal benefit to the 
T'ang in the form of troops or functional weaponry: 
The high point of medieval Sino-Japanese military co-operation 
was reached when the Emperor Junnin, hearing of An Lu-shan's 
rebellion against the T'ang, and alarmed at this threat to his 
fellow Buddhist-Confucian monarch, decided to dispatch military 
aid to the Chinese court in the form of vast quantiti~s of 
bullocks' horns (used in the manufacturing of bows). 
This is an early example of a gesture which was to be often 
repeated in later Japanese history, most recently by the Japanese 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.3 
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.3 
13 
government's initial offer of financial aid rather than defence 
force personnel and equipment as its contribution to the 
multilateral military operation to end Iraq's occupation of 
Kuwait in late 1990. 1 
Five important and enduring threads in the cloth of Japanese 
history are discernible in the battle of Paekchongang and its 
aftermath: one is the defeat of Japanese military forces when 
sent abroad; a second is the failure of the states which 
vanquished those Japanese forces to subsequently attack Japan; a 
third is a form of "one-sided" alignment of Japan with the 
dominant regional power; a fourth is Japan's interest in adopting 
and adapting ideas, institutions and technology from a more 
advanced society; and a fifth is Japan's propensity to internal 
turmoil and (unsuccessful) external aggression when "open" to the 
outside world. 
Accordingly, from the fourth to the sixth century, the 
introduction of Chinese culture from Kyushu to the court of 
Yamato had produced serious and prolonged strife at court: 2 from 
the seventh to the ninth century, the period in which Japan ' s 
acquisition of Chinese culture and religion was accelerated, and 
during which it was vanquished at Paekchongang, Japan's internal 
strife widened and became more bloody as Yamato and other 
Japanese states sought to transform themselves according to the 
T'ang model and to expand, frequently making "violence ... the 
1. See: lOA dogs-of-war house for Japan", The. Economist, 19.1.91, pp.27-28 
2. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p. 194 
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order of the day". 1 Eventually, a form of backlash occurred, and 
Japanese insularity reasserted itself. 
From the ninth to the twelfth century~ during the so- called 
Heian Age, Japan eschewed foreign military adventures, and 
retreated into isolationism, terminating its contact with China 
and henceforth showing "no int.erest in foreigners". 2 It was a 
period of Japanese history notable for its large measure of 
domestic calm and stability, and for its brilliant cultural 
achievements, including Lady Murusaki's Tale Q.f. Genji. This era 
of peace and accomplishment was notable also in that, although 
the imperial family was preserved and the Emperor's throne never 
usurped, control of the court was actually in the hands of 
another family, the Fujiwara. They set "a lasting Japanese 
pattern of control from behind the scenes through a 
figurehead ... This fact has often helped to conceal the realities 
of Japanese life and confuse the casual observer". 3 The Fujiwara 
effectively ruled Japan from 670 until 1165, and continued to 
heavily influence court politics until 1945. 4 
With the passing of the Heian Age, Japan again established 
contact with the outside world and suffered frequent bouts of 
1. Leonard, Early Japan, p. 16 
2. Leonard, Early Japan, p. 39. In accordance with the strong continuity of 
many Japanese mores over its nearly 2000 years of recorded history, such 
xenophobia was to manifest i t.self again strongly during the more than t.wo 
hundred years of Tokugawa isolation which began in the seventeenth century; 
and, in a public opinion poll held by the Prime Minister's Office in 1980, 64% 
of Japanese wanted "nothing whatsoever to do with foreigners". (Harries, 
Sheathing the. Sword, p. 269). 
3. Reischauer, Japan, p.43 
4. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial ConspiracY, pp.196-197 
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internal conflict, most notably between the rival Taira and 
Minamoto families. When Minamoto Yoritomo eventually gained the 
upper hand, he retained the Emperor in Kyoto, as the Fujiwara had 
done, but effectively ruled from his military command post at 
Kamakura, t,hereby creating the country's first "tent government", 
bakufu, and becoming its first shogun. Yoritomo's bakufu was to 
evolve into the feudalistic form of government which saw warrior 
aristocrats either governing or, at least, holding the military 
balance of power in Japan for the next eight centuries, 
There were similarities between Japanese and European 
feudalism, but instructive differences as well. One such 
difference was the Japanese concept of feudal relationships being 
primarily based on moral obligations as opposed to the Romanised 
European concept of their being based on legal obligations. Of 
more importance to an understanding of Japanese pacifism today is 
the difference in longevity between feudalism in Japan and 
Europe. The Japanese variety far outlasted its European relative, 
surviving intact until the Meiji Restoration, and maintaining a 
powerful influence, especially in its emphasis on militarist 
values, on Japanese politics and society until the end of the 
Pacific War. 
Elements of feudalism may still be noticed in many areas of 
life in modern Japan, 1 but equally, if not more noticeable, is 
1. see Reischauer, Japan, pp.52-55. However, it should be noted that 
"feudalism" is to a great extent in the eye of the beholder: rrost Australians 
would not consider their country feudalistic, yet its head of state is a 
queen. The political, legal, religious and cultural practices of all Western 
societies are to a great extent derived from the European feudal period, and 
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the Japanese public's continued aversion to anything that hints 
at a resurgence of militarism. Given Japan's present, 
comparatively democratic mode of government, its technological 
prowess and its success as a trading state, it is significant 
that in Europe, the more politically and socially constraining 
aspects of feudalism were abandoned with the rebirth of humanism 
and its attendant advances in science and technology, and the 
rise of an internationally competitive society. One of the more 
salient features of the modern world is that the seven major 
economic powers1, while together disposing of great military 
strength, are not individually feudalistic or militaristic 
states: it is the least successful economies which are most 
commonly under military or other forms of totalitarian rule. 
It was during Japan's first period of military rule that it 
experienced a threat of foreign invasion greater than any until 
the twentieth century. Mongol warriors had swept out of Central 
Asia in the early thirteenth century, to conquer within a few 
generations a great swathe of the Eurasian landmass, from Korea 
... Continued ... 
all retain many feudalistic elements. So does everyday life: whenever a r~l 
opens a door for a woman, or stands when a woman enters the room, he is 
obeying a feudal (twelfth century) code of courtesy. The "feudalism" of Japan 
is not unique, and can 1:::e overstated. 
1. The so-called "Group of Seven (Major Industralised Nations) If comprises 
Japan" the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany and Italy. A 
further salient feature of this group is that three of its mem1:::ers, Japan, 
Germany and Italy, were defeated by an alliance of the other five states in 
W.W. II., and divested of their empires. Japan and Germany have nevertheless 
enjoyed extraordinary economic success since then, with Japan now 1:::eing the 
wor ld ' s second largest economY and Germany the wor ld ' s largest exp::>rter. The 
implications of this for Japanese defence policy are presented in Chapter III, 
pp.85-86; and Conclusion, p. 144. 
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and China to the Middle East and Muscovy. Under the leadership of 
Kublai Khan, the Mongols attempted to extend the eastern boundary 
of their empire to Japan. 
The first invasion was mounted from Korea in 1274, and after 
an inclusive battle with Japanese forces on the coast of Kyushu, 
the Mongol troops, who had reboarded their ships for the night, 
were drowned or blown back towards Korea by a storm. In 1281, the 
Mongols attempted another invasion, this time mustering an army 
which was probably larger than any other sea-borne invasion force 
that had ever been assembled. 1 The Mongol armada again crossed 
the Straits of Tsushima from Korea and made for the coast of 
Kyushu. However, before the full, overwhelming force of Mongol 
and allied warriors had come ashore, a typhoon bore down on the 
fleet, destroying it and Kublai Khan's designs on Japan. 
The typhoon was believed by the Japanese to be the product of 
divine intervention; it was the "god wind", kamikaze, and yet 
another sign of Japan's uniqueness and inviolability. 2 They did 
not, however, presume on that divine protection to the extent of 
mounting any retaliatory assault on the Mongols. 
This brutal intrusion into Japanese affairs by the outside 
world and a subsequent increase in economic contact between Japan 
and neighbouring states was characteristically accompanied by an 
era of violent political upheaval in Japan. The Kamakura period 
was succeeded by the Ashikaga bakufu, or Muromachi period, which 
1. p.81; and Leonard, Early Japan, pp.61-64 
2. see, Reischauer, Japan, pp. 64-65, and The Japanese, p.55; Leonard, Early 
Japan, pp. 61-64 
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was characterised for the most part by increasing political 
disruption and confusion, and, towards its end, by almost 
incessant warfare. 
During the fourteenth century, trade with China expanded and 
brought considerable prosperity to Western Japan. The Ashikaga 
shoguns tried to monopolise it, by permitting their country to 
become a Chinese tributary state in return for the Ming Emperor's 
recognition of them as "kings" of Japan", to the lasting shame of 
Japanese nationalists. 1 
The Muromachi period also saw Japanese influence extend for the 
first time far beyond its shores, as Japanese traders and 
pirates, who were usually masterless . samuraJ., sought by barter or 
the sword to obtain goods from as far away as the Philippines, 
Java and Thailand. They plundered their way into China as far as 
Nanking, an expedition with unfortunate modern resonances. 
Although these pirates amounted to a serious scourge of the 
coasts of China and the seas of Southeast Asia, and brought 
prosperity and exotic products to their baronial patrons, the 
daimyo of western Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, their activities 
did not represent a concerted effort by Japan to conquer foreign 
lands. They would rather have served as evidence to Japan's 
nobility and burgeoning merchant class that foreign trade was 
generally a more profitable and safer enterprise than overseas 
territorial expansionism. 
The recurring pattern in Japanese history of increased foreign 
contact coinciding with increased civil strife was again evident 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.63 
19 
in the fifteenth century, which brought the Onin War, and in the 
even more violent sixteenth century, the "Age of the Country at 
War, sengoku jidai. Trade with China and other lands was 
furnishing Japan with new ideas and technologies, and a 
redistribution of wealth in favour of western and southern 
Japanese. The demise of the Ashikaga bakufu was accompanied by 
growing disorder and there occurred "something of an age of 
freedom for Japan's lower classes .. 1 . While rising discontent and 
acts of civil disobedience on the part of the peasantry did not 
amount to a revolution, had the new wealth, goods and ideas been 
permitted to continue to flow into Japan, there might eventually 
have been a movement away from feudalism and military rule. 
However, when faced with evidence that Japan was not an effective 
external aggressor, and that it was being encroached upon by 
nations possibly more powerful even than China, the military 
leaders who succeeded the Ashikaga chose to react to threats to 
Japanese sovereignty and its socio-political status ~Q by 
strengthening the feudal system and ensuring its preservation by 
sealing off Japan from the outside world. 
This was not, however, the initial reaction of Japan's leaders 
when confronted with the superior technology of Europe. When the 
first Europeans known to have visited Japan landed on an island 
near Kyushu in 1542/3, the local lord welcomed the three 
Portuguese adventurers, and showed particular interest in a 
demonstration of their arquebuses. The Japanese bought them, and 
1. Leonard, Early Japan, p. 104 
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set about making copies of this new and powerful weapon. The 
first Japanese leader to restore a measure of order to the 
central region of the anarchic "Country at War", Oda Nobunaga, 
made good use of this new weapons technology in his battles with 
rival daimyo and militant Buddhist monks. His successor, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, further consolidated centralised control over the 
country, and, almost one-thousand years after the last disastrous 
foreign military adventure by the Japanese, he decided to utilise 
Japan's new-found wealth, advanced weapons technology and 
abundance of unemployed soldiers in the conquest of China. 
In 1592, Hideyoshi's very large, well-trained and well-
equipped expeditionary force landed in Korea, then a Chinese 
tributary state, and swiftly overran the peninsula, until the 
force arrived, overextended, at the Yalu River. Although the Ming 
Dynasty was by now in decline and would shortly be overthrown by 
the northern Manchu tribe, the massive army it dispatched to 
assist Korea pushed Hideyoshi's forces, their supply lines cut, 
back to the south of the peninsula. A further Japanese effort to 
conquer Korea was made five years after the first invasion, but 
after again sweeping the southern half of the peninsula, it too 
was stalemated in the face of China's seemingly unending supply 
of reinforcements, and once again Hideyoshi's soldiers had their 
supply lines severed by Korea's superior naval vessels and 
strategy. Peace negotiations began, but, in 1598 "the death of 
Hideyoshi ... gave the Japanese a welcome excuse for abandoning the 
whole venture, and their armies streamed home". 1 Despite its 
1. Reischauer, Japan, pp.80-81 
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advanced weaponry, Japan's first attempt since Paekchongang to 
prevail by force of arms in continental power politics had, like 
its previous attempt, been unsuccessful. And costly, for in terms 
of "sheer carnage, it had surpassed anything that Europe would 
see until the campaigns of Napoleon more than two hundred years 
later. ,,1 
Under Nobunaga, Japan had further expanded its overseas trade, 
and European influence, especially in the form of new 
technologies and Christianity, made a significant impression on 
Japanese society. However, Hideyoshi proved less welcoming to the 
Christian missionaries than his predecessor, and he welcomed not 
at all the unprecedented degree of freedom and prosperity, and 
access to firearms, being enjoyed by the common people. During 
the civil wars, armed peasants and small landowners had taken to 
banding together to defy their feudal masters and to chase tax 
collectors out of their villages. Firearms had encouraged such 
rebelliousness, because they afforded peasants a hitherto 
impossible degree of "armed parity" with their overlords, and 
militant commoners "who had good weapons were too dangerous to 
molest without the support of a large army." 2 Although Hideyoshi 
was himself a commoner by birth, he sought to restrain other 
would-be parvenus and prevent any major, concerted peasant 
uprising by introducing repressive laws and practices even before 
he had consolidated his rule, thereby creating the framework for 
1. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.211 
2. Leonard, Early Japan, p.144 
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a more conservative and rigid form of feudalism. 
Hideyoshi was succeeded by Tokugawa Ieyasu, and under him and 
his descendants many of the familiar threads in Japanese history 
were woven into a new and enduring prominence. 
The failure of Hideyoshi's armies to conquer the region's 
customary hegemon, China, and even to maintain control over its 
much smaller neighbour, Korea, had demonstrated that despite 
their advanced weaponry, new-found wealth and large population, 
the Japanese were no more able to prevail in war against 
foreigners, and especially against an alliance of foreigners, 
than they had been a millennium earlier. Moreover, the hostile 
alliances Japan might now face, comprising European powers and, 
possibly, their agents within Japan, were an unprecedented and 
therefore more alarming threat. The outside world, for a period 
perceived by Japan's ruling class as a cornucopia of riches and 
beneficial inventions, and seemingly ripe for Japanese conquest, 
began now to assume a different guise, that of unpredictable and 
intractable menace. 
Japan's centuries of isolation under the Tokugawa bakufu was 
heralded by the expulsion of Christian missionaries and the 
suppression of Christianity. The threat posed by Japanese 
Christians was that, like militant Buddhists, they could become 
powerful enough to challenge the Tokugawa shogun; the 
missionaries were seen as liable to encourage such a development, 
and as liable also to embroil Japan in the terrible wars of 
religion then being waged in Europe. 
Just as dangerous were the new secular concepts of statecraft 
being developed in Europe, which, if allowed into Japan could 
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undermine the political and social status ~UQ, recreating the 
sengoku jidai and destroying the Tokugawas' dynastic aspirations. 
The obvious means by which such concepts could enter Japan was 
via foreign trade, and this, together with the shogun~' concern 
that trade could enable the western daimyos to acquire wealth and 
new technologies sufficient to challenge the central 
administration, resulted in the limiting of trade to only one or 
two visits per year by Dutch ships to Nagasaki. Foreigners in 
Japan were all expelled, save for a few Dutch merchants confined 
to an island in Nagasaki harbour. 
One difference between Japan's experience after Paekchongang 
and after Hideyoshi's abortive assaults on China, was that in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Japan failed to align itself 
with a hegemonic power as a means of guaranteeing its security. 
Nobunaga's association with European missionaries and his use of 
them and European weapons technology in his feuds with rival 
daimyos and militant Buddhist monks could be interpreted as a 
form of very loose alliance resulting from a fairly brief 
convergence of interests. Hideyoshi entertained the idea of 
turning Japan itself into a hegemonic power, but in the end 
Japan's military rulers proved hostile to foreign contact. Yet, 
this does not mean that Hideyoshi or Ieyasu and his descendants 
would not have chosen to align themselves with a power able to 
afford Japan protection and more tangible benefits, from a safe 
distance and at little cost to themselves, had such a power been 
available. However, the region's customary hegemonic power was 
failing and hence unreliable. In 1658, when the half-Japanese 
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Ming resistance leader Zheng Cheng-gong (Coxinja), whose navy 
controlled the China seas, appealed to the Tokugawa shogunate for 
assistance against invading Manchus, "the Japanese leadership, 
after careful consideration, decided not to intervene. The 
outcome of the conflict was uncertain. Discretion, therefore, 
seemed the better part of valour ... 1 There was similar 
uncertainty as to which of the European nations would emerge 
strongest from their wars on the other side of the world, or from 
their contest for imperial possessions in Asia. It was likely, 
moreover, that a European ally would seek to interfere in Japan~s 
internal affairs. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptable 
alternative, the Tokugawas "retreated into watchful 
isolationism". 2 
In terms of understanding the strength of pacifism in Japan 
after 1945, and its influence on Japanese defence policy, the 
above outline of Japanese history prior to the Meiji Restoration 
reveals certain recurring themes, or modes of political and 
social behaviour, which have powerful resonances in modern Japan. 
Japanese isolationism and American expansionism: 
a study in contrast. 
As described above, for almost two-thousand years, the 
Japanese maintained a singularly defensive posture, with a marked 
tendency towards isolationism when the external world appeared to 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.3 
2. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.5 
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threaten the security and stability of their nation. From the 
third century A.D. to the end of the nineteenth century, Japan 's 
contact with the outside world was restricted for the most part 
to economic and cultural activity, with few attempts made to 
intervene militarily or otherwise in the affairs of its 
neighbours. On those rare occasions when Japan did attempt 
foreign military adventures, they failed. 
For most of its existence, Japan was protected from the 
vicissitudes of continental politics by the sea, by alignment 
with the prevailing dominant power, and, it was believed, by the 
help of the gods. Remarkably, neither Korea, nor East Asia's 
customarily dominant power, China, has ever attempted to invade 
their populous and prosperous neighbour across the Tsushima 
Straits. Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did the aggressively 
imperialistic European nations at the height of their power, 
although they, and the United States, imposed unequal treaties on 
Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Overall, 
Japan has enjoyed a singularly benign geopolitical environment 
for most of its history, and this makes the Japanese people 's 
belief in the uniqueness and divine protection of their island-
nation until the end of the Pacific War understandable. 
There were several obvious conclusions which the Japanese could 
draw from the recurring pattern of their nation's opening to the 
~ outside world, followed by its attempted territorial 
expansionism, and then its withdrawal into isolation, in the pre-
industrial era. These included the high probability that: 
I 
I~ 
* overseas military aggression by Japan would fail; 
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* overseas military aggression against Japan would not 
occur, and if it did, it would fail; 
* alignment with a non-intrusive dominant power would enhance 
national security but also increase the risk of entanglement in 
overseas conflicts; 
* a foreign presence on Japanese soil would challenge the 
status ~, and draw Japan into international wars in which 
it wanted no part; 
* isolation, except for carefully managed foreign trade, would 
produce stability and security; and 
* contact with the outside world would produce mixed blessings, 
with trade bringing prosperity but new technologies and ideas 
bringing baronial and popular challenges to centralised 
government and the existing political and social system 
As Japan approached the middle of the nineteenth century and 
the end of its more than two-hundred years of seclusion under the 
Tokugawas, it was a society which, given no reason to question 
the lessons of the past, had remained essentially introspective, 
defensive, homogeneous, and pre-industrial. Yet, while the 
Tokugawa may have considered the exercise a success in terms of 
keeping external threat and internal change at bay, nearly 
complete seclusion under rigid feudalism did very little to 
benefit the majority of Japanese, except to reduce the power of 
the daimyo and encourage a form of self-government to arise in 
its place in most provincial villages. For most people outside 
Edo, the two centuries of Japan's isolation meant a stable but 
bleak existence: the Japanese population, which had risen 
dramatically in pre-Tokugawa times, increased under the Tokugawa 
bakufu only from twenty-six million to thirty-three million. "The 
farmers were so well taxed and policed they exposed and abandoned 
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all infants who could not be fitted into the national budget. It 1 
However, Japan would shortly be forced to open up to the 
outside world, and contest for power in the Asia-Pacific region 
with a nation whose historical experience, and hence its values 
and practices, appeared diametrically opposed to Japan's. 
The American experience during the period which coincided in 
Japan with the latter stages of the sengoku jidai and the 
Tokugawa era was notably expansionist and, in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, marked by success in wars against 
contemporary Great Powers such as Britain and Spain. While Japan 
was turning isolationist and more intensely feudal in response to 
its third failed attempt to defeat China and Korea and perceived 
vulnerability to European expansionism, the United States was 
being born of a trans-oceanic migration from Europe, and growing 
prodigiously through the westward conquest and occupa'tion of vast 
territories, from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard. 
This expansion of America's physical horizons was matched by an 
expansion of scientific, technological and political horizons. It 
had began in Europe with the Renaissance and proceeded with the 
Reformation, a period which coincided with the advent of Japan's 
period of enforced isolation and internal political and social 
rigidity. Towards the end of Japan's era of seclusion, the United 
States was already reaping the technological and economic 
benefits of the industrial revolution, and experiencing the 
social dynamism which flowed from the attainment of national 
sovereignty and popular representative government, the industrial 
1. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, p.218 
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revolution and an unprecedented degree of mass immigration. 
By the time of the Meiji Restoration, the United States had 
weathered a civil war, emerging with a strengthened industrial 
base and a self-confident, heterogeneous society set, with 
Britain and Germany, to initiate and to exploit the second phase 
of the industrial revolution, the era of steel, oil and 
elect.rici ty. 
Even though, unlike Japan, the United States possessed within 
its own borders large quantities of the natural resources needed 
for this phase of industrialisation, it was also the era of 
American imperialism overseas, and in this, as they had done ever 
since the landing at Plymouth Rock) Americans looked westward. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. had acquired North 
Pacific territories and the Philippines, the latter conferring on 
its possessor the status of an imperial power in Asia. The goal 
of this territorial expansion was plainly hegemonic: President 
Theodore Roosevelt stated that the Pacific era, "destined to be 
the greatest of all", was at its dawn; moreover., as another 
contemporary American politician claimed, the "power that rules 
the Pacific is the power that rules the world". 1 
The United States at the same time acquired, or at least 
articulated, a moral justification for its expansionist 
behaviour. In 1850, an American journalist had written that his 
countrymen had, .. a destiny to perform, a 'manifest 
destiny' ... the haughty Japanese tramplers upon the cross [must] 
1. Roosevelt and Senator A. J. Beveridge quoted in B3.rraclough, An Introduction 
tQ ContemporarY History, p.76 
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be enlightened in the doctrines of republicanism and the ballot 
box . .. and a successor of Washington ascend the chair of universal 
empire." 1 The Americans had, as it were, picked up "the white 
man's burden", as Arthur Conan Doyle had noted when visiting the 
u.s. in 1894: "The centre of gravity of race is over here, and we 
have to readjust ourselves ... 2 
The Japanese at this time were readjusting to being part of 
international society once more. However, it was a society far 
removed from that which had existed when Japan's era of seclusion 
begun, when "few Japanese questioned the assumpt.ion that East 
Asia was coeval wit.h the civilized world". 3 And, the "centre of 
gravity of race" in that world had always been China. Yet, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, it was possible for the Russian general, 
Dragomirov, to assert that "Far Eastern affairs are decided in 
Europe,,;4 and in America, it could be added with respect to 
Japan. 
The United States demand that Japan open up to trade, 
delivered by Commodore Perry and about one quarter of the 
American navy to the Tokugawa government in Edo in 1853, was a 
1. De fuw, J . D. B, quoted in Barraclough,&l Introduction ro Contemwrary 
History, p. 102 
2. Quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction tQ CQnterru;x:>rary ~, p.75 
3. Welfield, John, An EmPire .in Eclim.e., p.2 
4 . Barr aclough, An Introduction tQ Conte~rary History, p.93 
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reflection of America's economic and territorial expansionism. 
There has long been a strong current of isolationist sentiment in 
the United States, many of whose settlers had fled the bitter 
wars, prejudices and injustices of European society. Yet, 
although the U.S . experienced strong bouts of isolationism during 
the first half of the twentieth century, it did not forgo its 
North Pacific territories such as Hawaii and Guam, nor the 
Philippines, and its isolationist periods may thus, in contrast 
to Japan's, be seen more as an exercise in post-industrial self-
sufficiency than a defence against a serious threat to its 
sovereignty. Although the U.S. has been wary of entanglement in 
major armed conflicts outside the western hemisphere, and 
accordingly entered the First and Second World Wars long after 
the other major combatants, it prevailed in both wars and emerged 
from the latter as the most militarily and economically powerful 
nation in the world. 
Commodore Perry's mission to Japan was an early indication of 
where American expansionism would ultimately lead, for it was " . 
the Pacific that the United States first trod the path to world 
power", 1 and that path would end, as it had begun, in conflict 
with Japan. The outcome of that conflict, if it should lead to 
ln 
outright war between the two nations, was also strongly indicated 
by the contrasting experience of the two nations in territorial 
expansion and international warfare up to that point, as well as 
the enormous, and more tangible, disparity in their capacity for 
industrial self-sufficiency. 
1. Barraclough, An Introduction to. CQntelllOOrary Hi.s~a, p.102 
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CHAPTER 
IGNORING THE LEGACY OF HISTORY 
Synopsis 
This period in the history of Japan, from the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 to the end of the Second World War, and in 
particular the Pacific War between Japan and the United States, 
reveals how, in its haste and determination from the mid-
nineteenth century to abandon its strict isolationism and pre-
industrial economy, Japan, in effect, went too far: it also, 
hastily and determinedly, abandoned its customary discreet 
approach to power politics and its aversion to external 
aggression. The result of Japan's modern half-century of 
graduated territorial expansion was to bring it into armed 
conflict with other Pacific powers, including, finally, the 
United States, and hence to a military defeat far more crushing 
than Paekchongang and far more costly to human life than the 
carnage of Hideyoshi's war with China. This program of empire-
building was embarked upon by Japanese militarists, despite 
consistent warnings about the folly of their ambitions from 
eminent political and military figures, including such luminaries 
as the statesman Prince Saionji Kinmochi, the Commander-in- Chief 
of the Imperial Navy, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, and Japan's 
Ambassador to Britain and later first elected postwar Prime 
Minister, Yoshida Shigeru; and despite early disillusion and 
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opposition, which was widespread and on occasion even violent, on 
the part of the ordinary people of Japan. Indeed, the economlC 
burden of dramatic military build-ups and external warfare was 
realised, and strongly and widely protested against, by the 
Japanese masses long before the advent of the final and 
disastrous phase of Japan's imperialistic aggression; such 
protests, in the streets and in the form of majority votes for 
I 
parliamentary parties with anti-fascistic platforms, continued 
even after the Japanese people were subjected to an intense and 
pervasive program of militaristic indoctrination in the 1930s. 
However, because the prewar Japanese Constitution failed to place 
sufficient power over national policy in the hands of elected 
representatives of the people; because it failed to bring about 
universal adult suffrage: and because, in particular, it failed 
to explicitly entrench control of the Army and Navy in civilian 
hands, the document failed also to prevent Japan from gradually 
adopting the militaristic, externally aggressive policies also 
adopted, to their eventual detriment, by the fascist powers of 
Europe. 
Yet, this fateful half-century was also, and more 
encouragingly, marked by further evidence of Japan's 
extraordinary capacity for the adapt ion of foreign technology, 
and for rapid economic development, the benefits of which were 
felt in a raised standard of living for ordinary Japanese, 
except, significantly, at those times when this new-found 
j national wealth was diverted to fund a series of wars abroad. 
The Meiji, Taisho and early Showa eras, coinciding with the 
I ~ last phase of territorial expansion by the old European powers, 
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thus produced two distinct and largely contradictory theories as 
to how Japan should best conduct its domestic and international 
affairs: one, was to submit the nation to military rule at home 
and military expansionism abroad; the other, was to encourage 
democracy and a more pacifist, trade-oriented foreign policy. By 
August 1945, the former theory had been discredited; since 1945, 
Japan has revived and, for the most part, abided by the latter 
theory, which is essentially a modernised version of the 
politically and militarily isolationist, but economically 
expansionary foreign policies which have been evident during 
those periods of Japanese history in which the nation has 
prospered. Chapter II of this paper therefore furnishes further 
historical evidence that Japan's current defence policy 
represents a continuance or development of beliefs and practices 
which have recurred throughout the nation's long history. In 
particular, the paper argues that the strength and persistence of 
modern Japanese pacifism is to a significant extent a product of 
this historical continuum. 
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From the Meiji era to the Taisho era: a study in contradictions 
Tokugawa Ieyasu's belief that it was in Japan's best interest 
to hold itself aloof from power politics was seemingly validated 
by the early stages of the nation's forced return to 
international society in the mid-nineteenth century. It was 
virtually powerless before Commodore Perry's cannon, and before 
those of the British fleet, which destroyed the southern Japanese 
city of Kagoshima in 1863. One year later, the Chosu forts on the 
Straits of Shimonoseki were razed by a Western fleet. No typhoon 
materialised to disperse the foreign intruders, and Japanese 
weapons technology had fallen far behind that of the West, so the 
Edo government, already weakened and facing revolt by 
discontented noblemen from southern Japan, had no choice but to 
admit defeat in the face of such Lar_~ majeure and "the full 
unequal treaty system developed in China was applied to Japan. II 1 
During those periods when it had been open to outside 
influence in the past, such as in the sixth, seventh and eighth 
centuries and in the sengoku jidai, Japan had experienced social 
and political upheaval and had exhibited unusual interest, but 
little talent, in playing power politics and attempting the 
conquest of neighbouring states. The course of Japan's history 
during the century which followed the arrival of Perry's ships 
was to follow the same pattern. Thus, initially, the shogun's 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.79 
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accession to America's demands further undermined the authority 
of the government in Edo, caused a widening of the rift between 
the Tokugawas and the court in Kyoto, and produced a civil war, 
although one which proved shorter and less destructive than the 
sengoku jidai. The result was the fall of the Tokugawa bakufu 
system and its replacement by a form of oligarchy, comprised 
largely of noblemen and samurai from the Chosu and Satsuma clans 
of southern Japan, which operated in the name of the Meiji 
Emperor, much as the Fujiwara and the various bakufu had done. 
Nevertheless, despite the ascendancy of the Chosu and Satsuma 
clique and the continued machinations of the ever-present 
Fujiwara, the young Meiji Emperor was one of the few of his kind 
who had both the opportunity and the talent to exercise real 
power during his reign. 
True to its established pattern, Japan's exposure to the 
outside world and its ensuing political perturbations in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century were accompanied by a 
burgeoning foreign trade and a thirst for foreign knowledge. 
Just as it had done in the great Taika Reforms which preceded 
Paekchongang and during the latter days of the sengoku jidai 
before Hideyoshi's assault on China, Meiji Japan now sought to 
improve its position in international society by utilising 
suitable foreign innovations, including advances in military 
technology, derived from the region's prevailing hegemonic power, 
I" 
III 
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which in the post-industrial world meant Europe. 1 The Japanese 
would thus be able to "'expel the barbarians' in the modified 
sense of achieving security from the West and political equality 
with it." 2 
This process would be the most exacting attempt at national 
transformation undertaken by Japan since its assimilation of 
Chinese culture which had begun in earnest in the sixth century. 
Yet, whereas the Sinification of Japan took several centuries, 
the process of Westernisation was to be achieved in decades. This 
in itself was sufficient to ensure some rough passages in the 
process, especially as Japan had shown a propensity to civil 
strife when exposed to novel foreign influences, and a need to 
prove at least the equal of its foreign exemplars in the game of 
power politics. The dislocation would be further accentuated 
during the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa era, because having come 
to the end of the long straight track of Tokugawa rule, Japan ' s 
leadership was now faced with choosing from a multiplicity of 
untried roads which promised to lead to potentially very 
different versions of a modern, industrialised Japan. For 
example, Japan's more ardent "Westernisers" believed the best way 
to progress would be by: 
1. One other notable parallel between the Taika Reforms, Hideyoshi's bakufu 
and the Meiji Restoration was that each introduced a program whereby the state 
assumed sole responsibility for the waging of war: in the first two instances 
by the forcible collection of weaponry, and in the third, by the more subtle 
but similarly effective expedients of making samurai subject to the same laws 
prohibiting murder and violence as all other citizens . and establising 
universal manhood conscription for a national army and navy. In all cases, the 
external aggression subsequently attempted by the Japanese state ended in 
failure. 
2. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.80 
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uprooting the nefarious influence of Chinese civilization, with 
its ... pessimistic view of war, its emphasis on stability, 
hierarchy and order in international society, and substituting 
more robust and assertive Western models in its place. This 
required abandoning Japan's deeply rooted sense of community with 
China and Korea . 
Another school of thought, not incompatible with the above, 
emphasised the desirability of Japan using Western military means 
to oust Western influence, in particular in the form of imperial 
Britain and Russia, from Asia, creating instead a Pan-Asian 
community centred on Japan~ with the divine emperor at its heart. 
The notion of incorporating "liberated" Asian states into an 
Asian confederation was one means of avoiding or ameliorating the 
daunting and discomforting task of rejecting Chinese and Korean 
values and replacing them with Western ones. As John Welfield has 
noted, this Pan-Asianist vision represented, in many respects, a 
return to the "ideals of Prince Shotoku, the sixth-century 
Buddhist aristocrat who presided over the Sinification of the 
original Japanese state." 2 
Opinion on the way in which China and Korea and other states 
were to be incorporated ranged from advocacy of armed force to 
allowing a peaceful process of unification, already perceived by 
some as underway, to run its course. The pacifist vision of 
Japan's potential as the "centre of gravity of race" also 
proposed a future role for Japan as a bridge of understanding 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.5-6 
2. Welfield, p.9 
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between East and West. 1 
The one outstanding difference between all these theories of 
how Japan might best protect itself and usurp the Western role in 
Asia, and the theories of Japan's place in international society 
which had prevailed for the best part of two thousand years was 
that never before had the Japanese seriously postulated that 
their nation, rather than China, was the centre of the East Asian 
world. Ultimately, the short-lived empire which Japan created in 
the Asia-Pacific region would include elements of Western-style 
imperialism, Japanese nationalism and Pan-Asianism. 2 
The Meiji Constitution was promulgated in 1889 as a gift of 
the Emperor to the people. It was a debatable gift, for the 
people would continue t,o be "reigned over and governed" by the 
Emperor, and the document's ambiguities would facilitate the 
eventual erosion of civil administration. These ambiguities 
enabled the Meiji Constitution to be all thing to all men. Thus, 
for those among the Japanese leadership who were genuine 
liberals, the document was "an opening wedge for their plan to 
rationalise the mystical relationship between people and Throne 
and make the Emperor as being under law." 3 For those .Japanese 
whose prime objective was to make their country an 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.10-11 
2. However, it is salutory to compere the term, "Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere", with its connotations of egalitarianism and mlmificence, 
with the rrore brutally frank "Third Empire" of Nazi Germany. Even at the 
height of its imperial JX)wer, the Japanese is land-nation seerrs to have had 
difficulty in escaping its Sinocentric heritage and accepting the proposition 
that it was no longer on the periphery of things. 
3. Pergamini, Japan's ImPerial Conspiracy, p.260 
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internationally-recognised Great Power, the document would serve 
as evidence that Japan possessed a legally binding and explicit 
social contract, which would obviate the need for foreign 
jurisdiction over foreign residents and business interests in 
Japan, and hence necessitate the renegotiation of unequal 
treaties. 
By 1894, Britain was sufficiently impressed by Japan's 
modernisation to agree to relinquish its extra-territorial 
privileges by 1899, and other nations followed its example. 1894 
was also the year in which Japan eschewed the "pessimistic view 
of war" and the legacy of past defeats by China, by sending an 
army to Korea, where it easily defeated Chinese forces, much to 
the surprise of the Western powers. 1 In 1895, the war concluded 
with China's agreeing to an independent Korea and Japan's 
acquisition of Taiwan and the tip of southern Manchuria, the 
Liaotung Peninsula. Japan was also accorded the "same unequal 
diplomatic and commercial privileges the Westerners had 
extorted. tt 2 Even at this very early stage, the idealistic Pan-
Asianist vision of a form of "Pax Japonica" was proving elusive: 
1. This was not, strictly speaking, the first engagerrent by Japanese forces 
abroad since Hideyoshi's campaigns: after the Meiji oligarcnY was dissuaded 
from launching an invasion of Korea in the 1870s, it gave approval for a 
number of unemployed samurai to fight "a few aborigines in Taiwan (Formosa) 
who :bad killed sorre Okinawan mariners II • (Reischauer, Japan, p. 146) However, 
the skirmish did not constitute a war against another state, having rrDre in 
corrunon with the exploits of the HakQ pirate-traders than the progressively 
rrore ambitious Japanese wars of expansion fought after 1994. It did, however, 
have a significant if fortuitous result for Japan: the indemnity paid by China 
to Japan for the incident unwittingly confirmed Japan's claim to sovereignty 
over the Ryukyu Islands. 
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being new entrants in the game of power politics, the 
inexperienced Japanese were closely following the example of its 
accomplished Western practitioners. 
Yet, at an even earlier stage, in the 1870s, there were 
Japanese leaders who harboured doubts that overseas aggression by 
Japan would be successful, or, if successful, worth the effort. 1 
There were those who pointed out with great prescience that a 
Japanese invasion of the East Asian mainland could result in 
Japan's exhaustion and a further increase in Western military 
power and territorial possessions in the region. After five years 
of argument, the anti-war faction triumphed, but only for a 
time. 2 
The victory over China in 1895 henceforth strengthened the 
argument of those men who saw Japan's future as a secure and 
prosperous Great Power being principally guaranteed not by trade 
and diplomacy, but by military strength and economic autonomy 
achieved by the forceful acquisition of land and resources. Thi.s 
was, of course, the prevailing view in international society in 
the late nineteenth century. And, as Richard Rosecrance has 
pointed out, it remained largely thus until recent decades, when 
weapons of mass destruction, global economic interdependence and 
the remarkable rise to prosperity of a militarily weak and 
empire-less Japan ( and Germany), have combined to mitigate what 
he has termed the "worst aspects of the Westphalian system with 
1. See: Bergamini, Japan's Iroperial Conspiracy, p. 257 
2. See: Blainey, The. Causes Qf ~., pp.59-60; and, Bergamini, Japan's Imperial 
ConspiracY, p.256 
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its emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty and a spurious 
independence". 1 Yet, it is reasonable to question the wisdom of 
those who advocated Japanese territorial expansionism at the turn 
of the century, for while they could not see into the future, 
they could look back on the past, and reflect on Japan's poor 
performance as an external aggressor and aspiring hegemonic 
power. 
Soon after Japan's victory over China, the pitfalls awaiting 
the inexpert player of late nineteenth century power politics 
became evident to the Japanese when they were forced by Russia, 
France, and Germany to surrender control of the Liaotung 
Peninsula of southern Manchuria back to China. This "lesson in 
power politics was made all the more bitter for the Japanese when 
the Russians appropriated the area for themselves three years 
later. ,,2 
In 1904-5 Japan fought Russia, again over control of Korea. 
The world was even more surprised by Japan's victory in this war 
than it had been by its victory in the war against China. In 
particular, Japan's defeat of the Czar's Baltic Fleet in the 
Straits of Tsushima was a compelling sign that Japan was becoming 
a major naval power. Even more compelling, and to the Western 
powers, more alarming was evidence that an Asian nation could 
vanquish a European one. 
Mindful of what it saw as Russia's duplicity over the Liaotung 
Peninsula, and to help ensure the outcome of the war, Japan "set 
1. Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State, p. 211 
2. Reis chauer, The Japanese, p.90 
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a new pattern for modern warfare by first crippling Russian naval 
strength in East Asia and then declaring war ... 1 
The ploy worked to the extent that Russia acknowledged Korea as 
being within Japan's sphere of influence, transferred to Japan 
its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and its railways in southern 
Manchuria, and ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of 
Sakhalin. Another expedient which held great promise was Japan's 
new alliance with Britain2 , the first ever equal alliance between 
a Western and non-Western power. It was based on the old Japanese 
principle of aligning with the stronger against the weaker and 
was specifically intended to prevent other Western powers, 
including in particular Russia, from again "ganging up" on Japan. 
However, despite its apparently sound victories over China and 
Russia, there were signs that Japan's resources would be severely 
taxed were it to attempt further expansion of its empire, and 
that the Japanese people were not in any case convinced that 
aggressive empire-building was an efficient way of advancing the 
national interest. Before the Sino-Japanese War, China had 
already been weakened by internal political disorder and the 
inroads of Western imperialism. Russia had also to cope with 
revolutionary movements during its war with Japan, which was 
moreover fought on the extreme eastern boundary of the Russian 
empire, at the end of a single-track railway several thousand 
miles long; the Russian Baltic Fleet had had to travel more than 
1. Reischauer, Japan, p.148 
2. The Anglo-Japanese Aliance was signed in 1902, lapsed in 1921 and was 
terminated two years later. 
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halfway around the world before it was set upon by the entire 
Japanese navy operating in its home waters. Despite its pre-
emptive launch of the war, and its geo-strategic advantages, a 
year-and-a-half of fighting left Japan "so exhausted that she 
welcomed the peace arranged by President Theodore Roosevelt, who 
greatly admired Japanese efficiency and pluck". 1 
Such admiration was only possible for as long as Japan was 
content to control parts of Northeast Asia far from American 
I territories and interests. Admiration for Japan's expansionist 
LN" 
Ill! 
I ~ ', 
1'1 
program on the part of the Japanese public had already waned as a 
result of the damage done to the economy by the war against 
Russia. So desperate for a settlement was the Japanese 
government that, while it gained territory, it had to accept the 
loss of an expected cash indemnity, and this so infuriated the 
public that massive riots broke out in every major Japanese city. 
The violence reached such a pitch that the government proclaimed 
martial law and the war Cabinet of General Katsura Taro had to 
resign. The new government was headed by Prince Saionji .. . [and 
being] known as an opponent of the war, he successfully soothed 
the angry people, but he also shouldered for his 
Constitutionalist party the grievous fi~ancial problems and 
unpopular austerity created by the war. 
This profound resentment on the part of the Japanese public at 
UI being falsely persuaded by mili t.arists that war was the path to 
I ~ prosperity, rather than a sure road to pointless carnage and 
~ , 
iJ 
~ 
I 
..I 
1. Reischauer, Japan, p.148 
2. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial ConspiracY, p.282 
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poverty, would find its fullest and most durable expression 
during the second half of the twentieth century in popular 
resistance to Japan's postwar military build-up. 
Opposition to expansionism was still strong among the Japanese 
populace even after Japan annexed Korea in 1910, at no cost to 
itself. Britain accepted the move as the quid ~ quQ for Japan's 
support: the Anglo-Japanese alliance also ensured that there was 
no resistance offered by any of the other Great Powers. Yet, only 
two years after such a painless example of empire building, when 
it became known that a militarist faction had engineered an 
effective coup d'etat, popular resentment at this affront to 
constitutional government and fear of an impending return to 
territorial expansionism produced a repetition of the 
disturbances which followed the Russo-Japanese peace treaty. 
Again, there were massive riots in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka, 
newspaper offices were burned, and mobs waged pitched battles 
with the police. The nation had been brought to the verge of 
civil war, when a new, popularly acceptable Cabinet was installed 
and promptly cancelled most of the expensive military expansion 
program which had been ordered by its predecessor. 1 
During the course of the crisis, an event had occurred which 
underscored the growing independence of democratic forces in the 
Japanese political system: the Constitutionalist party had voted 
not to comply with a request made in the name of the Taisho 
Emperor that it cease its opposition in the Diet to the 
militarists' new political arrangements. It is highly probable 
1. See: Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, pp.292-296 
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that, as David Bergamini has stated, "Never before in the history 
of Japan had an express imperial order been rejected outright. ,,1 
The outbreak of the First World War provided an opportunity 
for those Japanese in favour of territorial expansionism to 
satisfy their ambitions with relative ease and at no great cost 
to the nation. While the European powers fought on the other side 
of the globe between 1914 and 1918, Japan, as an ally of Britain, 
assumed control of German territories in East Asia and the North 
Pacific, and took the opportunity of exacting more concessions 
o from China, the subsequently infamous "Twenty-One Demands".L. It 
appeared at the Versailles Peace Conference as one of the 
victorious Great Powers. 
The Meiji leaders, who had set out in 1868 to create a Japan that 
would be militarily secure from the West and fully equal to it, 
had, within the very lifetimes of their more long-lived members, 
done exactly that. Few generations of political leaders anywher~ 
have proved as successful within the limits of their own goals . ' 
To a considerable extent, however, that success was fragile or 
even illusory. Japan had done very little in the war, and yet 
what little it had done proved unpopular with the Japanese 
1. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial ConspiracY, p.294 
2. This was a particularly notable example of Japan's lack of finesse when 
attempting to play power politics, and of what extensive damage to its wider 
MI and longer-term interests such an "ill-concei ved and clUITEily handled j diplomatic offensive" could do: the offensive, planned by Japan's military 
attache in Beijing and an official of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, was so 
repugnant to Chinese nat.ionalists and Americans, t.hat. after "1915 Japan never 
recovered, in the eyes of the American people, the rr:Dral prestige -- so high 
in 1905 -- that was lost at that tirre ... [henceforth, in] terrll3 of propaganda 
the Chinese, who of course often had a good case, swept the field." (Starry, A 
Illi Hist.ory Qf Modern Japan, pp.151, 123-154) 
3. Reischauer, Japan, p.150 
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public, whose analysis of the cost benefits of warfare for their 
nation was evidently more sober and, in the long term, more 
accurate than that of many of their leaders. 
Between 1915 and 1917, Britain had been pressing its Japanese 
ally to shore up the eastern front by moving troops westwards 
from Vladivostok, but because Japan could not be certain of the 
outcome of the conflict, discretion, once again, seemed the 
better part of valour. Japan also ignored repeated British 
requests for it to send troops to the western front, and instead 
sent destroyers to the Mediterranean and troops to help quell 
unrest in Singapore and protect British interests in Hong Kong 
and Shanghai. This Japanese unwillingness to involve its troops 
in other people's wars was fully in accordance with its behaviour 
since its stunning defeat at Paekchongang in the seventh century, 
and had thus far served Japan comparatively well, even if it had 
disappointed or annoyed those embattled foreign leaders who had 
hoped to elicit more substantial Japanese assistance than 
bullocks' horns. In order to help preserve its amicable relations 
with Britain, however, Japan would have been well advised to have 
moved with less speed and apparent opportunism in seizing German 
mandates and leaseholds in the Asia-Pacific region. And, to at 
least maintain the appearance of consistency in its policy on 
affording minimal assistance to allies, and to again avoid the 
appearance of opportunism, Japan should have offered only token 
participation in, or refrained altogether from, an allied 
'(I 
I ~I intervention in Siberia in 1918. 
However, after the United States joined the allies against 
I ~ 
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Germany in 1917, Japan felt more confidence in the allied cause, 
and, when America sought allied assistance in July, 1918, not to 
fight Germany but to fight Bolshevism in Siberia on behalf of the 
White Russians, the Japanese Cabinet, which was dominated by Army 
interests, agreed to dispatch thirty-thousand troops. The size of 
the Japanese contingent and the speed of its deployment, and the 
alacrity with which the Japanese Cabinet responded to this chance 
of achieving a further extension of an already strong Japanese 
military presence in and around Manchuria, surprised and 
disturbed the United States government and even sections of 
opinion in Japan's ally, Britain. 1 
Japanese troops remained in Siberia until 1922, but as an 
intended force of leverage in international politics rather than 
as a serious bulwark against Bolshevism, because the White 
Russian cause had quickly proven hopeless. Overall, the exercise 
not only failed to secure Japan's short-term objective of 
installing a White Russian regime and a lasting Japanese presence 
in Siberia, but it, and other Japanese wartime operations, also 
failed to obtain for Japan the complete equality it sought with 
the Western Great Powers at either the Versailles Conference of 
1919, or the Washington Naval Conference of 1921. The 
intervention was also detrimental to long-term Japanese 
interests, because of the hostility engendered in Japan's big 
Soviet neighbour by its championing of anti-revolutionary forces, 
the massacres of Russian civilians carried out, under orders, by 
1. Bergamini, Japan's Il'TlWrial Conspiracy, p. 305; and, Welfield, An Em.!2ir~ in 
Eclipse, p. 15 
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its troops and its four years of military rule over the eastern 
sector of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. 1 
As had happened before Paekchongang and Hideyoshi's war on 
China, those among Japan's leadership who favoured overseas 
aggression had again demonstrated their propensity to 
misjudgment. 
The intervention was highly unpopular with the Japanese 
people. Throughout August, 1918, after the decision for it was 
made: 
Japanese housewives staged riots in the major cities, burning 
warehouses in protest against the high price of rice. Soldiers 
complained that no one would come to see them off when they left 
for the front, and many of them wore civiAian clothes so that 
they would not be recognised as Army men.~ As a result of the 
popular protest, the [Army dominatedl government resigned in late 
September, and Emperor Taisho mollified the mobs by appointing in 
its place J~pan's first true party government, presided over by a 
commoner ... 
In 1905, the Japanese public had protested against what it 
deemed the meagre rewards of a costly and bloody war against 
Russia; in 1912, it had protested even more vehemently against 
the installation of a Cabinet dominated by militaristic 
1. See: Bergamini, J"apan's Imwrial Conspiracy, pp.302-305; and, Blainey, The. 
Causes Qf llar, p. 47. Blainey points out that "one of the rosary beads of U. S. 
nationalism during the Vietnam war was the belief that [the] U. S. A. had never 
lost a war. The war of intervention in Russia had been forgotten". 
Nevertheless, this does not detract from the argument put foward in this paper 
that Japan has been a singularly inept foreign aggressor, because such a loss 
for U.S. forces fighting abroad was an exception, whereas for Japanese forces 
fighting abroad, it was more often the rule. 
2. It is interesting to note that in postwar Japan, members of the Self 
llifence Force are similarly rarely seen in uniform outside SDF bases, because 
of the public's disenchantment with militarism. 
3 . Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy "' p. 304. For a pos t-W. W. I I analys is 
of the frequency of popular disturbances in Japan, their severity, and 
political and social implications, see Chapter III, pp. 80-82, of this paper. 
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interests; in 1918, it had protested once more against the cost 
of a military intervention, creating what has been described as 
the greatest social upheaval in modern Japanese history. 1 As a 
result of popular pressure, militaristic Cabinets had been forced 
out of off ice in 1912 and 1918. In 1912, the Diet had sided wi-th 
the public in opposing the militarists' coup, and its 
Constitutionalist party members had, in an unprecedented instance 
of lese-majeste, refused to comply with a direct request from the 
Emperor that they cease criticism of a planned military build up. 
It was evident that a deep division of opinion had opened 
between militaristic interests and the public and parliamentary 
parties over Japan's internal political arrangements and the 
course it should pursue to secure its sovereignty and prosperity 
in international society. From the point of view of those who 
believed the best course was to permit less democratic latitude 
internally, and to promote armed expansionism externally, the 
public and Diet would need to be taken in hand and re-educated. 
Undaunted by the lessons of history or by considerations of 
cost-effectiveness and just where empire building might 
eventually lead their nation, Japan's militarists saw victories 
over China, Russia and Germany as an encouraging sign that Japan, 
too, might aspire to fulfilling a "manifest destiny", It was also 
becoming obvious that Japan would have to fulfil that destiny on 
its own, proving beyond doubt that it was equal, indeed, 
superior, to the Western powers. For, despite Japan's prominence 
1. Sugimoto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, p.68 
50 
at Versailles, it became apparent shortly after that, when it 
came to the equality of Great Powers, some were more equal than 
ot.hers. 
The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 set the ratio of 
capital ships possessed by Japan, the United States and Britain 
at 3:5:5. American concern about Japan's territorial expansionism 
had emerged shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, and the world 
tour of Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" at that time was 
"primarily designed to impress the Japanese with the awesome 
potentialities of American power." 1 Such concern had been 
increased by Japan's seizure of German assets in the Pacific in 
1914, and its large-scale intervention in Siberia. 
While its invitation to the Washington conference in 1921 
seemed a confirmation of Japan's parity with the West, and 
agreements on China and military bases in Asia and the Pacific 
seemed to lessen friction between Japan and the U.S. and Britain, 
the lower number of capital ships allowed the Japanese navy 
offended militarist and nationalist groups in Japan. In private, 
the military strategists of both Japan and the United States were 
preparing for inevitable conflict between their two nations. 2 
Britain, too, was growing weary of its alliance with Japan, under 
which "i t had given t.oo much and got. t.oo Ii ttle in return", 3 and 
wary of Japanese territorial ambitions in the Far East. The 
alliance was terminated in 1923, the British having belatedly 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Ecli~e, p.14 
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.14-15 
3. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.15 
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realised that Japan had not been playing balance of power 
politics in East Asia, but had taken the necessary first steps 
towards the creation of an Asian empire, with Britain's 
encouragement. 
Some postwar Japanese commentators have nevertheless claimed 
that the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance made Japan's 
next phase of rapid and much more ambitious territorial 
expansionism almost inevitable. Their argument is that, while 
~ Japan felt itself protected by Britain, it was to a significant 
extent able to divert its energy and resources away from military 
programs and into the development of democratic institutions and 
a raised standard of living for all its citizens. 1 The 
combination of Japan being bereft of Great Power protection and 
the increasing hostility of the international political and 
economic environment in the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 
served, it is argued, to strengthen the hand of those misguided 
individuals who favoured the securing of Japan's national 
sovereignty by the build-up of a more powerful autonomous 
military capability and the securing of lebensraum and vital 
resources by force of arms. 2 Japan was, in effect, reacting with 
the over-compensative bravado of a frightened child suddenly 
bereft of its parents in an unfriendly world. This variation on 
1. See: Okazaki, "The Restructuring of the U. S. -Japan Alliance", pp.135 & 141 
2. According to Fujii Hiroaki, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
rr.eant that "Japanese foreign policy was in effect cut adrift from the rroorings 
that had steadied it ever since the Meiji Restoration"; see, "Japan's Foreign 
Policy in an Interde:I;endent World", p.122 
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the oyabun/kobun theme may be part of the explanation for the 
phenomenon of Japanese militarism and expansionism in the 1930s 
and 1940s. Another part, and probably the greater, was the wilful 
disregard of Japan's exhaustion at the end of its war with 
Russia, of its earlier outright failures in territorial 
expansionism and of the limitations of its current military and 
industrial capabilities. The impulse for this, as Barbara Tuchman 
has stated, came not from a patriotic desire to protect Japan, 
but "from the compelling lure of dominion, from pretensions of 
grandeur, from greed ... 1 
In Japan in the early 1920s, however, militaristic interests 
were forced to play a diminished role in national affairs because 
of the comparatively peaceful international environment and 
because this state of affairs reflected the will of the Japanese 
public and its representatives in the Diet. The economic and 
social changes of the Meiji and the Taisho eras had gradually 
produced a parliament and electorate which exercised a greater 
degree of independence and influence over national affairs than 
Japan's nineteenth century reformers had foreseen. Even the 
initially small body of male voters "proved to be far more 
politically conscious and cantankerous than expected ... 2 
The politicians in the Diet used their control over the budget 
1. Tuchrran, The. March Qf fullY, p.32. Japan's empire also foundered on its 
disregard of rising Asian nationalism, especially in China. However, Japan was 
certainly not alone in this miscalculation, which was also made, at great 
cost ., by various European powers and the United States in the postwar era. 
However, as the Japanese are themselves Asian, the failure of their leaders to 
appreciate the nationalist aspirations of their neighbours may be accounted a 
greater folly tran that of Western governments. 
2. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.91 
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to prise a share of real political power from the military, the 
court and other unelected policy makers. Ever since the Russo-
Japanese war, it had been apparent that the dramatic economic 
growth of the country would not result in a commensurate 
improvement in living standards for the majority of Japanese, if 
the government's first priority was to build up Japan's military 
power and finance its wars. In consideration of this, and of the 
violent popular protests it had caused, and given that Japan and 
, its foreign territories seemed secure in the early 19205, the 
Diet decided to cut the size of the standing army and drastically 
reduce the military share of the budget. According to Edwin 
Reischauer, this was one of several developments which "showed 
the tendency of the party governments to rely for Japan ' s 
economic security on trade with the outside world rather than on 
military expansion. ,,1 In 1925, an unprecedentedly large 
proportion of Japan's population gained considerable influence 
over national affairs by the granting of universal manhood 
suffrage. 
However, the Meiji Constitution, under which such democratic 
changes could take place, also provided for changes of a 
different and contradictory sort, for although the Diet had to 
vote both the military and civilian budgets, the Constitution 
assigned direct control of the Imperial Army and Navy to the 
Emperor. This meant that, in effect, the armed forces were 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.94 
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completely free of civilian control, 1 and this freedom would 
eventually prove useful to those militaristic elements who felt 
the surest way to commit their nation to a course of further 
territorial expansionism was to present the Cabinet, Diet and 
people of Japan with a fait accompli. 
The early Showa era: a study in conflict 
Japan's need for imported raw materials and overseas markets 
may have continued to have been satisfied, both in fact and In 
the perception of its leaders, by its existing empire and 
political, diplomatic and trading arrangements, had the Great 
Depression not intervened. However, this could have served merely 
to hasten the onset of empire-building, because Japan's foreign 
policy may indeed have already been "adrift" after the loss of 
its mooring in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and its militarists 
already seduced by "the compelling lure of dominion" by the t.ime 
commodity prices fell and the Wall Street Crash occurred. The 
latter event was both shocking and frightening, and was but one 
in a series of disasters which undermined confidence in the 
Western capitalistic and individualistic ethos. The constriction 
of world trade, the collapse of the international financial 
system and mass unemployment; the accentuation of chauvinism in 
international relations, the advent of fascism in Europe; and, 
not least, the effective freedom from civilian control of the 
1. See: Reischauer, The ,japanese, pp.92-95 
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Japanese Army in Manchuria, all no doubt contributed to Japan's 
return to military rule and expansionism. A further significant 
contribution to this, and to Japan's eventual decision to ally 
itself with Germany and Italy, was made by the consolidation of 
communist rule in Russia, the support being given to Chinese 
communists and Korean nationalists by Josef Stalin, and the 
activities of the Japanese underground left. 1 
Nevertheless, despite its previous centuries of government by 
bakufu, the lingering authoritarian and elitist elements in 
private and public life, and its victories over China and Russia, 
Japan's passage from democracy to military rule was neither 
especially swift, nor smooth, nor, unlike in Germany, the result 
of a popular mass movement. Much of the Japanese electorate and 
the parliamentary parties continued to resist the encroachment of 
militarism in the 1920s, although most Dietmen remained 
conservative enough to approve the Peace Preservation Law of 
1925, which would prove to be an important instrument of state 
repression, in particular from the early 1930s to 1945. 2 Yet, 
even during the 1930s, when Japan's education system and mass 
media were being used with increasing vigour to indoctrinate the 
Japanese people with extremely chauvinistic and militaristic 
views and ideals,3 the parliamentary parties continued to gain 
impressive electoral victories, and a new leftist vote was 
increasing. 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.17-18 
2. See: Reischauer, Japan, pp.173 & 198-199 
3. See: Reischauer, Japan, pp.199-201 
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However, this took place during a period marked not only by 
mass indoctrination, but also by rightist political 
I 
assassinations, including that of the Prime Minister by young 
Navy officers, an attempted military coup d:_e~, and the gradual 
replacement of civilians in the Cabinet by military men. Japanese 
chauvinism had been strengthened at the start of the decade by 
Japan's seizure of all Manchuria. 
In 1930, the Cabinet had forced the Navy to accept a treaty, 
J agreed to at the London Naval Conference, which extended to heavy 
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~ 
I 
II 
III 
'I 
~ 
I 
J 
~ 
cruisers the ratio of three to five with the United States and 
Britain that had been established in 1921. This was achieved only 
at the cost of almost open insubordination by the Navy. 1 The 
following year, Army commanders in Manchuria and Tokyo gave their 
tacit approval for a group of officers to stage an incident on a 
railway near Mukden, which gave the Japanese Army an excuse to 
take control of all Manchuria, and turn it into the puppet state 
of Manchukuo. When the League of Nations condemned Japan's 
action, Japan abandoned the League. The civil government in Tokyo 
had no choice but to accept the new stage of imperialism 
instituted by the Army, and to endure the mounting hostility of 
the Navy. Civil government was under mounting pressure from the 
military and civilian rightists, who feared the perceived growth 
1. It was not only the treaty provisions, but the rranner in which they were 
ratified which angered the Imperial Navy. The Emperor, the Cabinet and the 
Privy Council were persuaded to accept the treaty by an acting Navy Minister 
who was a civilian: this was considered irregular by the Navy. Moreover, 
"everyoody recognised that a blow had teen struck for the principle of cabinet 
suprerracy in a debatable field where considerations of foreign policy, 
national defence and strategy over lapped." See: Starry, A History Qf t'.hdern 
Japan, pp.178-179 
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of the communist threat, and leftists, who feared Japan's 
adoption of fascism. The ascendancy of the anti-communists was 
manifested in the signing by Japan and Germany of the anti-
Comintern Pact in 1936. 1 
The triumph of the military over Japanese political life came 
effectively in 1937, when all party collaboration in the Cabinet 
was eliminated under a prime minister who was an Army general; 
and when the Japanese Army refused to accede to Chiang Kai-Shek's 
demand that it stop its gradual extension of control over 
northern China and Mongolia. Although few people outside China or 
Japan realised it, the Second World War had begun. 
It might still have been possible for Japan to avoid outright 
war with the United States, but indications thus far were that it 
would not. Mao Tse-tung pointed out at the time that Japan's 
Chinese campaign was most likely part of a grander plan: Japan 
was set on a course aimed not just at control of East Asia, but 
of Southeast Asia as well, and as a corollary of this, at control 
of the China seas and the southern part of the Pacific. Such a 
course would inevitably bring Japan into conflict with other 
Pacific powers, including the United States. 2 
Japan, having judged that Germany and Italy were destined to 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, pp.98-100; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.16-
20. 
2. Mao's rerrarks were rep:>rted by Edgar Snow J EOO Star Over China ., London, 
1937, pp.94, 102; quoted in Barraclough, An Introduction tQ ContemporarY 
History, p.28. The US governrrent, under pressure from isolationists and the 
rrore p:>werful elerrents in the business community, and deeply worried about the 
threat of war in Euro:pe, continued to try and avoid opening a conflict in the 
Pacific: see Costello, The Pacific W~! p.61. 
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emerge from the war dominant in Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East, had according to its customary practice aligned itself with 
the perceived rising fortunes of the fascist powers under the 
Tripartite Pact of 1940. This alliance, and Japan's provocation 
of the U.S. I were to prove far more disastrous than its similar 
miscalculations of the relative strengths of other powers prior 
to the battle of Paekchongang and Hideyoshi's campaign against 
China. 
By 1941, American economic and oil sanctions had left Japan 
with three choices: to desist from further aggression in China; 
to reach a compromise settlement with the U.S. or to strike 
south and seize the oil-producing Dutch East Indies. The Japanese 
government was "unwilling to do the first and unable to achieve 
the second and therefore settled on the third choice". 1 
The Commander in Chief of the Imperial Navy. Admiral Yamamoto 
Isoroku, sought to convince his colleagues that Japan could not 
vanquish the United States and therefore should not fight the 
United States. When this view was condemned, he argued that to 
avoid disaster, Japan should cripple American naval power in the 
Pacific and seize what resource-rich territories it could swiftly 
and then, within a year, make a concerted effort to reach a 
compromise with America. This view was more acceptable to 
Yamamoto's colleagues. 2 
The attack on Pearl Harbour was to prove the most profoundly 
1. Reis chauer, The Japanese, p.101 
2. see: Costello, The Pacific ~, p.606; Craig, The Fall cl Japan, p. xxi; 
Taylor, The Second World ~, p.121 
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mistaken move in the game of power politics, and the most 
disastrous act of aggression yet undertaken by a country with a 
long and fairly satisfactory record of aloofness from power 
politics, and a short and unimpressive record of involvement in 
external aggression. It would seem as though, in its 
determination to ignore the warning inherent in the defeats of 
Paekchongang and Hideyoshi's China campaigns, the excessive and 
debilitating cost of the war with Russia and even the 
counterproductive intervention in Siberia, Japan's militaristic 
leadership had, as it were, been blinded also to the realities of 
the present. This led to the miscalculation which was not only 
disastrous, but strange: 
At a time when at least half the United States was strongly 
isolationist, the Japanese did the one thing that could have 
united the American people and motivated the whole nation for 
war ... The fact is that Japan could have seized the Indies without 
any risk of American belligerency; no attack on Dutch, British or 
French colonial territory would have brought the United States 
into the war. Attack on American lerritory was just the thing --
and the only thing -- that could. 
It may be that, once a nation has embarked on a program of 
conquest which required the level of determination and energy 
that Japan's did, it is virtually impossible to counter such 
psychological and physical momentum: discretion can no longer be 
the better part of valour. Certainly, those Japanese who 
supported the attack on Pearl Harbour were not only ignoring 
their own nation's past history and present capabilities, but 
1. Tuchman, The March of Folly, p.31 
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those of their adversary, The United States, with its unbroken 
record of success in major international wars, was highly 
unlikely to be so dismayed by the crippling of its Pacific fleet 
that it would not seek to retaliate, nor seek to contest for 
supremacy in the Pacific. The Japanese militarists' blindness is 
even more remarkable given that it was a similar action by 
Germany (the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare) which 
had brought the United States into the First World War, and which 
had brought about Germany's defeat. 
By December, 1941, when it was poised to carry out Yamamoto's 
planned attack on the United States' naval base at Pearl Harbour, 
Japan, by virtue of the militarists' incremental rejection over 
five decades of the political and strategic lessons of the past 
two-thousand years, was not being propelled forward into regional 
hegemony, but backwards into a corner. 
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CHAPTER ill 
I~ I 
REMEMBERING THE PAST 
Synopsis 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the consequences of 
Japan's eschewal of peaceful means of national advancement, and 
thereby the lessons of two-thousand years of largely non-
11" 
aggressive and beneficial relations with the outside world, which 
brought upon it the very thing it had always feared and yet had 
avoided in the past: conquest and occupation by foreign military 
tl forces. In order to render Japan incapable of again threatening 
world or regional peace, the Allied Powers, led by the United 
States, embarked on a program of dis-arming and de-militarising 
Japan. They also sought to reform Japan's political, economic and 
social institutions in such a way as the eventually enable Japan 
to re-enter international society as a democratic member of the 
I" Free World. 
The principle means of so doing was to have Japan adopt, in 
I ~ 1947, a Constitution which was intended to entrench and extend 
the liberal provisions of the Meiji Constitution, and to excise 
those provisions which explicitly or implicitly facilitated the 
JI militarisation of Japanese political life. Many Western observers 
in Japan during the early postwar period predicted the 
~ precipitate revision or rejection of the new Constitution once 
the occupation ended, and while it is true that many reforms were 
, 
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to prove ineffective, or were discarded by the occupation itself, 
the postwar Constitution has not been revised or rejected, 
I 
I~ principally because of the strong and continued resistance to any 
11"1 
I 
~. 
~ 
, 
alteration to it by the Japanese people. This is based in part on 
popular support for the "non-aggression and other constitutional 
provisions ~~, and in part on the assumption that once the 
precedent of constitutional revision had been set, further 
alterations and a possible diminution or rescission of electoral 
and other constitutionally guaranteed popular rights and freedoms 
might follow. 
The "non-aggression" provisions of Article IX have been 
circumvented to the extent that Japan now possesses what are, in 
ill effect, an Army, Navy and Air Force, but they are limited in 
ra 
111 
II 
II' j 
I 
U 
purpose and capability to the defence of Japanese territory, and 
the Japanese people have consistently opposed both internal and 
external pressure for increases in the capacity and budget of the 
Self Defence Force. The Japanese government has been constrained 
from acting too far or too openly in defiance of public opinion 
when formulating defence policy, because the Japanese people 
enjoy an unprededented level of political power under the postwar 
Constitution, and because they have long demonstrated their 
ability, when politically thwarted, to take their protest onto 
the streets, on occasion to the extent of threatening Japan with 
civil war. The Japanese postwar Constitution has overall proved 
more robust than expected, principally because a majority of the 
highly literate, historically aware and practical Japanese public 
has found it to be an efficacious means of ensuring that their 
nation's present defence and foreign policies more closely 
63 
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resemble those of the comparatively secure and prosperous semi-
isolationist periods which charaterise the greater part of 
Japanese history, rather than the short but very costly and 
ultimately disastrous periods when the nation forsook diplomacy 
and trade and adopted militarism and territorial expansion as the 
primary means of advancing the national interest. 
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Peace and the allied occupation: a study in renewal 
Japan surrendered unconditionally on August 15th, 1945. As 
Admiral Yamamoto had predicted, the Imperial Army and Navy had 
won a series of victories after the attack on Pearl Harbour, 
which, by mid-1942, had pushed the bounds of the empire south 
from Manchuria and eastern China through Southeast Asia to New 
Guinea, north to the Aleutians and west, across the Pacific, to 
beyond Wake and the Gilbert Islands. But, the Japanese Cabinet 
had underestimated or chosen to ignore the potential strength of 
the United States' war economy and its determination to destroy 
the Japanese military and its empire, as well as the efficiency 
of America's intelligence gathering, and, in particular, its 
ability to break and decipher Japanese codes. Thus, Yamamoto's 
other prediction, the Japan could not vanquish the United States , 
proved accurate. After the battle of Midway in June, 1942, 
Japanese naval forces in the Pacific were gradually pushed back 
towards Japan, and its land forces in South East Asia and New 
Guinea were either defeated or isolated. American forces had 
already captured Okinawa and were ready to invade the main 
Japanese islands when atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, principally in the expectation that a demonstration of 
this terrible new weapon would obviate the need for an invasion 
of Japan in order to secure its complete and unconditional 
surrender. The A-bombs did succeed in persuading half of the 
Japanese War Cabinet and the Emperor, who held the deciding vote, 
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that now was the time to publicly accept what had been apparent 
for some time: Japan must surrender unconditionally, or be 
destroyed. 
Less than one-hundred years had passed since Commodore Perry's 
arrival in Edo Bay. Since then, Japan's interaction with the 
outside world had, as always, produced turmoil within the 
country. In 1945, however, it was not just the existing political 
and social system that was affected, for great tracts of the 
country were in ruins: precious arable land lay fallow, factories 
were reduced to rubble and matchsticks, cities and towns had 
become wastelands, razed by explosions and firestorms, and two 
million Japanese soldiers and civilians were dead; burned, 
blasted and irradiated. 
Japan's modern march of folly had begun with its deceptively 
sound defeat of China and overly-taxing defeat of Russia at the 
turn of the century. Most significantly, the economic problems 
and the widespread popular resentment of militaristic policies 
which followed the Russian war was an omenous foretaste of what 
would happen when Japan ultimately pitted its military and 
industrial capacity against that of the United States. This was 
to be a disaster far in excess of Hideyoshi's Korean campaigns 
and even of Paekchongang. Japan's half century of overseas 
military aggression, undertaken on the pretext of protecting its 
sovereignty and establishing access to vital resources and 
markets, would succeed only in bringing about the very thing 
Japan had most feared and yet successfully avoided for more than 
a millennium: conquest and occupation by a foreign power. The 
kamikaze had turned on Japan. 
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This aggression was undertaken despite widespread and violent 
protest by the Japanese public, and warnings from some of the 
nation's most senior and well-informed public figures ever since 
the first mooted invasion of Korea in the 1870s. The greatest 
Japanese statesman of the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa period, 
Prince Saionji Kinmochi, had opposed the Siberian intervention, 
war with China, and war with the United States; a government 
leader and senior imperial adviser, Prince Konoye Fumimaro, had 
also opposed war with the United States; the Chief of the Naval 
General Staff, Admiral Nagano Osami, had expressed doubt that 
Japan could defeat the U.S.; and in 1940, the Lord Privy Seal, 
Marquis Kido Koichi, had predicted that: 
After this world war, the United States and the U.S.S.R. may 
unquestionably emerge unhurt when all other nations are 
devastated. I can imagine, therefore, that our country, which i s 
placed between these two giants, may face great hardships. 
Also in 1940, Admiral Yamamoto had with great prescience told 
Prince Saionji's political secretary, Baron Harada Kumao, 
that: 
It is my opinion that in order to fight the United States we must 
be ready to challenge the entire world ... In those evil days you 
will see Tokyo burnt to the ground at least three times. The 
result will be prolonged suffering for the people. And you and 
Konoye and the others, pitiful as it may be to cont~mplate, we 
will probably be torn limb from limb by the masses. 
1. Bergamini, Japan's Iruperial Conspiracy, p.733 
2. Bergamini, Japan's Imperial ConspiracY, p.734 
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The masses, however, did not need to tear their wartime 
, leaders apart, because the need for vengeance was to be satisfied 
~ 
by acts of seppuku on the part of various militarists and by 
allied war crimes tribunals. Instead, the masses did something 
much more constructive: they supported early postwar 
constitutional reforms intended to entrench and further develop 
the liberal political structures of the prewar era. Both the 
masses and the occupation authorities were aware that, as late as 
t 1936, the Minseito party had won a strong plurality in Diet 
,I 
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elections under the slogan, "Will it be parliamentary government 
or fascism?"l Particularly appealing to the Japanese public were 
those provisions of the postwar constitution that were 
specifically intended to prevent re-armament, re-militarisation 
and renewed external aggression by Japan, and a majority has 
continued ever since to resist pressure for a Japanese defence 
build-up) whether it has come from within Japan or from the 
United States. 2 For, by the start of the 1950s, Japan's conqueror 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, p.99. The Minseito Party, revived aftBr the war 
as the Liberal Party, later combined with the Democratic Party to form the 
Liberal Democratic Party, which has since dominated Japanese politics. 
2. roLL 
fufense system 
Appropriate Defense Efforts 
Q: ... do you think defense expenditures should be increased in order to defend 
the peace and security of Japan? Or do you think that defense expenditures are 
adequate at the present levels, or should they be lower than the present 
levels? 
Defense spendings had better be increased ............... 14.2% 
Defer~e spendings are adequate at the present levels .... 54. 1% 
Defense spendir~s may be lower that the present levels .. 17.7% 
fun ' t mow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. 0% 
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and champion of Japanese pacifism had performed a YQlte-face on 
Japanese re-armament. 
In August, 1945, however, the United States showed no 
equivocalness in establishing a constitutional framework for its 
"ultimate objectives" in regard to Japan, which were: 
(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the 
United States or to the peace and security of the world ... 
(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and 
responsible government ... 
These objectives will be achieved by the following principal 
means ... 
(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The 
authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will 
be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social 
life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and 
aggression will be vigorously suppressed. 
The principal means of achieving these objectives, and 
perpetuating them, would be Article IX of the Japanese 
Constitution, which sets forth Japan's "renunciation of war, non-
possession of war potential and rejection of the right of 
belligerency of the state". 2 
Japanese constitutional pacifism: a study in resilience 
... Continued ... 
(Public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in November 
1984: Defense Qf Japan: 1986, p.339) 
1. "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive", fulitical Reorienta-.tiQn Qf ~ 
Rerort Qf the. Government Sector J Suprerre Commander :fur the Alliesi Power~, 
II, vol. 2, Appendix A: II, see pp.423-426 
2. Defense cl Japan 1986, p.72 
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It has been observed that the manner in which their postwar 
constitution was presented to the Japanese people "parallelled 
the promulgation of the Meiji constitution in 1889. Then, as in 
1946, the constitution was presented as an act of good will on 
the part of the emperor ... 1 There were other similarities too, 
such as in the largely unchanged operations of the Diet and the 
electoral system. Even the seemingly radical and highly 
contentious definition of the Emperor as a powerless symbol of 
national unity was not entirely novel. Although it had never 
before been stated in a public document, this had, in practice, 
largely been the imperial role from the rise of the Fujiwara to 
the Meiji Restoration: the Meiji Emperor's exercise of real 
political power was the exception rather than the rule, and the 
degree to which the Showa Emperor exercised real power before 
August, 1945, remains the subject of often heated debate. 2 
But there were significant changes as well, most of them 
having the objective of transferring a much greater measure of 
real power from the hands of the nation's largely discredited 
conservative political, economic and military elite to the hands 
of the millions of ordinary Japanese people. Their widespread and 
strong outbursts of resistance to authoritarian rule in pre-
Tokugawa times, 3 their hard-headed appraisal of the cost-
1. Livingston et al. ,The. Japan Reade.r, p.17 
2. see ReiscrBuer, The. Japanese, pp.106-107 
3. See Chapter I. and Conclusion . of this paper for details regarding 
III uprisings by peasants and srrall landowners against, in particular, the 
economic burden placed on them by their local lords and the rigorous 
centralised tax system. 
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benefits of war and massive anti-militarist protests in the early 
part of the twentieth century, and their electoral support for 
incipient democracy had been recognised by the occupation 
authorities as more in keeping with, and likely to preserve, the 
customary non-interventionist and pacifist tenor of Japan's 
foreign relations. 
The mainly American drafters of Japan's postwar Constitution 
"wisely made their work not a new creation based on the American 
political system but a perfection of the British parliamentary 
form of government that the Japanese had been moving toward in 
the 1920s." 1 The Diet was assigned supreme political power, and 
all competing sources of power were eliminated or made clearly 
subordinate to it. The House of Peers was replaced by an elected 
House of Councillors, and cabinets were made responsible to the 
Diet by having the prime minister elected by the lower house. The 
Constitution also featured popular rights which existed in the 
American Constitution and others more recently formulated, 
including the enfranchisement of women and equality of the sexes. 
Whereas the Meiji Constitution emphasised duties, its successor 
stressed rights, such as the right to freedom of thought, the 
right to a good standard of living and the right to education. 2 
As is always the case with such human endeavours, not all the 
provisions of the new Constitution came to function in quite the 
way the occupation authorities had intended. Since 1946, there 
1. Reischauer, The Japanese, pp.106-107 
2. Storry, A History Qf Modern Japan, pp.250-253 
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has been "erosion" of some provisions, perhaps none more 
obviously, or controversially, than the "non-aggression" 
1"1 provis ions of Article IX. 
1"1 
I 
II' 
The Japanese Self Defence Force, comprising Ground, Maritime 
and Air arms, was created in March, 1954, in the aftermath of the 
Communist victory in China's civil war, and the stalemated war 
against Communist North Korea. In 1950, after most of the 
American ground forces in occupied Japan were dispatched to the 
Korean peninsula, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 
General Douglas MacArthur, ordered the establishment of a 
II Japanese Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men, and the 
strengthening, by 8,000 men, of the Maritime Safety Force, which 
had been established in 1948. The Police Reserve Force was 
succeeded by the National Security Force in 1952; two years 
later, it was converted into the Ground Self Defence Force, the 
Maritime Safety Force was converted into the Maritime Self 
Defence Force, and a new arm, the Air Defence Force, was created. 
The authorised number of SDF personnel under the Mid-Term Defence 
Program (1986-1990) was 272,162: however, the actual number of 
1°f 
SDF personnel has consistently fallen short of the target, and in 
the case of the Mid-Term Program, by some 10 percent. The 
authorised number is much lower than the 350,000 personnel 
1-, envisaged by John Foster Dulles in 1952. 1 
I 
A perhaps more significant figure is provided by comparing the 
IJI 
percentage of regular armed forces to men of military age in 
Japan with the percentage in several NATO and other Western 
III 
• g 1. Harries, Sheathing the. Sword, p. 213. 
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states: the Japanese percentage dropped from 1.0 in 1969-70 to 
0.9 in 1977-78; in 1977-78, the percentage was 3.2 in Britain, 
4.8 in France, and, in Japan's erstwhile Axis partners, it was 
3.8 in West Germany and 3.0 in Italy. In another u.s. Pacific 
region ally, Australia, the percentage was 2.5, and in non-
aligned Sweden, the percentage was 4.3. 1 
As employment in the Japan's civil sector affords the 
opportunity of both higher pay and higher status, and, for those 
~ at the top, more power, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Japanese who have the option seem in general to eschew a career 
in the SDF, which as a consequence has fallen short of the 
desired level, not only in quantitative, but in qualitative 
terms: 
They are not quite reduced to accepting anyone and everyone who 
applies: automatically ineligible are ex-convicts, those judged 
mentally incompetent, and members of the Japanese Communist 
Party. But they have had to make the physical requirements for 
entry less stringent than they would like. In the mid-1970s there 
was, for instance, no absolute ban on soldiers who were colour-
blind; and a consi~erable proportion of SDF members are older 
than is the ideal. 
Opinion polls conducted in Japan reveal a profound 
disenchantment with warfare, to the point of only just over half 
those polled by the Prime Minister's Office in 1984 stating that 
they were prepared to fight to defend their country: of these, 36 
percent were "rather willing" to defend Japan, and only 17.6 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.357-359 
2. Harries, Sheathing the. Sword, p.294 
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percent. were "highly willing". 1 In a poll 
conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1968, 37.0 percent of 
respondents thought the SDF should devote its attention to 
disaster relief work, 24 percent thought it should devote its 
attention to national defence, and 19 percent thought it should 
devote itself to the preservation of public order. 2 
Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has, by government 
interpretation, come to mean that Japan should possess the 
"minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise the right 
of self-defense". 3 This is, strictly speaking, an abrogation of 
"the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential, and 
rejection of right of belligerency of the state". It is not, 
however, a breach of the renunciation of aggression, the act of 
beginning a war or mounting an unprovoked attack, for Japanese 
policy remains that Japan "will initiate defensive operations 
only when she herself is attacked by a foreign power or powers" . 4 
Throughout the centuries, it has not been Japan~s possession of 
"war potent,ial" which has occasioned t,he country's military 
defeats, the suffering of millions of people in neighbouring 
countries and the devastation of Japan itself: it has been the 
combination of militaristic policies and the possession of war 
potential with a strong long-range projection capability, be it 
I~ ' 1. wfense Qf Japan: 1986, p. 340 
2. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.424 
t 3. Defense Qf Japan: 1986, p. 72 
4. Defense Qf Japan: 1986, p.72 
I 
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in the form of the ships sent to assist Koguryo, or the Pearl 
1  Harbour Strike Force, which has proven to be perilous. 
I 
IJ This is why the Japanese public reacted strongly to Prime 
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Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in Washington in 1981 that 
Japan would assume responsibility for the defence of sea-lanes up 
to 1,000 nautical miles from the home archipelago. However, 
despite this agreement in theory, Japan's power projection 
capacity remains limited, in that neither the Maritime nor Air 
Self Defence Force has an independent capability to transport and 
sustain large expeditionary forces overseas; 1 the SDF possesses 
no aircraft carriers, no powerful long-range bombers, and no 
t t · , 'I 2 s ra eglc mlSSl es. 
The potential for Japan's acquisition of such weaponry would 
be significantly augmented should militaristic elements again 
come to prominence in government. Although civilians may espouse 
militaristic policies, it has been the experience of the United 
States and Britain, and other Western democracies, that the 
. . 
removal of ultimate control over the armed forces from serving 
military officers to civilian members of government, has assisted 
in preventing the domination of national political life by 
militaristic elements, and in avoiding the precipitation of war 
by military forces acting in collusion with such elements. 
Indeed, the opposite of militarism is, according to strict 
theoretical definition, "civilian-ism" rather than pacifism, and 
1. For an analysis of SDF capabilities, see: Welfield,pp.356-357, 446 
III 2. In 1995 it will, however, te deploying its own potentially offensive and 
very effective surface-to-surface cruise missile. the SSM-l; see Chapter IV, 
pp.105-106, of this paper. 
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to a great extent this is the case in practice as well, 
I 
especially in the context of Japanese prewar politics. 
d 
, 
For eight hundred years, from the time of Minamoto Yoritomo to 
the last of the Tokugawas, Japan had been subject to direct 
military rule. One of the means by which Japan was returned, 
within the framework of the Constitution, to military rule and 
militaristic domestic and foreign policies in the 1930s was by 
t the gradual assumption of Cabinet control by military men. The 
~ 
II 
III 
, 
drafters of Japan's postwar Constitution fully appreciated this 
and sought to prevent any recurrence by stipulating in the new 
document that the prime minister and a majority of his Cabinet 
ministers must be members of the Diet, and, most significantly, 
that the premier and all ministers must be civilians. 1 This 
novel and very important interdiction has been neither legally 
abrogated or modified, nor, in practice, eroded since 1946. 
Similarly resilient has been the Constitution's severe 
curtailment of the imperial prerogative, in the name of which a 
number of militaristic or illiberal policies and practices were 
instituted in the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa era. Neither 
Emperor Hirohito, nor his successor, Akihito, has been restored 
to divine status: sovereignty still resides with the Japanese 
" 
~ people, and Japanese governments must still be popularly elected. 
~ 
l., 
1. Storry, A History Qf Modern Japan, p. 252 
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Given that the postwar Japanese constitution has lasted for 
I~ almost fifty years without amendment, it is interesting that so 
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many observers of Japanese affairs at the time of its 
promulgation predicted that it would not last long without major 
revision or even rejection. They seemed in particular to doubt 
that the Japanese people would grasp and retain the spirit of 
democracy and pacifism embodied in the constitution. 2 
1. A clear majority of Japanese have consistently expressed the view in public 
opnion surveys that the Constitution should not be revised. There have been 
studies made of the SDF's "constitutionality" and an LDP revisionist rrDverr:ent, 
headed at one stage by the forrr:er war criminal and later Prirr:e Minister Kishi 
Nobusuke, but, apart from rrDst Japanese not wanting to change Article IX rex: 
se, the biggest obtacle faced by revisionists is that this article is seen as 
a "test case for the durability of the Constitution as a whole, and too much 
else is at stake". (Harries, Sheathing the. Sword, p.290) 
The Asahi Shimbun has regularly conducted polls on arr:endrr:ent of Article IX: 
Should Arr:end (%) Should Not (%) 
1969 
1978 
1981 
19.0 
15.0 
24.0 
64.0 
71. 0 
61. 0 
(1969: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.421 
1978: Asahi Shimbun, 1. 11. 78 
1981: Asabi Shimbun, 25.3.81) 
2. The evidence is, however, that they did grasp what was at stake in the 
Constitution, in so far as rejectir~ or revising it could lead to a return to 
militarism: "loss of liberty" was the rrDst cornrron response as to the impact of 
such an eventuality; it was followed by "conscription" and "danger of war". 
roLL 
What would be the impact of a revival of militarism on your life? 
Austerity ........ ................. 16 
Loss of liberty ................... 38 
Peaceful coexistence impossible ... 15 
Inflation .......................... 7 
Conscription ...................... 32 
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Accordingly, T.A. Bisson noted that there "is no background 
of a popular struggle to limit monarchical power" in Japan, and 
that the "'democratization' of the emperor bids fair to make him 
an even greater symbol of Japanese nationalism than ever 
before". 1 Yet, Bisson's opinion does not take into account the 
fact that monarchical power in Japan had been severely limited 
since before the time of Minamoto Yoritomo. Under the bakufu 
system, and in particular during the Tokugawa period, the 
majority of emperors disposed of no political or military power, 
and frequently suffered economic hardships and social 
indignities: the imperial lot under military rule was more akin 
to the lot of the common folk of Japan than to that of a shogun 
or daimyo. Furthermore, it was a shogun, Hideyoshi, who launched 
the unsuccessful wars against China in the sixteenth century, and 
a samurai oligarchy, the Army in Manchuria and a coterie of 
presumptuous militarists in Tokyo which could be held responsible 
for Japan's most recent, ultimately ruinous military adventures. 
2 This may assist in explaining how a majority of Japanese have 
... Continued ... 
Danger of war ..................... 31 
Good for business .................. 3 
Other answers ...................... 1 
No effects ......................... 3 
No answers ......................... 7 
CAsahiShimbun poll of January, 1972; see: Welfield, kn EmPi;n~ in Kclime, 
p.428) 
1. Bisson, Prospects fQr Derrpcracy in Japan: on the constitution and retention 
of the emperor .1 see pp. 20-25 
III 2. Debate continues over Hirohito's "guilty" or "innocent" role in W. W. II: in 
1946, when the constitution was promulgated. SCAP's decision not to try the 
emperor as a war crirtinal was understandably construed by Japanese as evidence 
of his innocence. 
I 
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coped with the apparent contradictions of maintaining their 
emperor system and their "Western" Constitution, as well as their 
opposition to Japan's rearmament and remilitarisation. 
John Maki , writing in late 1947, stated that "there are few 
good officials in the occupation who can ride themselves of the 
feeling that much of what they now hope will be permanent in the 
reform of Japan may vanish as soon as the occupation ends ... 1 
Similarly, Mark Gayn asserted: "What is ~lrong - disastrously 
wrong - is that this constitution does not come from the Japanese 
grass roots ... And nothing in the constitution is more wrong than 
General MacArthur's own provision for the renunciation of war." 2 
Yet, it has been claimed that although this provision accorded 
well with the aims of the occupation, it was not proposed 
initially by MacArthur but by the then Japanese Prime Minister, 
Shidehara Kijuro. 3 
Since the seventh century, every attempt by the Japanese 
1. Maki, "The Role of the Bureaucracy in Japan", Pacific Affairs, XX: 4, p. 400 
2. Gayn, Japan DiarY: on drafting the constitution, see pp.125-131 
3. see: Storry.1 A History of Modern Japan, pp.251-252. Although Baron 
Shidehara was a rrember of the conservative elite .1 he was IT.Dre aware of the 
strong pacifist and isolationist traditions of Japan than many of the Western 
observers in Japan at the tirre, and appeared in a comrrBnt to MacArthur to 
appreciate that the Japanese people would wish to retain the "non-aggression" 
provision of the corffititution; he also appeared to assume at least shared 
responsibility for it with SCAP: see, Manchester, American Caesar, p.695 
However, there is no direct evidence to support this contention and sorre well-
inforrr:ed people, including Shidehara' s son, have denied it " claiming his 
father was a "realistic idealist" who had no patience with "illusory 
idealism"; see: Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p. 215. One obvious reason why no 
Japerlese politician would want to be associated with Article IX is that it 
would alienate him from the remaining militaristic or chauvinistic elerrents in 
the political, bureaucratic and business community; it would be far rr.ore 
expedient to attribute Article IX to SCAP or the IT.Dre vague and ever 
serviceable gaiatsu . 
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state at overseas military aggression had ultimately resulted in 
defeat, and in the case of its most recent and most audacious 
attempt, in progressively more ambitious stages from 1894 to 
1945, the defeat had been proportionately the most catastrophic. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that over the centuries, the 
Japanese people would have acquired a fairly strong aversion to 
warfare and its practitioners. This aversion would be reinforced 
by the fact that Japan, unlike most other nations, had never been 
subjected to attempted invasion by its nearest and, at various 
times, more powerful neighbours; and by the observation that the 
only occasion on which Japan's "divine protection" had failed and 
the nation been conquered by a foreign power, was at the 
conclusion of a half-century marked by Japanese involvement in 
foreign conflicts, the last of which was precipitated by Admiral 
Yamamoto's assault on Pearl Harbour. 
That a majority of Japanese are opposed to their nation's 
again resorting to militarism and foreign aggression is not only 
important to Japanese politicians because they must be elected, 
but because, over the centuries, the Japanese masses have 
frequently revolted against unpopular government policies, 
especially those affecting their economic wellbeing and the 
waging of war. 
Sugimoto Yoshio has presented evidence that in the first 
decade of the Meiji Restoration, there were many more incidents 
of public disturbance in Japan than in France and Germany during 
approximately the same period. The recorded incidents in Japan, 
between 1868 and 1877 , comprised 449 peasant uprisings (hyakushQ 
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ikki) and 24 urban mass disturbances CtQS.hi. sojo), a total of 523 
cases in which Japanese protested "against the power 
~~1 establishment, of the time." 1 
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The scale of the rioting precipitated by the economic 
consequences of Japan's intervention in Siberia in 1918 is 
especially noteworthy: 
• 
The immediate condition that precipitated this turmoil was the 
sharp upswing of food prices, especially rice prices. The series 
of incidents which followed began in a town in Toyama Prefecture, 
with the wives of fishermen forming a picket line to obstruct the 
shipment of rice to other areas. They attributed the skyrock~ting 
rice prices to the scarcity of rice in their own prefecture. 
Riots spread across the country, with some 570 cases of disorder 
being recorded between July 23rd and October 15th, 1918. The 
riots involved fort.y-two prefectures, leaving only five" intact". 
Among the incidents, there "is clear evidence of human injury or 
propert.y damage for 248 cases", and during t.he turmoil: 
the police forces were temporarily paralyzed and the army was 
mobilized in seventy locations. Riots involving military 
intervention numbered thirty-three in cities, twenty-three in 
towns, and fourteen in villages ... There is strong evidence, then, 
to suggest that the notion of Japan as a cohesive and tightly 
knit society based on a singular value system requires 
reassessment ... macro-studies hav§ often confused governmental 
stability with mass contentment.' 
The import of this is clearly that, when politically 
frustrated, the Japanese people were capable of attempting to 
1. Sugimto, Popular Disturbance in Pos±JAlar Japan. PP. 67 -68 
2. Sugimto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, p. 68 
"') 
0. Sugimto, Popular Disturbance in Postwar Japan, pp.68-69 
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take matters into their own hands, including by violence. The 
postwar Constitution, however, put matters in the hands of the 
people to an unprecedented degree, and in this, it was probably 
more reflective of "grass root" aspirations of the Japanese than 
was realised by American commentators on the occupation reforms. 
In consideration of their postwar political power, and their 
capacity, when thwarted, to riot, it is not surprising that, as a 
majority of Japanese have consistently indicated a lack of "mass 
contentment" with erosions of Article IX of that document, their 
elected representatives have found in such opposition a good 
reason to be slow and cautious in their approach to rearmament, 
increasing Japan's defence capability and in clarifying the 
military implications of Japan's alliance with the United States. 
It was certainly the case that most Japanese were eager to 
participate in the new postwar political system by exercising 
their right to vote a year before the new Constitution had even 
came into effect: in April, 1946, three out of four Japanese 
entitled to vote, did so, including for the first time fourteen 
million women. The result, although it featured a strong 
performance by independents (20.4 percent), minor parties (14.9 
percent) and the Socialists (9.1 percent), who almost doubled 
their 1937 vote, nevertheless provided an early sign of the 
conservatives' domination of postwar Japanese politics. Even 
though their numbers had been reduced by a purge of members of 
the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Liberals and 
Progressives (later re-named Democrats) obtained 43 percent of 
the vote. The Socialists were able to form a shaky coalition 
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government after the lower house elections of 1947, but by the 
time the occupation ended, the Liberals had obtained the first 
one-party majority under the new constitution, and the pattern of 
conservative ascendancy in the postwar Diet was established. 1 
That the Japanese people could accept many radical changes in 
their political, social and economic life, and yet maintain a 
preference for conservative leadership, may be explained by 
observing that this remainder from pre-occupation days may have 
provided a necessary symbol of continuity amid such dramatic 
change. The leftist parties had, in any case, been discredited in 
government by their inability to settle their differences, and 
the communists, in particular, lost support "in the eyes of the 
public during the summer of 1949 by several acts of violence 
generally attributed to them. Ever since the war, the Japanese 
public has reacted sharply against any violence that took human 
lives. ,,2 
Moreover, while Yoshida Shigeru, the man who led Japan's 
earliest postwar conservative governments, was a member of 
Japan's prewar elite, and deeply conservative and anti-communist, 
he was not a militarist, nor had he ever been one. He 
consistently condemned the Pacific War as an "unwinnable blunder" 
and the military leaders as "dangerous socialist radicals"; and 
he demonstrated "a significant feature of Japanese politics [this 
being] that one did not have to be a liberal to oppose the 
1. Manchester, Arrerican Caesar. p. 502; and, Reischauer, Jamn, pp. 264-268 
2. Reischauer. Japan, pp.268-269 
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militarists". 1 Yoshida's premiership undoubtedly made the return 
1 of conservative rule palatable for many Japanese, because under 
~ his guidance it did not threaten a return to militarism. 
The points made above, that Yoshida was anti-militarist but no 
liberal, and that he saw the militarists as "radicals", are 
extremely significant. They support the contention of this paper 
that resistance on the part of a majority of Japanese to an 
augmented postwar Japanese defence effort and increases in the 
defence budget are not just a reaction to the defeat and horrors 
of the Pacific War, but are a continuation of a much older, 
I 
I ~; 
I 
traditional view of Japan's proper place and role in the world. 
Central to this view is the notion that to commit Japan to 
involvement in foreign wars is to commit an "unwinnable blunder" . 
When, under the subsequent leadership of Kishi Nobusuke, the 
LDP Cabinet attempted to have the Diet pass legislation, the 
"Police Duties Perfomance Law", which was intended to expand 
police power, there was widespread concern, including among LDP 
members, that the new bill might herald a return of prewar 
"thought control" and "police suppression", and pave the way for 
a more aggressive military alliance with the U.S. , constitutional 
revision and, eventually, overseas service for Japanese troops. 
" This alarming prospect succeeded in rousing the Opposition 
~I parties, trade unions, the mass media, and "an impress i ve array 
I 
of citizens groups" to a determined resistance to the proposed 
'I 
legislation: throuhgout "October and November 1958 the Diet was 
paralysed, the country torn by strife and emonstrations" , and the 
III 
1. Harries, Sheathing The Sword , xxviii- xxix 
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Police Bill was, as a result, dropped. 1 
Another reason the conservative Liberal Democratic Party has 
enjoyed fairly consistent success at the polls, has been its 
having presided over the economic growth of Japan, which has seen 
the nation rise to the position of the world's second largest 
economy, and which has brought the Japanese an unprecedentedly 
high standard of living and their country an unprecedentedly high 
status in the society of nations. Economic growth has been 
largely fuelled by foreign trade, which has been a prime source 
of increased prosperity for Japanese since Japan's early 
associations with the T'ang, Sung and Ming dynasties and the 
rewarding exploits of its trader-pirates before the Tokugawa 
bakufu cut Japan off from the outside world. While it may be true 
that the more than two centuries of isolation which followed 
created an era of relative peace and stability and cultural 
integrity, it left the nation seriously disadvantaged when 
confronted with the scientific, technological and industrial 
developments of the West: indeed, having no advanced military 
technology, Japan was effectively helpless. 
It was the consequent rush to reach industrial parity with the 
West that, together with Japan's uncharacteristic subscription to 
the prevailing doctrine of territorial expansionism, eventually 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 152-153. For further details on popular 
opposition to the Police Bill, see Chapter IV, p.109, of this paper. 
Pacifism, and rrore particularly. concern aoout the Japan-U.S. security 
treaty ., is, to varying extents, a component of the platforms of all major 
Opposi tion parties, including the Socialists ., the Ierrocratic Socialists, the 
Communists and Korrei to, the par liarrentary party of the ten-million rrember 
Buddhist organisation, Soka Gakkai. See: Harries, Sheattung the SFQr~, p.286-
292; and, Reischauer. The Japanese, pp. 312-313 
85 
. 
11 
I~ 
'" 
11 
I 
II~ 
:1 
11 
1 
saw Japanese troops fighting overseas for the first time since 
Hideyoshi's abortive assault on China. Postwar Japanese, mindful 
of the wealth and technological prowess developed by their 
country under LDP rule., without resort to foreign aggression, 
have overall seen no reason to possibly risk their prosperity by 
removing it from office, despite evidence of widespread 
corruption. The LDP in its turn is mindful of the expectations of 
continued prosperity on the part of voters, and the importance of 
satisfying those expectations in order to retain power was 
demonstrated by the LDP's loss of its majority through upper 
house elections in 1989, principally because of popular 
dissatisfaction with a new 3 percent consumption tax and the 
level of corruption among party leaders. 
Japanese voters are also well aware that their nation's 
economic success has been due in large measure to its 
proportionately small defence budget. 1 Related to this, is the 
o 
realisation that being divested of militarism G and an empire has 
helped, rather than hindered Japan's economic growth: 
One of the differences between successful and unsuccessful growth 
seems to lie in countries' assumptions about the feasibility of 
economic self-sufficiency. Cartels flourish where autarchy 
appears attainable. In such conditions coalitions do not have to 
worry about being challenged by a wide international market or 
foreign competitors. If countries must export to live because 
they are too small to be self-sufficient, narrow special interest 
groups are an expensive luxury. As one observer remarks: 
1. see Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State, pp. 130,172-176 
II, 2. See: Asahi Shimbun Poll, Note 1, page 77, this paper. The p::>ll found that a 
revivial of militarism would not be advantageous for either business or 
individual prosperity. See also: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.419,428. 
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"Postwar Germany, Italy and Japan succeed economically not 
because of totalitarian episodes or foreign occupation, or 
integration into a larger unit but because losses of territory or 
empire, or the hope of empire left them with factor endowments 
that indisputably forced them to trade. ,,1 
The postwar Japanese constitution has confounded many 
predictions at the time of its promulgation by surviving intact 
for the best part of half a century. It has not, however, 
survived untouched by politically expedient "interpretation" or a 
considerable degree of circumvention, especially in relation to 
its renunciation of aggression and the sovereign right to possess 
war pot.ential. 
Yet, overall, Japan's currently "defensive" defence policy and 
capability, and its greater dependence for security and 
prosperity on trade and the economic and strategic benefits of 
foreign aid and investment, has more in common with the non-
interventionary strategies of the millennium that followed 
Paekchongang and the two centuries of the isolationist Tokugawa 
bakufu than it has with Hideyoshi's short- lived plans for 
regional dominance and the increasingly grandiose schemes of 
Japanese militarists during the half century after 1894. 
1. Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State, pp.175-176 
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CHAPTER IY 
THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE: A LEGACY OF DIFFERENT HISTORIES 
Synopsis 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Japan's 
security treaty with the United States evokes contradictory 
responses among Japanese, the relative strength of these being 
influenced by such external factors as the perceived capability 
of the U.S. to come to the aid of Japan should it be attacked; 
I the level of threat posed by the Soviet Union; and the extent to 
III 
which American bases in Japan are seen to increase or diminish 
the likelihood of an armed assault on Japan or more general 
warfare in the Asia-Pacific region. The record of Japanese 
history lends weight to the view that Japan will not be attacked 
if it abstains from provocative action, or if it is under the 
protection of a hegemonic power which respects Japanese 
sovereignty and does not risk attracting an attack on Japan by 
maintaining a significant military presence in Japanese 
territory, such as was the case with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Of great concern to those Japanese who see the treaty with 
America as a military alliance, rather than an agreement by which 
the U.S. is able to maintain a trans-oceanic forward deployment of 
troops and equipment, is that it could involve Japan in conflicts 
in which it wants no part. Although more than a millennium has 
passed since the crushing defeat of forces from Japan and its 
ally, Koguryo, a large majority of the Japanese public, and the 
Self Defence Force personnel, remain wary of being prevailed upon 
by an ally to commit Japanese armed forces to a foreign war. This 
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has resulted in the contradiction of Japan supporting United 
Nations peace-keeping operations while resisting the commitment 
[ ~ l of troops to assist such operations. The argument that the 
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American alliance could result in Japan's direct or indirect 
involvement in foreign military operations contrary to its 
perceived best interests was lent credibility by what Japanese 
critics saw as intervention by U.S. forces based in Japan in 
China's internal affairs in 1950. 
The Japanese government and people and, in recent years, U.S. 
administrations, have supported an alternative means of 
maintaining Japan's security, prosperity and stability by a 
program known as "Comprehensive Security". This attempts to 
compensate for Japan's lack of military power by utilising its 
great economic power to prevent, rather than combat, threats to 
Japanese and wider Western interests by fostering economic 
development and political stability in less wealthy and 
industrially advanced nations, in particular those which contain 
vital resources or which lie in, or adjacent to, strategically 
important parts of the world, including readily obstructed 
portions of sea lanes of communication. This approach to the 
advancement of Japan's national interest represents a return to 
the mainly non-aggressive, trade-dominated and mutually 
beneficial relations Japan enjoyed in past centuries with the 
rest of the (then) known world, comprising Korea and China and 
other Asian states, and during which it was in the main exempt 
from foreign threats to its security, and did not succumb to 
foreign conquest. 
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The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: a study in misunderstanding 
The postwar Japanese constitution and Japan's subsequent 
alliance with the United States were to be the cornerstones of 
its postwar defence policy. They were created, however, under 
very different conditions. By 1952, when the alliance came into 
effect, the United States was no longer the only nuclear power in 
the world, for the Soviet Union had demonstrated its first atomic 
device in 1949 and the W.W. II partnership between the two 
"s uperpowers" had degenerated into the Co ld War. The U. S. had " 
moreover, "lost" China to communism and was intent on fighting 
communist troops in Korea and communist sympathisers at home, 
through the activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It had become 
important to America to preserve Japan as a member of the "free 
world" and as a secure base for the forward deployment of 
American forces in Asia. 
Within Japan, this accentuated tensions which had been 
building between those Japanese attempting to exercise some of 
their revived or new political freedoms. such as the right to 
withdraw labour, and the occupation authorities who, as early as 
1947, had stopped a proposed general strike and who, a year 
later, prohibited strikes by public servants. By 1949, the 
occupation was generally more tolerant of rightist than leftist 
elements in Japan, and inclined to acquiesce in behaviour which, 
~ strictly speaking, was in contravention of the rights and 
~ liberties enshrined in the postwar Constitution. An example of 
I , 
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this was the so-called "Red Purge" of leftist activists from the 
payrolls of Japanese industries~ under the pretext of compliance 
with a government program of severe fiscal austerity. 1 It was 
becoming rapidly evident that the strengthening and development 
of de mocracy in Japan and the continuation of what was, in 
effect, foreign military rule were inimical to each other. 
This is the central problem of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
from the perspective of its Japanese critics, because it places 
l American armed forces in Japanese territory, and this is seen as 
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perpetuating a form of da facto foreign military occupation of 
Japan. 2 The bases are also seen as increasing the risk of attack 
on Japan by a country hostile to the U.S., and, because of the 
increasing level of cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces, 
such as joint military exercises, and improvements to the inter-
operability of SDF and American weaponry, there is also a 
perceived risk of Japan being drawn into a conflict even if the 
Japanese government decided against such involvement. 3 In 
consideration of such fears, it is understandable that: 
An Asahi Shimbun survey of 27 September 1971 found 30 per cent of 
1. See: Reischauer, Japan, p.235; and, Storry, A His..tQry cl Mo...dern J.a,ren, 
p.255 
2. See: Article VI.. "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan 
and the United States of America" (1960), The Defense Qf Jaren~ 1986, p.263 
3. See: "Guidelines for Japan-U. S. Defense Cooperation" (1978), The. ~nc.e Qf 
Japan: 1986, pp.264-269. For details of joint defence planning, military 
r~oeuvres, persormel training, logistics, co~micationsJ intelligence joint 
weapons production and Japanese participation in the Strategic Defence 
Initiative, see: United States Department of Defense Press Statements, of 
24.10.86 and :30.3.89; and The. Defense Qf Japan: 1989 (SumrTLqry) , pp.41 and 54-
56 
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respondents declaring that the alliance made a positive 
contribution to the security of Japan and the peace of Asia, 33 
per cent asserting that it was a dangerous arrangement, 
increasing international tensions and the risk of involvement in 
war ... A Newsweek survey published on 11 July 1983 found 52 
percent of Japanese respondents declaring that a strong American 
military presence around the world increased the chances of war. 
Only 27 per cent thought that the stationing of United States 
forces abroad enhanced the prospects for peace ... Popular Japanese 
suspicions of the United States ... were considerabl1 deeper than those to be found in Washington's European allies. 
Unlike Japan, Washington's continental European allies are all 
nations well used to the marching of foreign armies across their 
soil, and the marching of their armies across the soil of others. 
Britain, although not successfully invaded since 1066, had 
enjoyed one of the most prolonged periods of successful empire-
building, and one of the largest empires, the world has seen. 
European powers, and especially Britain, are also well used to 
alliances formed to ensure a regional balance of power, and have 
long subscribed to the concept and practice of collective 
defence. 2 
Prior to the Second World War, Japan's concept of the best 
form of bilateral security arrangements was to be found in the 
early twentieth century Anglo-Japanese alliance; and the worst , 
in its seventh century alignment with Koguryo. In the first 
instance, Japan was obliged only to reach naval parity with 
Russia, and was otherwise left alone to pursue its domestic 
affairs and external territorial expansion under British 
protection: Britain's repeated requests for Japan to dispatch 
1. Welfield, &l EmPire in Eclips~J p.415 
2. For a fairly comprehensive catalogUe and analysis of European balances of 
power . see: Wight, Power Politics, pp.168-185 
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Army divisions to the western front in the First World War were 
ignored by the Japanese Government. 1 In the second instance, 
Japan dispatched a large force to assist its ally against the 
T'ang and Silla, and was crushingly defeated. 
The 1940 Tripartite Pact represented a similarly damaging 
miscalculation, for although the pact did not involve Japan in 
any conflicts against its will on behalf of its allies, this 
alignment with what they perceived to be the globally ascendant 
fascist powers afforded Japanese militarists a sense of security 
and of destiny, in the absence of which they may have behaved 
with greater prudence, particularly in respect of the United 
States. 2 The alliance with Germany and Italy could thus be seen 
as the instrument whereby Japan brought upon itself the conquest 
and occupation by a foreign power which it had until then avoided 
with singular success for almost two millennia. 
The furore occasioned in 1981 by Prime Minister Suzuki's use 
of the term "alliance" to describe Japan's security arrangements 
with the U.S. is therefore explicable in terms of the long-
established Japanese view that military pacts may encourage or 
require the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad, to fight in wars 
in which Japan wants no part, and in which its ally might in any 
case be defeated. Japan's record of failure as a foreign 
1. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse. pp. 12-13; and Okazaki, "The 
Restructuring of the U. S. -Japan Alliance", p. 141. Bergamini describes the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance thus: "For her pittance of co-operation Japan expected 
a mountain of reciprocity" . Japan's Irm,:>erial ConspiracY., p. 298 
2. As Tsucruyama points out, Japan's preferred form of alliance is one whic h 
affords protection by compensating for "the perceived weakness of the 
[Japanese] state"; see, "Why Japan Enters Into Alliances", p.5 
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aggressor underlies this fear. Nor is opposition to the 
deployment abroad of Japanese defence personnel limited to 
civilians, for a study undertaken in 1965 revealed that of 
eighty-eight SDF and Defence Academy members whose opinions were 
sought on a range of political and strategic issues, only two 
hoped II for overseas service as part. of the Free Wor ld" . 1 
The view that Japan's security would be enhanced by the removal 
from its territory of armed forces which have a powerful forward 
deployment capability and long-range weapons systems (such as the 
u.s. 7th Fleet and strategic missiles), is based on the premise 
that Japan would not be subjected to attack unless its own, or 
allied troops based on its soil, precipitated that attack. As 
Japan has only once been subjected to attempted invasion without 
having initiated hostilities 2 , and as this attempt (by the 
Mongols) failed, this point of view is not unreasonable. 3 
That the presence on Japanese soil of foreign agents and 
1. The study was undertaken by the Japanese military critic, Yoshiwara 
Koicruro, and involved Defence Force personnel from the elite First Airborne 
Group, the Eighth Guards Unit, the Defence Agency and students at the National 
Defence Aacademy. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.388. 
2. It should be noted howeveI' that prior to the invasion, the Japerlese 
"militarists" of the day, the warriors of Karrakura, beheaded sorre of the 
Khan's errussaries, thereby markedly increasing the likelihood of war with a 
more powerful adversary -- a gamble not unlike the assault on Pearl Harbour, 
but with a more fortuitously beneficial result. 
3. A Mainishi Shimbun poll of 3. 5. 72 found that a total of 47 percent of 
respondents believed an external attack on Japan was UYilikely or totally 
impossible, arid exactly the sarre percentage believed an attack was possible or 
likely. See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp. 417-418 
A Yomiuri Shimbun poll of 17.4.78 fOUYld that in response to any Arrerican 
pull-out of troops from South Korea and force reductions elsewhere in Asia, 
31% of Japanese respondents said Japan should strengthen its autonorrous 
defence system; 22.3% said it should not; and 46.6% were undecided or had no 
response. See: Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.429 
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property might in a number of ways precipitate an attack on Japan 
had been evident to both Hideyoshi and Ieyasu and later 
Tokugawas: such an attack did occur in 1863, when the murder of 
an Englishman by Satsuma samuraL resulted in the retaliatory 
bombardment of Kagoshima by a British fleet. The initial 
helplessness of Japan in the face of nineteenth century Western 
military power, and the humiliating unequal treaties imposed on 
it by that power J have disquieting resonances for many Japanese 
of the late twentieth century, who consider the presence of 
American military bases inside their supposedly sovereign and 
customarily isolationist nation a very high, if not excessive 
price to pay for putative U.S. protection. 
Only 21.2 percent of Japanese questioned by the Yomiuri Shimbun 
in April 1978 thought that the United States would really come to 
Japan's assistance in time of crisis. Some 38 per cent, including 
34 per cent of Conservative vote1s, declared that the United States could not be relied upon. 
The value placed by Japanese on their security treaty with the 
United States tends to reflect their disposition to alignment 
with a clearly hegemonic power, in the absence of which autonomy 
is preferable. 2 This was the course adopted by Nobunaga, 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.415 
2. According to Tsuchiyama, the Japanese disposition to being most comfortable 
when it is, in effect, playing a subsidiary role in an alliance seenE to be a 
reflection of Japan's geographic location near China, for "its surrounding 
areas were colored by Sinocentrism and the assumption of Chinese superiori ty" . 
During the tirre when Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912) power and influence was at its 
height, this Sinocentrism was formalised into an East Asian tribute system 
that included Korea, Vietnam, the Rvukyus and Japan, and their suzurain, 
China; see: ~ Ja:oon Enters Into Alliances, pp. 6-7. 
There are numerous exarr~les of former dominant powers (as Japan was briefly 
95 
Hideyoshi and Ieyasu. Alignment with states whose dominance is 
less certain, such as Koguryo or the Axis powers, has proven 
detrimental to Japanese interests: in these cases, discretion 
should have been the better part of valour. In accordance with 
such observations, Japanese support for the security treaty with 
America waned during the Carter administration, which initially 
favoured decreased defence spending and a U.S. troop withdrawal 
from South Korea, and increased during the early years of the 
Reagan administration, which favoured a strong military build- up 
by the U.S. in response to the Soviet build- up and its invasion of 
Afghanistan. Popular support for the treaty and the SDF reached a 
postwar high point after the Soviet Air Force shot down a South 
Korean civilian jumbo jet which had entered restricted Soviet air 
space: the jet was downed in what the Japanese consider their 
territory, between Hokkaido and the disputed southern part of 
Sakhalin, and Japanese nationals were among the 269 people on 
board who were killed. 1 
... Continued ... 
during the first year of the Pacific war) which have settled into a dependence 
up:)n their supplanters, as Japan has up:)n the United States; see: Wight, fuwer 
Politics, p. 127. Japanese dependency is not ., rer. ~, unique , although the 
marked and prolonged asymmetry between Japan's military weakness and economic 
strength ~ a ~ its American supplanter probably is. 
1. In 1945, the USSR took control of what had been Japanese territory on 
Sakhalin island, northwest of Hokkaido, and in the Kuril island chain, which 
forms the eastern ooundary of the Sea of Okhotsk, north of Hokkaido. Japan has 
not relinquished its claim to the islands, which are considered to be of 
strategic importance to the USSR. 
IDIJS 
Necessity of SDF 
Q: Do you think Japan needs or does not need the SDF? 
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The Japanese public and politic al leaders do not always share 
the same threat perceptions as Americans, nor do they always 
agree on how to counter those threats. There is, however, a 
convergence of opinion on the Soviet Union. Opinion polls reveal 
that Japanese consider the U.S.S.R. as posing the greatest 
external threat to their nation, although this perception is 
not based upon the same considerations as those which underlie 
American concern about the U.S.S.R. 1 The United States and t he 
Soviet Union have spent the best part of the postwar era 
... Continued ... 
It's better to have SDF ....... 82.6% 
It's better not to t~ve SDF .... 7.5% 
fun't know ............... . ..... 9.9% 
fufense System 
Q: ... Japan has concluded a security treaty with the U.S. Do you think the 
Japan-U.S. security treaty is conducive or not conducive to the peace and 
security of Japan? Indicate you answer from the items listed below. 
It is useful ............. . .... 33.9% 
It is rroderately useful ....... 37.5% 
It is not particularly useful .. 6.5% 
It is not useful .... . .......... 3.9% 
Don't krlOW .................... 18.2% 
(Public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in November 
1984. Source: Defense Qf Japan: 1986, p.338) 
1. See: Jiji Press .! Public Opinion Polls Qf Ji,ji, nos. 167, Nov. 11th 1979, and 
242, Dec. 11th, 1981. 
What Country Poses the Greatest Threat? 
USSR Uni ted States North Korea PRC South Korea Others Don't Know 
% % % % % % ~~ 
1979 77.3 11. 2 6.9 6.1 2.5 1.5 9.3 
1980 83.6 7.1 1.5 1.6 2.4 1.0 8.4 
1981 77.4 12.5 2.5 1.2 0.5 1.6 11. 1 
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contesting for ideological and military supremacy on a global 
scale, and hence, America has been concerned to maintain its own 
nuclear deterrent capability and overall armed parity with the 
U.S.S.R, and to maintain collective Western security. However, 
according to the terms of the U.S.-Japan Treaty, the postwar 
Japanese Constitution, and its traditional inclination, Japan has 
not been concerned with the defence of any nation but itself. 1 
Thus, while glasnost and perestroika, the demise of communist 
governments in much of Eastern Europe, actual or proposed force 
reductions in Europe, and Soviet support for the American-
initiated military operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
in 1991 have markedly improved relations and reduced the prospect 
of war between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, they have done 
little to improve relations between the U.S.S.R and Japan. 
Apart from its inclusion in the global INF reductions, 
Northeast Asia has been largely exempt from international 
agreements or even negot,iations on limiting troops and weapons, 
or other confidence-building measures. Moreover, Japan and the 
U.S.S.R./Russia have a long history of Rnimosity stemming from 
rivalry over control of territory in Northeast Asia, and which 
produced armed conflict between them in 1904-5 (over Korea and 
1. The revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 obliges America to defend 
Japanese territory, but places no reciprocal obligation on Japan to defend 
American territory, see: Article V, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
Between Japan and the United States of America", Defense Qf Japan: 19.86., 
p.263. 
The view of successive Japanese governrrBnts has been that "the right of 
collective self-defense ... is constitutionally not permissible", see: wfense 
Qt. Japan: 1986, p. 73. Tsuchiyama points out that this is another example of 
postwar Japanese policies reflecting long-established practices, because 
"Japanese alliances ... have customarily excluded collective action" ., ss: W.b.Y: 
Japan Enters Into Alliances, p.9 
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Manchuria), 1918-22 (over Siberia), 1939 (over Outer Mongolia), 
and 1945 (over Manchuria). They have remained technically at war 
since the end of W.W. II, principally as the result of their rival 
claims to sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kurils. Japanese 
critics of the American alliance believe this history of 
animosity would increase the likelihood of, for example, a Soviet 
missile attack on American and SDF facilities in Japan should 
superpower rivalry escalate to war, because such an attack would 
amount, in effect, to "killing two birds with one stone". This is 
the reasoning which has contributed to the Japanese nomination of 
the United States as the second greatest external threat to their 
security. 1 
The need for forward deployment of American forces in Japan 
was further undermined in the opinion of many Japanese by their 
not concurring with the United States' security concerns about 
China in the 1950s and 1960s: moreover, the threat from North 
Korea was felt by Japanese to be adequately contained by United 
States and indigenous forces in South Korea. The historical basis 
for Japan's low threat perception ~ a ~ China and North Korea 
is obvious, for although Japan invaded Korea in the sixteenth 
century, and annexed it in the twentieth; and although Japan 
attacked China in the sixth, sixteenth, nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, neither China nor Korea has retaliated by attempting 
to invade Japan, despite possessing at various times the means to 
1. The other major contributing factor has been bilateral trade friction. 
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do so. 1 
This millennia-old Japanese perception of East Asia's 
traditional hegemonic power, major source of trade and cultural 
fountainhead as being of no danger to Japan, as being, indeed, 
more of a benignant than a malignant force in the region, was 
not altered by China's acquisition of a Communism government, nor 
has it been limited to leftists or the postwar generation. In 
1951, it was made clear to Prime Minister Yoshida that unless he 
agreed to abandon plans for Japan to recognise the People's 
Republic of China after the conclusion of the allied occupation. 
the U.S. Congress would not ratify the San Francisco peace treaty, 
and hence deny Japan its formal independence. Japan duly 
recognised the Kuomintang regime as the only legitimate 
government of China, but that "so virulent an anti-communist as 
Yoshida had to pressured into taking this position indicates how 
widely divergent the two counties were". 2 
Events in China have furnished Japanese with a concrete 
example of how American bases in Japan (and on Okinawa) could be 
used in ways potentially detrimental to Japan's interests or even 
contrary to its wishes. In 1950, President Harry Truman responded 
to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea by assigning the Seventh 
Fleet to the Straits of Taiwan, "effectively preventing a 
communist invasion of Taiwan, and having the fleet operate out of 
1. Chinese and Koreans participated in the thirteenth century attempt to 
invade Japan, but this was at the direction of their overlord, the Mor~ol 
Kublai Khan. 
2. Ibwer, "The Eye of the Beholder", Bulletin Qf Concerned Asian Scholars II: 1 
(October 1969), p.25 
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Sasebo -- thus making Japan~ in the words of one Japanese 
commentator, a forward military base for intervention in the 
Chinese communist revolution'." 1 The independence of U.S. forces 
in Japan from Japanese government control was modified in the 
revised Security Treaty of 1960: an associated agreement states 
that a build-up of U.S. forces in Japan, or the use of such forces 
and U.S. facilities in Japan for combat operations other than in 
the defence of Japan must be preceded by consultation between the 
two governments. 2 Doubts about the efficacy of such arrangements 
were aggravated by a series of major United States policy changes 
on Asia in the 1970s, which were announced without prior 
consultation with Japan. 3 
Japan is a nation which has shown a strong preference for 
isolationism during almost two-millennia, which has a history of 
failed external aggression, and which, when aligned with other 
states, has done the least damage to its own interests by 
offering them token military assistance or none at all. For many 
of the people of such a nation, the presence on their soil of 
foreign military bases and ultimately irresistible pressure to 
1. Ibwer, "The Eye of the Eeholder", Bulletin cl Concerned Asian Scholars II: 1 
(October 1969), pp. 16-25 
2. Defense Qf Japan: 1986, p.86 
3. U.S. rapprochement with the PRe under President Nixon and a withdrawal of 
US forces from South Korea under President Carter; the latter was not 
undertaken. Both the Japanese goverrillBnt and the Japanese people were dismayed 
by the Nixon and Carter YQlte-face: see Lee & Sato, U.S. Policy TQBarrls Korea 
and Japan, p.110.; and Solomon, "The Role for Japan in United States Strategic 
Policy for Northeast Asia", p. 99. 
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send military personnel to a foreign war zone 1 has been a very 
heavy burden to bear. 
This is not the United States' estimation of Japan's burden, 
nor that of many Japanese allies prior to W.W. II. It is certainly 
the case that American pressure on Japan to increase its defence 
expenditure and its defence capability, and its commitment to 
military operations undertaken to protect Western interests, has 
coincided with the increase in America's trade deficit with Japan 
and its inability to play the role of global hegemon. However, as 
has been the case with Japanese popular pacifism and other 
concepts and practices that impact on Japanese foreign and 
defence policy, Japan's perceived enjoyment of a "free ride" at 
its an ally's expense is not a recent phenomenon; indeed, it is 
very old. 
In 1980, when the U.S. Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, was 
quoted as saying of Japan's defence expenditure that it fell 
seriously short of what was expected, and was "so modest that it 
conveys a sense of complacency",2 he was voicing the frustrations 
1. The Japanese Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, first proJ;X)sed sending MSDF 
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1987 (The Me. , 5. 4.88). llirr:estic derete 
aoout the proJ;X)sal eventually subsided, and was not revived until after Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. Then, after intense US Congressional 
criticism and rronths of derete in the Diet and public fora, Japan agreed in 
April, 1991, to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to help a United Nations 
effort to clear it of Iraqi mines and other debris of war. Because the vessels 
and their crews would not ba involved in fighting .. the decision could ba seen 
as a token gesture, not unlike tr1B.t of the Emperor Junnin's dispatch of 
bullocks' horns to the T'ang. As could have baen expected, some of Japan's 
neighoours did not see it this way: the former Singa]:X)rean Prire Minister, Lee 
Kwarl Yew, said this initial breach of the ban on JSDF personnel serving abroad 
was like "giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic". (The Japan T.imas., 
3.5.91) 
2. Lee & Sato, US Policy Toward Korea and Japan, p. 136 
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of Japanese "allies" at various times over a period of some two-
thousand years: 
The Japanese, while eager to participate in trade and obtain 
access to the most advanced technology of the age, were generally 
careful to avoid too intimate a strategic association with their 
mentors and allies. The Wei emperor's hopes that Yamatai, 
populous, wealthy and disposing of considerable naval power, 
might prove a useful ally in his protracted struggles with Wu, 
Shu Han and the governors of Yen for continental hegemony, 
proved, in the end, illusory. Japan's military assistance to 
Paekche was insuf1icient to alter the military balance on the Korean peninsula. 
After Wei and Paekche came Koguryo: Japan broke with tradition 
to dispatch a great naval force to assist this ally, and was so 
crushingly defeated at Paekchongang in 663 that it consequently 
refused to send military forces abroad for almost one thousand 
years. During their alliances with mainland powers, Japanese 
states had, however, acquired advanced technology, and in 
particular, advanced military weaponry and techniques with which 
to fight domestic (and potential foreign) rivals, 2 and Japan had 
not, even after Paekchongang, fallen victim to the wars of 
conquest waged by various mainland states, including the mighty 
and highly expansionist T'ang. 
It was only when Japan's isolationist tendencies were carried 
to the extreme under the Tokugawas, and when it was consequently 
denied access to new technology over a period coinciding with the 
industrial revolution in the West, that its sovereignty came to 
be seriously imperilled. Until the seventeenth century, Japan's 
primary preoccupation with its domestic affairs, its discreet 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.3 
2. See: Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.4 
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approach to power politics, its eschewal of external aggression 
and its undemanding alliances had, with the assistance of the 
Straits of Tsushima, served it well, and it is understandable 
that the Japanese saw no reason not to revive this rewarding 
strategy in the late nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the 
beneficial affect of the strategy as a whole was eroded and 
eventually destroyed by Japan's not reviving two of its key 
elements: discreet diplomacy and non-aggression. 
By the 1920s, Britain had grown weary of its alliance with 
Japan, having given too much and received too little in return. 
This state of affairs must also have been apparent to the other 
victorious Great Powers at the Versailles peace conference: 
Japan's seat among them, and its possession of former German 
territories, had been secured by the barest minimum of war effort 
in the East, and no effort whatsoever in the bloody trenches of 
the Western front. Thus, "Japanese alliances are apt to be one-
sided from the standpoint of the ally", because: 
... nations that place high value on the [collective] good --
usually the larger power -- bear a 'disproportionate' share of 
the alliance burden ... 
The Japanese concept of alliance was not exactly alliance Qe.r.. ~, 
but could be described as issue-specific coalitions formed for 
the attainment of limited and issue specific objectives ... Japan 
won the 'carte blanche' in a key issue area, its allies basically 
gained only the global strategic implications of an alliance with 
Japan, with the rxception of U.S. military bases in the U.S. -
Japanese case . .. 
It is this "exception" which has persuaded many Japanese that 
1. Tsuchiyama, ~ Japarl Enters lntQ Alliances, pp.3,11,12; emphasis added. 
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they, and not the Americans, are bearing an unprecedentedly heavy 
share of the alliance burden, a burden which is not only 
strategic but now economic, as the Japanese financial 
contribution towards maintaining American forces on its territory 
has steadily increased since 1978. The United States has, 
moreover, demanded of Japan that it increase spending on its own 
defence force, and increase the capability of that force to the 
extent that it is capable of providing early warning of an 
impending enemy attack on Japanese territory and, until U.S. forces 
in Japan and possible reinforcements from America can engage that 
enemy, to deny air superiority to enemy aircraft and landfall to 
enemy vessels, and to contain an invasion force on Japanese soil. 
The United States in addition sought and gained Japanese 
government agreement to acquire an Air and Maritime SDF forward 
deployment capability such as to protect the sea lanes out to 
one-thousand nautical miles from Japan, and a strategically 
significant augmented capacity to blockade the Tsugaru, Soya and 
Tsushima Straits. The latter task has provided the rationale for 
Japanese development of the SDF's new surface- to-surface missile, 
the SSM-l. 
It is obvious that the security of a nation is increased in 
direct proportion to the increase in the distance from its 
territory at which it can efficiently destroy or contain enemy 
forces. However, while long-range weaponry obviously affords a 
significant defensive advantage, increases in its range and 
accuracy also increase its potential to afford a significant 
offensive advantage. Thus, as John O'Connell has observed, the 
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SSM-1 project may, by 1995: 
... give Japan the capability of interdicting surface ship 
traffic to and from the Sea of Japan. That capability, combined 
with mining the straits to interdict submarine passage, can 
drastically alter the balance of power in the Far East ... As 
cruise missiles go, it may not necessarily be the most advanced 
when it enters service. Its potential for significant strategic 
impact lies in the roles which it may be assigned by the Japanese 
government. There is no doubt in my mind that the only intended 
role is entirely defensive at present, and that it is solely 
intended for anti-invasion efiorts. But things have a way of 
changing, and so do policies. 
Each increase in the sophistication, range and efficacy of 
Japanese military technology brings with it an increase in actual 
or potential erosion of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, 
and a consequent increase in the responsibility of the Japanese 
government and people to ensure that such technology is not 
deployed in a fashion contrary to their best interests. It also 
brings Japan a step closer towards acquiring the capacity for 
armed autonomous defence, which is not what a majority of 
o 
Japanese want. G For, although hosting American forces is seen as 
1. 0 'Connell, "Strategic Implications of the Japanese SSM-1 Cruise Missile", 
pp.53 .,65. 
2. B)1J.: ~fense System 
Q: What steps do you think must 00 taken to defend the sect.rri ty of Japan? 
Indicate your answer from the items listed oolow. 
Aoolish the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and upgrade, instead, 
the cOUTltry's self-defense capability so as to enable Japan 
to . ta' . ts . t . ts ~ 0°1 rraln ln 1 securl y on lawn ........................... v. 10 
defend the security of Japan under the Japan-U.S. security 
and with SDF as at present ................................... 69.2% 
Aoolish the JaparrU.S. security treaty and scale down or 
disoorld SDF ................................................... 6.8% 
Others ........................................................ 1. 1% 
fun't mow ................................................... 17.9% 
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a potential risk to Japanese security because of their ability to 
invite or initiate attack, and although American pressure on 
Japan to increase its defence effort is seen as increasing the 
risk of revived Japanese militarism, 1 the alliance ~ ~ 
nevertheless acts as a counterbalance to these risks, in that it 
limits the possibility of a drastic Japanese defence build-up and 
re-militarisation on the pretext of its being necessary in the 
absence of a friendly and protective hegemonic power. 
There is no reason to suppose that Japan will not continue in 
its current and customary role of subsidiary military ally for as 
long as the American alliance, and in particular its provision 
for the basing of U.S. forces in Japan, does not significantly 
increase the risk of attack on Japan, or Japan's involvement in 
overseas aggression; nor, from the public's perspective, increase 
the risk of revived domestic militarism or of a much augmented 
... Continued ... 
(Public opinion survey conducted by the Prire Minister's Office in November 
1984. fufense Qf Japan: 1986, p. 338) 
Acording to public opinion polls undertaken in 1971-1973 by the Yomi~ 
Asahi and Mainichi Shimbun, there was "widespread anxiety about a possible 
revival of Japanese militarism, especially in the context of American ressure 
for an accelerated arms build-up. Many appeared uneasy about the adequacy of 
the civilian control system. There was little confidence that Japan's re-
erergence as a great military power would be advantageous either to the nation 
or its people"; see: Welfield J An Empire in Eclipse, p.419. 
American pressure may work in favour of remilitarisation in two possible 
ways: (1) by simply forcing Japan into a defence build-up which could 
precipitate drastic changes to the Constitution., political system and defence 
rx::>licy; or (2) by the rrore subtle and more likely reans of providing 
militaristic elerents in Japan with the pretext for a drastic defence build- up 
and a reans of absolving therrselves of responsibility for it. Japanese 
opponents, and others, could find themselves hard pressed to identify whether 
militaristic developrents were the result of indigenous initiatives or 
gaiatsu. However J at tirr:e of wri ting . nei ther of these scenarios appears 
probable. 
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defence budget and capability. In the absence of any other 
serious external threat to Japan's security, should gaiatsu 
emanating, or popularly perceived as emanating, from the United 
States government seem to threaten to seriously undermine Japan's 
sovereignty, unprecedentedly liberal political arrangements and 
prosperity, the popular resistance which may be expected to such 
a development could find its expression in a repetition of the 
popular disturbances which occurred in the 1950s. The most 
notable of these were the demonstrations by hundreds of thousands 
of protesters which accompanied the "undemocratic"l ratification 
by the Diet of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and which 
occasioned the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and 
the last-minute cancellation of a visit to Japan by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Similarly, if the Japanese government or other powerful 
domestic interests should appear to be returning the nation to 
policies and practices significantly more in accordance with the 
Meiji Constitution than the "civilian-ist" and pacifist postwar 
Constitution, popular opposition, if constrained from expression 
through the ballot box, could spill onto the streets and revive 
the destabilising and violent confrontations which brought Japan 
to the brink of internal warfare in 1912 and 1918, and which were 
echoed in the less destabilising, but still serious mass 
1. Reischauer, Japan, p.282; also, see: Storry, A History Qf Modern Jamn. 
pp.273-276. 
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demonstrations of the early post-occupation period. 1 While it is 
the case that militaristic or chauvinistic elements might welcome 
serious popular disturbances as a pretext for the reimposition of 
authoritarian rule, such as occurred under Hideyoshi and the 
Tokugawa bakufu, it is doubtful whether the damage that would 
inevitably accrue to parilamentary government and the Japanese 
economy would be welcome to the government or other powerful 
groups with a major interest in Japan's continued prosperity. It 
was to a significant extent recognition of the danger posed to 
political stability by the far right which enabled compromise to 
be reached over the 1960 and 1970 crises, and which informed 
1. Sugirrnto has found the frequency and rragnitude of violent popular 
disturbances in Japan in the decade following the end of the postwar allied 
occupation to be greater than those of similar disturbances in the decade 
after the Meiji Rsetoration, another period of Japanese history rrErked by 
great change and "openness to the outs ide world": the frequency of popular 
disturbances in Japan from 1952 to 1960 was rrore than eight tirres that of 
similar disturbances during the sarre period in France. (See Sugirrot.o, Popular 
Disturbance in Postwar Japan, Table 4.1, p.67, & pp.66-92) 
From 1952 to 1960, Japanese rrass derronstrations, often involving several 
thousand people, injury and damage to property., occurred in repsonse to 
perceived challenges to political and social reforms and to pacifism. Popular 
grievances included: infringerrents of employees' rights; loss of farmin..~ land 
to military bases; industrial accidents; visits to Japanese ports by nuclear-
powered American vessels; the transportation of fuel or oil tanks for use in 
Vietnam; and the erosion of "derrocratic education" and the reintroduction of 
portions of the prewar eductation system. Leaders and participants in these 
disturbances ranged from the left to the right of the poli tical spectrum: sorre 
protests featured leftists from student and labour organisations; sorre 
featured rrBmbers of anti-union and pro-government organisations such as PTAs 
and Shinto groups; whereas others corr~rised coalitions of left and right. 
(Ibid. ) 
When the Kishi government attempted to expand police power through a 
"Police Duties Law Arrendrrent Bill", it was defeated by pressure from an 
unexpected coalition which included groups which as a rule eschewed politics: 
arrnng them were the YMCA, the Federation of Worren' s Organisations and several 
religious organisations. (See: Sissons, "The Dispute Over Japan's Police Law", 
pp.36-37, 43-45) 
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government decisions not to mobilise the SDF against anti-
alliance demonstrations} thereby averting the likelihood of civil 
war and an "appalling t.ragedy" for Japan. 1 
As they approach the twenty-first century, the preference of a 
majority of Japanese people, in consideration of their current 
geopolitical situation and their two-thousand years of 
accumulated experience in such matters, is in essence for an 
updated form of the military arrangements they enjoyed in the 
third to ninth centuries, minus the naval assistance to Koguryo. 
This would comprise an indigenous "defensive" defence capability 
such as to deter limited aggression, supplemented by an alliance 
with a hegemonic power able to maintain regional stability and 
participate in mutually beneficial trade, and to come to Japan's 
defence in the face of large-scale aggression, but which would 
otherwise desist from interference in Japanese internal affairs. 
Such a preference may appear unrealistic and selfish, yet the 
evidence of history suggests that the further the Japanese stray 
from such arrangements, and in particular from a purely 
"defensive" military capability, the greater is the harm done to 
themselves and to millions of others. 
Comprehensive Security: a study in discretion 
Japan is not a great military power, yet it is a great 
economic power, with global economic interests which depend for 
their security on the preservation of international trading and 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p.137-141, 180-182 
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financial regimes and institutions, and the maintenance of peace 
not only in regions close to Japan, but as far away as the Middle 
East. and Europe. Japan is a prime example of the "interdependent" 
state, for the maintenance of its domestic prosperity and 
stability is heavily dependent on its continued access to foreign 
resources, especially energy resources, and foreign markets for 
its manufactured goods and investment. 
For a time, most notably immediately after the end of the 
Second World War, the United States was able to assume a large 
part of the burden of defending not only Japan itself, but the 
sea lanes and foreign markets and resources on which Japan's 
economic reconstruction would increasingly come to rely. This, 
however, became an increasingly onerous task for the United 
States, for the postwar world rapidly became the post-colonial 
world, which brought with it a multitude of conflicts which in 
themselves often imperilled access to resources and the passage 
of vessels t.hrough "choke points" on sea lanes of communication, 
and which also proved an almost irresistible lure to foreign 
intervention. As hostility between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
increased, so too did the number of their "wars-by-proxy" and the 
size of their nuclear and conventional forces. 
The combination of manifold actual and perceived threats to U.S. 
and general Western security, coinciding with the decline of the 
American economy, in particular at the time of the Vietnam War, 
led the U.S. to the decision that it must reduce its overseas 
military commitments, and encourage its allies and friendly 
states to take up more of the burden of their own defence: 
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America's Asian allies were informed of this new, and for many, 
worrisome arrangement in a speech by President Richard Nixon in 
Guam, in 1969. 
Japan's ability to contribute more to its own defence and to 
that of other non-Communist states by a military build-up was 
constrained by both public opinion and Article IX of its 
Constitution, and by Cabinet decisions banning the possession of 
nuclear weapons and the export of armaments and military 
technology, 1 both of which policies also had strong popular 
support. Japan was also constrained by international concern 
about any sign of resurgent Japanese militarism, a sentiment 
particularly strong among those states which had been, or seemed 
about to be, unwillingly incorporated into the Greater East Asia 
Co-prosperity Sphere. In consideration of these inhibiting 
factors, the course which Japan adopted in order to enhance its 
security was to largely eschew an augmented military effort2 in 
1. The United States, concerned that the flow of technology between it and 
Japan was largely one-way, sought not only to obtain access to Japanese 
military technology (to which earlier bilateral agreements had in any case 
already entitled it), but to also obtain easier access to even rrDre attractive 
dual-use Japanese technology, by obtaining the Japanese governrrent's consent 
to a new agreement, which permitted the broaching of the ban on ex:p:)rts of 
Japanese military tecrmology and goods in respect of the US. (See: "Exchange 
of Notes on the Transfer of Japanese Military Technologies", 1983, and, 
"Detailed Arrangerrents for the Transfer of Military Technologies", 1985) Some 
observers rave expressed the view that the US-Japan military technologies 
agreement will eventually facilitiate the easing or lifting of Japan's arms 
export restrictions; see: Drifte, ~ Production in Japan, p. 6 
2. One gesture, which was largely symbolic, was the Nakasone Cabinet's 
decision in 1986 to perrrJit the defence budget to exceed one percent of GNP, 
which it had not done, according to Japanese reckoning, since 1967. The 
decision took considerable tirre to reach, principally because domestic public 
opinion, and op:p:)sition parties in the Diet were against a breaching of the 
one percent limit (see: Katahara, T.he Politics Qf Japanese. Defence Policy 
Making, p. 35): so, too, were neighbouring states. 
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favour of utilising its great wealth to establish what has become 
the world's largest foreign aid program. Owing to its inclusion 
of significant economic and diplomatic components, as well as the 
more customary military component, this form of national defence 
was named "Comprehensive Security". 
The reasoning behind this approach is twofold: firstly, as 
economic problems such as trade deficits, overseas debt, and 
endemic poverty contribute to political instability, in 
particular in the more fragile post-colonial societies, 
assistance in overcoming those problems should also assist in 
maintaining stability. This is, of course, a good thing in 
itself, yet it may in addition further the security interests of 
the Western world as a whole. The absence of war or civil unrest 
in a developing country obviously facilitates access by other 
nations, such as Japan, to its natural resources and cheap 
labour, and to its domestic market, which, with increased 
prosperity, should expand and be capable of absorbing 
manufactured goods from the industrialised nations. In other 
words, Japanese economic aid to developing countries is intended 
to foster mutually beneficial economic interdependence and 
political stability. This is more important to Japan than most 
other nations because of its heavier than usual dependence on 
trade and imported raw materials and energy for its continued 
prosperity. And, the importance of continued prosperity to 
Japan's continued domestic stability may, among other things, be 
gauged by the serious popular disturbances which resulted from 
unfulfilled economic expectations in 1905 and 1918. One of the 
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major underpinnings of Japanese popular pacifism is the very 
early realisation that the risks and costs inherent in external 
aggression are generally in excess of its benefits. 
The second major reason for Japan's making a singularly large 
contribution to the economic stability of other nations, for 
example, in Southeast Asia, is that it is not thereby helping 
only to ensure its access to the resources and markets of 
Southeast Asian nations, but also to those of nations beyond the 
region. Most of Japan's oil imports come from the Middle East 
through the Straits of Malacca, between Singapore and Indonesia, 
and the narrow channels that permit egress from the South China 
Sea to waters adjacent to the Ryukyus and the western reaches of 
the Pacific Ocean. The maintenance of stability within and 
between states bordering such maritime "choke points" is of prime 
importance in keeping them safe and open to the passage of 
vessels bearing Japan's vital oil and other energy imports, and 
the exports of its manufacturing sector. Moreover, security of 
access to resources and markets, and sea lanes of communication, 
is important to the continued prosperity and stability of all 
trading states, and thus Japan's economic contribution to 
maintaining such access may be considered a constitutionally 
permissible contribution to the "collective defence" of the 
economically interdependent world. 
Japanese appreciation of the benefits of economic 
interdependence is not a postwar phenomenon: Japan had enjoyed 
"centuries of harmonious and mutually beneficial"l intercourse 
1. Welfield, An EmPire in Eclipse, p. 1 
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with neighbouring states, and, in particular, with China and 
Korea from as early, perhaps, as the Han Dynasty. Certainly by 
the time of the T'ang, there was a sizable trade in raw 
materials, manufactured goods, medicinal herbs and objets d'art. 
The Japanese were especially quick to understand the strategic 
benefits of imported technologies, as attested to by the Korean 
weaponry in the tumuli of Yamato's earliest rulers. 1 By the 
sixteenth century, Japanese traders-cum-pirates were venturing as 
far afield as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, and the 
daimyo of western and southern Japan were growing rich and, to 
the displeasure of the shogun, more powerful, notably so after 
their acquisition of fire-arms from the Portuguese. More than 
anything else, it was the virtual elimination of Japan's trade 
with the outside world under the Tokugawa bakufu which ensured 
its helplessness in the face of Commodore Perry's guns. 
There is a third reason for Japan's subscription to the 
pacifistic approach to defence manifest in "Comprehensive 
Security", and this is that by example and by economic ties, it 
assists in drawing other nations into the trading system, and: 
If every factor favoring the military-political and territorial 
system is itself an augury against the trading system, the 
reverse is also true. The greater the attractiveness of the 
trading system, the less likely the military-political world is 
to be chosen by nations ... 
.. . if trading strategies hold out the prospects of rapid new 
growth, the latter will likely be selected as the primary means 
1. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.2.4. 
The U.S. has sought access to Japanese military technology, and, through this, 
its dual-use technology, which is of interest not only to the US IbD, but. US 
indust.ry. 
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of national advancement ... 
.. . There are fateful consequences involved in choosing one 
primary means over the other. In an open economy greater 
production and trade by one nation does not prevent another from 
achieving similar goals. The forceful seizure of additional 
territo1y by one nation, however, diminishes the possibilities of others. 
The Japanese people have learned over the centuries, and 
particularly this century, that territorial expansion is a zero-
sum affair. Their eschewal of the military-political and 
territorial system in favour of the trading system has gained 
them the prosperity and prestige, and global influence, such as 
they had sought, but failed to obtain, by means of aggression in 
the past. And, these benefits have been won in the main without 
loss of territory, independence or prosperity to others. 2 Japan 
has, as it were, set a very good example, albeit one which has 
been followed with varying degrees of difficulty and success by 
ot,hers. 
Overall, the United States has not been displeased with Japan s 
approach to increased defence burden-sharing, although in 
consideration of Japan·s great wealth, it may fall short of what 
is desired. In 1980, the former director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, William Colby, claimed that if Japan 
1. Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State ., pp. 39,43 
2. I t is l::eyond the scope of this paper to argue whether or not, or to what 
extent Japan·s economic success has l::een at the expense of the US: it is worth 
noting, however, that while U.S. exports to Japan increased in 1981, its 
exp:lrts to Europe decreased, and the U. S. rrBrchandise trade deficit world- wide 
was alrrost 28 billion dollars (Oki ta, "Japanese Arl'Brican Economic Troubles ", 
p. 201). Moreover, nurrerous Japanese and ArrBrican studies have shown that if 
Japan conceeded to every Congressional derrand designed to end its "free ride", 
the US deficit would l::e reduced by no more than about 16 percent. (See: The 
Economist, 9.1.88; and, Okita, "Japanese Arl'Brican Economic Troubles", p.202) 
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increased its defence budget by four to five percent, putting 
most of it into foreign economic assistance and thereby far 
exceeding American ODA: 
. .. then I think there would be general understanding that the 
Japanese have made a major effort in the area appropriate for 
Japan to contribute. This is the way alliance should work: that 
we do not necessarily do the same thing, but we each do the thing 
that is appropriate to a good relationship between us. 1 
However, when American troops are called upon to fight in the 
perceived defence of Western interests, including Japan's Middle 
Eastern oil supplies, money is not enough: allies must be seen to 
be doing .. the same thing". When allied ass ist.ance was requested 
for the United Nations-sponsored and American-led military 
operation to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the Japanese 
government's response, (which was, in effect, to again permit 
discretion to be the better part of valour), proved unacceptable 
to many Congressmen and disappointing to the Bush administration. 
The latter had to maintain a delicate balance between, on the one 
hand, being seen very publicly to care about the possible 
"unfair" burden of blood to be shed by American t.roops and about 
American economic problems, and, on the other hand, being 
concerned less publicly to reduce bilateral trade friction and 
preserve good relations with Japan: the dispatch of JSDF 
personnel to the Middle East, not just Japanese money and high 
technology products, would have been considered of great 
1. Look Japan, November 10, 1980 .1 p. 11. Quoted in Lee & Sato 1 Gp. cit., p. 140 
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assistance. 1 Despite a compensatory increase in the several 
thousand-million dollars pledged by Japan to the war effort and 
in strategic aid to countries such as Egypt and Turkey, pressure 
from America and other Western powers and recognition by the 
Japanese government that it could now invoke such gaiatsu to 
facilitate a contribution "not only in finance but also in 
personnel",2 led to the eventual dispatch of MSDF minesweepers to 
the Gulf~ after agreement to a ceasefire had been reached. 
The Japanese public opposed the decision. For several months 
before it was made, the Diet had been discussing a U.N. Peace 
Cooperation Bill. which was proving to be highly unpopular, in 
part because it revived memories of the ambiguities of the Meiji 
Constitution, which had proved valuable to militaristic 
interests: 
The bill has major flaws, particularly in its wording, the vague 
nature of which inspires fears of inadequate civilian control 
over the military. Moreover, it became clear as the debate 
continued that the Japanese public did not support the bill; 
various opinion polls indicated that only 20% to 30% were in 
favor of its passage. 3 
However, some observers believed the debate was efficacious in 
that it "brought Japan's role in international activities 
relating to peace and security to the attention of the general 
public for the first time ... 4 The reluctance of the Japanese 
1. The Econorrdst, 19.1.91, pp.27-28 
2. The Japan Times, 3.5.91 
3. Ogata, "The United Nations and Japanese Diplomacy", p.163 
4. Ogata, "The United Nations and Japanese Diplomacy"., p. 162 
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people and government to assert their views in international 
I 
II fora, be they such institutions and regimes such as the World 
Bank and the GATT .. or meetings such as those of the "Group of 
Seven", is not surprising, given Japan's customary aloofness from 
involvement in international politics. The period of some two 
decades. during which Japan has acquired politically significant 
global economic interests, is a very short space of time in which 
to overturn, not only the Japanese feeling of "separateness", but 
the very real lessens of the centuries during which the military 
:/[ 
and political isolation of Japan from outside events, unless 
:j 
\ 
I 
III 
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carried to the extreme, was generally beneficial, and certainly 
preferable to the risks and costs of involvement in power 
politics. Japanese considering the overseas deployment of SDF 
personnel have not only the legacy of the recent half-century of 
mainly poor diplomacy 1 and failed aggression to contend with, 
but also the legacy of profound strategic misjudgements on the 
1. The trillinph of Japarlese diplorracy early trus century was the Anglo-JaPL~ese 
Alliance, although, in the longer term. it may be accounted disadvantageous in 
tr~t it helped lay the foundations of Japan's half-century of empire-building. 
Otherwise, as we have seen, Japan's forays into the world of diplomacy-cum-
}?Ower }?Olitics were singularly unimpressive. Japanese leaders, notably those 
of militaristic inclinations. misconstrued victories over China and Russia as 
indicating that further expansionism would be possible and beneficial. The 
"Twenty-One remands" and Japanese intervention in Siberia which followed soon 
after were both counter-productive. The Axis Pact proved of little assistance 
to Japan, and, by December 1941, it proved a liability, by serving to abet 
those Japanese who had so seriously urlderestinEted America's will and capacity 
to fight, that they failed to appreciate its ability to conduct successful 
warfare in Europe as well as the Pacific. On the other hand, the efforts of 
those Japanese who wished by diplomatic means to contain their nation ' s 
expans ionism and prevent or curtail its war with the U. S. carre to nothing. 
Prominent Japanese participation in international fora also entails the 
possibility of prominent loss of face. as happened at the Washington and 
London naval conferences.. not least because of the American perception that a 
increase of Japarlese power meant a dirrunition of AnErican power, a perception 
that persists in sorre quarters to this day. (See Appendix. this paper) 
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part of Hideyoshi and the court which dispatched the Japanese 
contingent to Paekchongang. Moreover, as bombing raids and the 
allied occupation of Japan cast serious doubt on the efficacy of 
its divine protection, the wisdom of the members of the Kamakura 
bakufu who so provocatively beheaded Kublai Khan's emissaries is 
open to question. 
There is good reason to argue that the Japanese should be 
permitted to slowly and cautiously strengthen and expand their 
I political role in international society in the concluding years 
of the twentieth century, rather than attempt to emulate their 
III 
remarkably speedy and frequently ill-advised assertions of the 
military and political prerogatives of Great Power status which 
characterised their re-entry to international society in the 
concluding years of the nineteenth century. Japanese reticence in 
assuming a more prominent role in power politics may be difficult 
for a majority of Americans to understand, given their nation's 
far different and long-standing record of generally successful 
political assertiveness and belligerency on the international 
stage. It would seem, however, that in recent years, the Reagan 
and Bush administrations have come to terms with the 
peculiarities of Japan's defence policy. 1 Apart from American 
1. Despite Congressional arid popular American armoyance at Japan's initial, 
purely finar~ial contribution to the Persian Gulf war, inforrred opinion in 
Washington rJaS for sorre years accepted that Japanese and overall Western 
interests would best be served by Japan continuing, " its steady defense build-
up in order to attain its desired defense capabilities ... Addi tonally, Japan 
can and should do nnre to increase the level of host nation suppport ... within 
the limits of the U. S. jJapan status of forces agreerrent, and continue to 
increase roth the amount and quality of its ODA. " (Wright, before House 
Foreign Affairs Subcoroonttee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 28.2.89) 
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concern not to provoke the kind of domestic Japanese unrest which 
marked the years leading up to the signing of the revised 
security treaty, and which eventually erupted into massive and 
potentially de-stabilising protest demonstrations, Japan's 
espousal of purely "defensive" defence capabilities ., 
"Comprehensive Security" and a cautious approach to asserting 
itself in international fora and regimes: 
... spare American citizens the hard truth that burden sharing 
also means power sharing, and that the world would look a lot 
different if the U.S. were effectively beholden to collective 
security arrangements in which major strategic decisions were 
conceived in foreign capitals. 1 
Through their customary insular preoccupation with domestic 
affairs, and corresponding lack of cumulative experience in 
playing power politics, it may well be that the Japanese are 
simply not good at international politics. 2 Given Japan's 
existing capacity to influence global affairs by virtue of its 
wealth and wide economic interests, and its potential capacity to 
exert much greater influence through a more assertive utilisation 
of its large population, industrial prowess and technological 
sophistication, it is reasonable to argue that the best course 
for Japanese and foreign governments is to respect the wishes of 
1. Armitage, "Enhancing US Security in the Pacific", 30.8.88. 
2. This is the opinion of a forrr:er ~Tapa.nese diplomat.ic, Kawasaki rchiro, who 
criticised t..Tapa.nese leaders in his 1x)ok, Japan Unmasked, as better party-
:p::)li tical .. operators" than diplomatic or strategic "independent. t.hinkers" 
(pp. 200-201), and ~Tapanese dorr:est.ic :p::)lit.ics as a block to a greater role in 
foreign affairs, even to such tentative ID:)ves as Japa.n' s ini tial particiPc""l.t.ion 
in the Asian lliveloprr:ent Banl;:;: (pp. 206-207). Yet., even this critic of Japanese 
insulari t.y and int.rospection at. one :p::)int. described any ~Tapa.nese aspirat.ions 
to regional leadership as "grandiose" (p. 231). 
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the bulk of the Japanese people as to their nation's foreign and 
defence policies. 1 In accordance with this, it should be noted 
that because of its popularly-supported constitutional and 
governmental bans on the dispatch of military personnel and the 
sale of weaponry abroad, Japan, unlike both the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. and several European NATO members, did not 
substantially assist the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, in the 
augmentation of his military power and hence the realisation of 
his territorial ambitions regarding Kuwait. As Meirion and Susie 
Harries have noted, when the United States decided to continue 
promising prewar trends and make postwar Japan a democracy, the 
Americans "made the will of the Japanese people paramount -- and 
the will of the Japanese people, generally speaking, is firmly 
against, military escalation". 2 
1. The nature of these wishes, and their divergence from those of Americans on 
the sarre subject are indicated by a public opinion survey conducted by the 
Yomiuri Shimbun in 1981: 
roLL 
Chose two items from the following regarding Japan's effort to strengthen its 
national security. 
Japanese Americans 
Strengthen the free economic system 
in the west ............................ 18.3 .............. 32.8 
Strengthen military-alliance system 
in the West ............................. 5.5 .............. 44.6 
Strengthen Japan's defense capability ..... 24.6 .............. 46.6 
Increase aid to developing countries ...... 18.9 ............... 7.4 
Strengthen the United Nations ............. 28.8 .............. 15.8 
Strengthen disarmarrent negotiation 
with the USSR ........................... 8.4 .............. 23.4 
Increase economic and cultlrral 
intercourse with the East .............. 12. 1 ............... 8.6 
Ib not mow ............................... 24.2 ............... 3.1 
2. Harries, Sheathing the Sword, p. 286 
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CONCLUSION 
There was a great recoil, 
The blood was bitter to thl bone 
The trigger to the soul ... 
.. . it is according to the dictate of time and fate 
that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand 
peace for all the generations to come by enduring 
the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable. 2 
There can be no doubt that the result of Japan's participation in 
the Second World War -- the death of two million Japanese, the 
razing of their homes, farms, schools and temples, and the 
humiliation of the conquest and occupation of their land by a 
foreign power has greatly impressed upon the Japanese people 
the fact that international war in the twentieth century can 
cause suffering and destruction on a scale unmatched by even the 
worst of their internal conflicts and the natural catastrophes 
which so frequently visit mayhem upon the Japanese islands. They, 
more than any other people, have good reason to know that warfare 
today can mean, not just humiliation, but annihilation, by the 
ever more numerous and terrible descendants of Robert 
1. Louis Simpson, "The Ash and the Oak", Good News of Death and Other Poems, 
in Poets Qf Today II, New York, 1985, p.162 
2 . Emperor HiropJ.to's broadcast to the Japanese people on their nation's 
surrender to the allied forces, in Craig, The F..all Qf Japan, p.210-212 
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Oppenheimer's first atomic "Shatterer of Worlds". 1 
Yet, this alone cannot explain the persistence of Japanese 
pacifism, for almost half a century -- two generations -- has 
passed since the firebombing of Tokyo and the mushroom clouds 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki: countries have lost terrible wars 
before, only to launch new ones soon after, as Germany did this 
century. Indeed, nuclear weapons may not deter, but facilitate 
aggression by a nation which wields such power. The United States 
and Soviet Union have most visibly demonstrated that one thus far 
successful means of averting direct nuclear or conventional 
attack is to possess the capacity to launch a nuclear counter-
attack: a nation may indulge in all sorts of direct and indirect 
aggression against other less powerful non-nuclear states when it 
is in possession of such a fearsome arsenal, provided it does not 
overstep the boundary of what other nuclear-armed states will 
tolerate. Japan has no nuclear weapons of its own, but it has 
spent most of the past half century in alliance with the United 
States, one of the two greatest military powers in the world, and 
sheltering under the U. S. "nuclear umbrella". Yet. Japan has not 
since 1945 attempted by force of arms to acquire territory or 
political influence in neighbouring states, even though its 
postwar political leadership, which included a prime minister who 
was a convicted war criminal,2 its quasi-military forces, and 
powerful bureaucratic and industrial sectors were not wholly 
1. J. Rooort Oppenheirrer, quoting the "Bhagavad Gita"; in, Spector, Eagle 
Agair~t the Suil,p.552 
2. Kishi Nobusuke 
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purged of militarists. 
Indeed, Japan has been so reluctant and slow to assume even 
part of the burden of its own defence that it has been criticised 
by the U.S. Congress and even, publicly, by U.S. administrations, as 
being an "unfair" ally which has taken a "free ride" at the 
expense of its powerful and generous, but increasingly hard-
pressed former foe. That Japan should have chosen to stay so long 
on the pacifist path it began to follow in the early days of the 
allied occupation, despite pressure from within and from without 
the country to diverge, implies a stronger commitment to non-
aggression than the loss of one war might be expected to elicit. 
There has, of course, been considerable pressure from other 
Asian nations for Japan to refrain from acquiring a much larger 
or offensive military capability. However, while the countries 
which were the victims of Japan's recent aggression have ever 
since protested vociferously at perceived signs of a resurgence 
of militarism or precipitate re-armament on the part of Japan, 
this has arguably been a comparatively minor constraint on 
Japan's military capability. In deciding national policies, the 
governments and, in democracies, the people of a state primarily 
follow the dictates of their domestic political, social and 
economic aspirations and standards, because these are generally 
more constant, reliable and comprehensible than the fluid, self-
interested and alien policies of other states in what is, after 
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all, an "anarchical society". 1 In the absence of a persuasively 
high level of duress on the part of other states, a nation's 
preferred policies have usually originated internally, and have 
eva I ved over., and s toad the tes t of, time: " What s ta tes do is 
influenced by what they believe they must do, and that in turn is 
the product of social learning".2 
Japanese pacifism has stood the test of time, not just since 
1945, but since the days of Himiko, Queen of Yamatai, in the 
third century A.D. 3 Japanese external aggression, on the other 
hand, has not. This is known to the Japanese people who have, 
since the days of the Tokugawa bakufu, enjoyed a higher literacy 
rate than most other peoples, and who are keenly interested in, 
and knowledgeable about their history, especially their 
comparatively uncontroversial prewar history. 
In Chapter One of this paper,4 it was stated that the Japanese 
could draw certain conclusions from the recurring patterns of 
their more than one thousand years of recorded history prior to 
the Meiji Restoration: it is appropriate to examine these 
conclusions again to ascertain whether they have stood the test 
of later times, and to discern their influence on postwar 
Japanese defence policy. 
1. The term chosen by Hedley Bull to describe international society, by which 
he did not mearl that it was necessarily always disorderly or violent, but that 
it was not subject to government; see: The Anerchical Society, pp.46-51 
2. Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State, p. 43 
3. Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p.2 
4. See: Chapter I, pp. 26-27 of this paper 
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* Overseas military aggression by Japan would fail. 
l 
'. After their defeat in the battle of Paekchongang and in 
Hideyoshi's attempt to conquer Korea and China, a Japanese army 
next went abroad in 1894 to again fight China, principally over 
control of Korea. Japan won this war against a nation which had 
been weakened by poor government, internal political unrest and 
partial subjection to Western imperialism, but Japan nevertheless 
promptly lost one of its most important territorial gains, the 
southernmost tip of Manchuria, in a clever playing of power 
I politics by Russia. 
1 The Russo-Japanese war which followed a decade later resulted 
I 
~ in another deceptive Japanese victory, for Japan launched an 
unexpected pre-emptive strike, and the Czar's far eastern naval 
and land forces and his Baltic Fleet were hampered by profound 
logistical problems. The war so exhausted Japan, and caused so 
many casualties and so much economic hardship to the Japanese 
people, that when its outcome failed to compensate them for their 
privation, the rioting that consequently erupted was of such 
magnitude that martial law was declared and the war Cabinet had 
to resign. 
[ i The First World War resulted in Japan acquiring territory and 
'I assets, though more by German default than Japanese prowess . 
Japan's intervention in Siberia in 1918 failed in establishing a 
long-term friendly buffer state there, but succeeded in 
establishing long-term animosity towards Japan on the part of 
successive Soviet governments, and its perceived economic cost to 
" 
the Japanese people caused even worse rioting than in 1905. Thus, 
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even before the Pacific War, the Japanese public had good cause 
. _. 
~ ~ to rue the loss of Japanese life in foreign conflicts, and again 
, 
question the militarists' apparent reckoning that the benefits of 
war outweighed its cost. 
The aversion of the Japanese public to overseas aggression 
thus has emotional and practical underpinnings. Its emotional 
basis is to be found in the fact that few Japanese were 
personally untouched by the losses and horrors of wars fought by 
, their nation this century, and most notably, the Pacific War. If 
i~; 
:\ 
~ ; 
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the millions of Japanese war dead were not to have died in vain, 
then it was reasonable to construe that it was their lot to have 
demonstrated the error of militarism and overseas aggression, and 
ensured Japan's future adherence to civil government and non-
aggressive foreign policies. 
The Meiji Emperor's grandson, Hirohito, seemed to appreciate 
this point when, on August 15th, 1945, he sought to make Japan's 
defeat and surrender palatable for his millions of subjects by 
telling them that their suffering had a point, in that he had now 
decided that they should fulfil their destiny to work towards a 
peaceful future: in so doing, he exhibited good judgment and 
considerable prescience. 
The practical basis of Japanese aversion to overseas aggression 
is simple and tangible and therefore probably the stronger and 
more durable of the two: it is that Japan's territorial gains 
from aggression have been transitory and their economic cost too 
I I high. At the end of the Pacific War, the frontiers of the 
J Japanese empire were the same as they had been at the time of the 
I j 
~ 
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Meiji Restoration, and the country was in ruins: 
Profits and death grow marginal, 
Only the mourning and the mourned recall 
The wars we lose, the wars we win; 
And the world is -- what it has been. 1 
It was obvious that an alternative, more reliable and 
productive means of advancing the national interest should be 
pursued: since the early 1950s it has been, and the results have 
been spectacular. It is this conviction, validated by the 
empirical evidence of Japan's present wealth and prestige, which 
is reflected in the largely negative responses in public opinion 
surveys to questions concerning the desirability of increases in 
Self Defence Force capabilities and budgets, constitutional 
revision, the possession of nuclear weapons and the deployment of 
SDF personnel abroad. 2 
* Overseas military aggression against Japan would not occur, and 
if it did, it would fail. 
Warriors from mainland Asia, such as Jurchen forces from eastern 
Siberia, have occasionally landed on Japanese soil) but they have 
not constituted a serious threat to Japanese states. One of the 
most significant and singular features of Japanese history has 
been the nation's exemption from invasion, or even danger of 
invasion, during almost two millennia. The exception to this, the 
1. Randall Jarrell, "The Range in the I::esert", The CQU1plete fu~n:G.. p. 176 
2. It is not just the civilian public which is resistant to a Japanese nuclear 
weapons capabili ty: according t,o a survey of atti tudes of Self I::efence Force 
rr.ernrers, the aversion to nuclear weaponry extends to the SDF; see: Welfield, 
An Empire in Eclipse.l p. 388 
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great Mongol campaign to conquer Japan in the thirteenth century, 
was thwarted, and the Christian churches and European powers 
, 
failed to establish a presence in Japan beyond the sixteenth 
century, save for a few Dutch traders confined to an island in 
Nagasaki harbour. 
Despite their military superiority, the European powers which 
encroached on Japanese sovereignty in the nineteenth century did 
not attempt to conquer Japan, as neither China nor Korea had ever 
done, despite their periodically possessing the military 
'Iii 
capability to do so, and, most notably under the T'ang dynasty, 
j. an expansionist policy to complement that capability. 
I 
The two greatest threats to Japanese sovereignty, the 
j 
invasion forces assembled by Kublai Khan and the United States 
some seven hundred years later, were in part the product of 
expansionary processes in those societies which operated 
independently of any Japanese influence, but they were also in 
part, and in the latter case, for the greater part, the result of 
provocative action by Japan. The defiant and very risky gesture 
of the Kamakura warriors' beheading of Kublai Khan's emissaries 
was echoed in the Mukden incident and attack on the U.S. Pacific 
fleet in Pearl Harbour: the scale and folly of the latter gesture 
was matched by the overwhelming nature of the hostile power it 
unleashed. 
'I It is thus reasonable to conclude on the basis of past 
experience that Japan is unlikely to fall victim to serious 
~, aggression or invasion if it refrains from inciting such 
behaviour, or if its troops are not deployed where they may 
I 
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become involved, willing or not, in provocative incidents: this 
n reasoning underlies the Japanese public's aversion to the 
" deployment of SDF personnel abroad and to the SDF's possession of 
I"~ 
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an offensive capability, such as could appear to threaten, or 
actually attack, other states. 
* Alignment with a non-intrusive dominant power would enhance 
national security but also increase the risk of entanglement in 
overseas conflicts 
The reasoning which supports a non-offensive Japanese military 
capability is also the source of popular concern and opposition 
to American military bases in Japanese territory, because they do 
possess a powerful offensive and long-range forward deployment 
capability. 
Although the protection it afforded may have served as an 
inducement to Japanese militarists to raise their territorial 
ambitions, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was less intrusive and to 
this extent less dangerous than the present American alliance in 
the eyes of its Japanese critics. The British alliance did not 
lncrease the chance of attack on Japan by a third country (except 
by Russia, which was unlikely after its defeat in 1905 and its 
subsequent internal revolutionary ferment and war against 
Germany), and did not produce irresistible pressure on Japan to 
commit troops to the killing fields of World War I on the other 
side of the world. Britain thus proved a more satisfactory ally 
than Koguryo and, in some ways, than the United States. 
President Truman's dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the 
Straits of Taiwan at the start of the Korean War in 1950, the 
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subsequent use of U.S. forces in Japan in combat on the Korean 
peninsula, and the later use of U.S. facilities in Japan for the 
Vietnam War effort only served to reinforce the view that the 
American alliance could prove a liability, as has pressure on 
Japan to deploy SDF personnel abroad in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. It is for historical reasons difficult for Japanese to 
conceive of their nation being attacked in the absence of 
provocative action by their own military forces, or, as some may 
see it, the inadvertent involvement of Japanese military forces 
in a clash with foreign troops, and thus the defensive rationale 
for the deployment of U.S. forces outside American territory is 
not a convincing one for many Japanese. 
Such conclusions about the American military presence in Japan 
are the source of concern expressed in opinion polls, and in the 
massive demonstrations of 1960, and at the time of its automatic 
extension in 1970,1 about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the 
likelihood of U.S. overseas forces precipitating} rather than 
preventing, warfare. 
1. These demonstrations were larger even than those of 1960} with police 
estirrating the number of participants to be in excess of 700,000: the 
organisers of the protests put the figure at more than 2 million. The size of 
the disturbance reflected Japanese public concern about the American military 
presence in Asia contributing to warfare there, in the wake of the large- scale 
U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War. which began to escalate in 1965, and its 
more recent invasion and massively destructive strategic bombing of neutral 
Carrlbodia. In 1971, local elections resulted in overwhelming victories for 
anti-alliance. Socialist and Communist backed candidates in Tokyo, Kyoto ., 
Osaka and other urban centres; and elections for the Upper House of the Diet 
sr~rtly after resulted in losses for the LDP, and significant gains for 
Socialist and Communist parties. (See: Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.280-
285) 
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* A foreign presence on Japanese soil would challenge the status 
~ and draw Japan into international wars in which it wanted no 
part. 
The concept of a foreign presence in Japan producing political 
and social instability may have its roots in the prehistoric 
migrations of people from the Asian mainland which gradually 
displaced the Ainu and other long established inhabitants of the 
islands. In particular, it may reflect memories of aggressive 
migrants who arrived in Kyushu from across the Straits of 
Tsushima in the third century. They expanded northeast to Honshu 
and there established the state of Yamato and the imperial 
family, and a warlike, patriarchal society whose values came 
eventually to displace those of the Yayoi, the milder, 
matriarchal societies of southern Japan. 
However, express concern about the dangers of a foreign 
presence in Japan first came to prominence in the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, when the presence of traders and 
missionaries, first from Portugal and then other Western 
countries, raised the prospect of sectarian strife being imported 
into Japan with the new religions and the goods which European 
ships brought from China. The foreigners also brought with them 
alien ideas about government and, more threatening, the Christian 
notion of ultimate loyalty to faith and God, not the Emperor of 
shogun. It was also appreciated by Hideyoshi and Ieyasu that 
religious and economic rivalries between the various churches and 
countries which supported them might not only produce conflict 
within Japan, but could result in one or more of the Western 
states attacking or even attempting to colonise Japan. 
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Japan embarked on its program of territorial expansionism after 
the Meiji Restoration largely by its own volition, at the 
insistence of militaristic elements among its leadership and 
despite advice against such a course by many eminent and well-
informed figures, whose views, while far from being liberal, were 
realistic. 
However, it is not unreasonable to ascribe some validity to the 
view that, were it not for the violations of Japanese sovereignty 
by the European-American presence on Japanese soil under the 
unequal treaty system, and the seeming encirclement of Japan by 
expansionist Western states, there would have been much less 
reason for Japan to try to regain its national pride and defend 
itself by, as it were, beating the Western powers at their own 
imperialist game. 
The period during which the foreign presence on Japanese soil 
was greatest was during the postwar allied occupation, and as was 
noted above, events surrounding the Korean War furnished Japanese 
with evidence that their country would through American forces be 
involved, at the least indirectly, in foreign conflicts. The 
occupation presented the greatest challenge to the political and 
social status 9JJQ.. in the nation's history, directly by imposing 
unprecedented foreign military rule, and indirectly, but more 
lastingly, by introducing constitutional and other reforms. 
It is this concern which contributes to opposition to American 
military forces remaining in Japan and, especially from the 
chauvinists' point of view, the alien cultural impact of those 
forces and, compared with prewar times, the extraordinarily large 
number of civilian foreigners now living in or visiting Japan. 
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Isolationism has a powerful attraction to Japanese, and this is 
reflected in results of public opinion polls ranging from the 
high number of people who want nothing to do with foreigners to 
an even higher number who oppose the overseas deployment of the 
Self Defence Force. 
* Isolation, except for carefully managed foreign trade, would 
produce stability and security. 
The Tokugawa period of Japan's isolation from the outside world 
was characterised by stability and, in the short term, security. 
However, it was also characterised by political and social 
rigidity and oppression and, especially in rural areas, extreme 
hardship for a majority of people. Moreover, severely restricted 
foreign trade tends to benefit only those who are directly 
engaged in it. Heian and Tokugawa introspectiveness may be seen 
as a form of over-reaction, a retreat to policies the extreme 
opposite of the adventurism apparent in the provision of 
significant military aid to Koguryo, the expansionism of 
Hideyoshi, and the overseas exploits of the wako, the pirate-
traders of the pre-Tokugawa era whose exploits enriched the 
shogun's political and military rivals and provoked potentially 
dangerous Chinese antagonism to Japan. 
The conclusion that isolation and restricted trade produce 
stability and security is reflected in the Japanese public's 
aversion to foreign military bases on their soil and the overseas 
deployment of SDF personnel. It is also reflected in resistance 
to the opening of domestic Japanese markets to outside 
competition., one of the allegedly "unfair" practices which 
135 
I 
complicates the management of Japan's alliance with the United 
I 
States and its relations with other countries. and contributes to 
: 1 
Japan's lack of assertiveness in international regimes such as 
the GATT. 
Some Japanese so resent the charge that their country is 
taking a "free ride" at its allY's expense that they have 
suggested that the U.S. should recognise that in some ways it now 
needs Japan more than Japan needs it. An outspoken politician, 
~ Ishihara Shintaro, provoked controversy in the U.S. following 
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publication of a booklet . The. Japan that c.an s..ay ~ Japan's.. n.e.H 
card in ili relations with America, in which he . and the Chairman 
of the Sony Corporation, Morita Akio~ strongly criticised 
America's economic performance and its perceived attitude towards 
Japan. He argued that: 
Japan holds very strong cards - - its high technology 
capabilities which are indispensable to weapons development in 
both the U.S. and U.S.S.R .... 
Some of Japan's business leaders ... are of the opinion that 
Japan could go neutral, revoking the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty~ 
if the Soviets will return our northern islands. and allow Japan 
the right to develop Siberian resources. 
Although Japanese people may harbour reservations about the 
perceived dangers attendant on having U.S. military forces . In 
their country, and would rather have a non-intrusive and 
1. Ishihara. The. Japan that can ~ ~ Japan's neH card in it5. relations with 
America: excerpts reprinted in The Independent MQnthJ.y, March 1990, pp. 27,29 
A further indication of the lack of appeal of Ishihara's comrrents to the 
Japanese public may be gained by noting his failure to win the elections in 
1991 for mayor of Tokyo .1 despite his having official LDP endoresment. 
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undemanding alliance such as Japan enjoyed with Britain early 
this century, it is evident from public opinion polls that a 
majority do not want the security treaty with America revoked, 
nor the acquisition by Japan of the autonomous defence capability 
implied by such action. What they do appear to want is greater 
recognition by Americans that, given Japan's history of "one-
sided" alliances, and its concern about foreign entanglements, 
the Japanese, in their own estimation, are bearing a heavy burden 
in maintaining an alliance which places foreign military forces 
in their territory. 1 
* Contact with the outside world would produce mixed blessings, 
with trade bringing prosperity but new technologies and ideas 
bringing baronial and popular challenges to centralised 
government and the existing political and social systems. 
While no one may doubt the bravery of individual Japanese 
soldiers over the centuries, the often superior quality of their 
training, weaponry and battlefield tactics, or, on one of their 
rare deployments overseas, their determination to acquire the 
glittering prizes afforded by dominion over foreign lands, it is 
nevertheless the case that their military efforts to carve out an 
empire in Asia and the Pacific, or even merely to sway the 
outcome of conflicts on the mainland, have been singularly 
1. Homrra Nagoyo replied to Ishihara thus: 
"The arrogant nationalism of Ishihara, who exaggerates Japan's technological 
power, does not represent mainstream thinking in Japan, nor does his 
unilateralist view that from now on, Japan can go it alone without America's 
assistance". (liThe Peril of Revisionism", p.19) 
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unsuccessful and ultimately catastrophic. By contrast, Japanese 
economic and cultural contacts with other states have been 
,t beneficial and lucrative, al though, on occasion, the foreign 
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ideas and technologies imported with foreign goods have given 
rise to domestic political and social instability. This, however, 
has customarily been more of a threat to Japanese rulers than 
those they ruled. 
Contact with China in the seventh century was accompanied by a 
particularly bloody interval of civil warfare between rival 
aristocratic clans, but it also introduced Confucianism to Japan, 
and with it the concept of good government, and instruction in 
the means by which to implement it. 1 During the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, revived trade with China and novel trade 
with South East Asia brought in exotic goods, technologies and 
coinage which flowed into the hands of daimyos, merchants, small 
landowners and other ordinary people, and removed the monopoly on 
wealth and power enjoyed by the Ashikaga bakufu. Guilds of 
merchants fortified their towns and enlisted soldiers to protect 
their shipments; peasants revolted, assaulted tax collectors, 
plundered granaries, drove the shogun'$ officers out of whole 
provinces and deposed local daimYQ.a and ruled in their s t.ead: it 
was, according to a popular contemporary saying, a time of "the 
low oppressing the high". 2 
1. The clans were the Soga and what becarre the Fujiwara; a docurrent 
prescribing prOfer behaviour for officials, which has been attributed to 
Prince Shotoku, has been described as the first constitution of Japan; see: 
Leonard, Eary ~l, p. 15 
2. Leonard, Early J.amn, p.100 
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Hideyoshi and Ieyasu laregly put a stop to such assertions of 
plebeian political independence and power, which in the sixteenth 
" century had been further encouraged by the introduction of 
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Christianity, with its notions of spiritual egalitarianism and 
the individual's ultimate allegiance to a deity or his high 
priest in Rome. 1 
After more than two centuries of isolation and feudalism, it 
was the arrival of foreign gunboats and the subsequent revival of 
foreign trade under unequal treaties which precipitated the 
demise of the repressive Tokugawa bakufu and the eventual 
promulgation of the Meiji Constitution which, whatever its 
faults, gave an increasing number of ordinary Japanese an 
increasing degree of ligitimate power over national affairs: 
those who were neither content with government policy nor 
enfranchised, like the fishwives of Toyama in 1918, understood 
and practised the exercise of political power by the more time-
honoured means of rioting. Finally, the postwar period of Japan's 
close interaction with the United States and other countries, 
which has seen it rise to the position of the world's pre-eminent 
trading state and, on the basis of its assets, the world's 
richest state, has also been the period during which all Japanese 
1 have enjoyed unprecedented political power and prosperity. It has 
~ 
I 
i.1 
also brought the power to influence the affairs of other states 
1. The Tokugawa shoguns were not, however, entirely successful in quashing 
popular disturbances or quenching the spirit of inde:P9ndence arrong the masses ., 
as is shown by popular revolts which continued throughout the era, in 
particular in rerrote rural and rr:ountainous areas where the authority of the 
t.>akufu. was relatively difficult to enforce. (See: SuginDto, .2opular 
Disturbance in Postwar Japan, pp.172-176 
139 
I ' 
~; 
~, 
'I II 
III 
~ Jt 
~ 
II 
I 
~ 
I ~ 
by economic means, and by example to persuade others to forgo the 
costly and risky business of war: "Trading states are beginning 
to emerge once again in world politics, and the erstwhile low 
politics of trade and growth is becoming high politics once 
again. ,,1 
The peaceful, primarily economic relations with the outside 
world, a comparatively liberal internal political system and a 
generally high standard of living which characterise Japanese 
society today are not conditions that merely co-exist: they are, 
and their less developed but recognisable manifestations . In 
earlier times were also, to a great extent, dependent on each 
other. The Japanese people are aware of this, as is demonstrated 
by their opposition to constitutional revision and their 
persistent aversion to potentially militaristic domestic policies 
and aggressive foreign policies, and by the reasons to which they 
ascribe this aversion, including the prospect of conscription, 
the time-honoured means of co-opting civilians to the 
implementation of militaristic policies. 2 
This does not necessarily mean that some further 
circumvention, or adaption, of the democratic rights and 
principles embodied in the postwar Constitution, or entrenchment 
of governmental practices which may not accord with the Western 
ideal of good political leadership, necessarily herald a return 
to Japanese militarism and aggressive foreign and defence 
1. Rosecrance, The Rise Qf the Trading State, p.227 
2. See, for example: POLL, Note 2, page 77, of t,his paper. 
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policies. lOne of the greatest of modern Japanese statesmen, 
r 
, Yoshida Shigeru, was not a liberal, but he was opposed to 
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militarism and expansionism. In the prewar era, the leader of the 
Meiji oligarchy, Iwakura Tomomi, opposed war with Korea in the 
1870s, as did another oligarch, who is credited with being the 
main architect of Japan's modernisation, Okubo Toshimichi. These 
men pointed out that the economic cost of war would be greater 
than any potential rewards, and would thus hinder Japan's 
economic and political development and its the ultimate objective 
of obtaining diplomatic recognition of itsequality with the 
Western powers; and, they predicted that severe economic problems 
would also hinder Japan's ability to repay its debts to Britain, 
affording the British a pretext to intervene in Japanese internal 
affairs. Saionji Kinmochi, originally a member of the Meiji 
oligarchy and a Fujiwara, opposed the attempt by militarists to 
dominate the Cabinet and finance a big Army build-up in 1912, and 
persistently argued against every war fought by Japan this 
century. 2 
1. As the case of Article IX shows, a constitution which can bend sorr.ewhat may 
be less inclined to break. However, to avoid a repeat of past errors, such as 
the Mei"; i Constitution's allowance of the gradual dj_splacerrent of civil 
governrr:ent by military rule, and foreign ];X)licy being decided by armies in the 
field, some principles of the ];X)stwar Japanese Constitution must rerrain 
inviolate: these include; the sovereignty of the people, and the requirerr.ent. 
for civilian cabinets comprised only of Diet rr:embers, civilian control of the 
Self Defence Force., and ];X)pular elections for both houses of the Diet. Given 
that civilian Cabinet rrembers rray sorretirr.es be arrong the rrnst ardent of 
militarists (and not just in Japan), it is also important that budgetary 
control rerrain as far as ];X)ssible with the Diet as a whole, rather than being 
permitted to shift further within the exclusive province of the LDP and 
Ministry of Finarlce. 
2. See: Reischauer, Japan, p.164; Blainey, The Causes Qf Wr, pp.59-60,90-91; 
Bergamini, Japan's ~ Conspiracy., pp.255-256 
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.Japan's experience of warfare up to and including the last 
war it fought attest to the validity of the view of some Meiji 
oligarchs that foreign aggression is a very risky and 
costlybusiness. Moreover, the longer it lasts . the costlier it 
becomes, and short wars, in particular those against bigger 
states, show a propensity for turning into long ones, as did 
Hideyoshi's initially quick advance to the Yalu River, and 
Admiral Yamamoto's year of victories after Pearl Harbour. As one 
historian observed of the miscalculations which preceded World 
War I: "Quick, decisive victory was the German orthodoxy; the 
economic impossibility of a long war was everybody's orthodoxy ... 1 
As Geoffrey Blainey has found, the expectation of a fast and 
comparatively inexpensive war is not only a mistake often 
associated with war, it is, in itself, a cause of war, which 
afflicts both sides and which is obviously attributable to 
"differing calculations of the rival forces and rival 
equipment. ,,2 It is notable that those Meiji era leaders who were 
opposed to foreign aggression, Okuba, Iwakura and Saionji, had 
all travelled abroad and had made realistic calculations the 
forces and equipment of potential rivals: similarly, Yamamoto, 
who warned against fighting the United States had been a student 
there, and the anti-war Yoshida was a well-travelled diplomatic 
and former Ambassador to Britain. 
1. Tuchm:ill, The Gu.ns. Qf August: August 19.14, London. 1964, p.142; quoted in: 
Blainey. The. Causes of ~. p.39 
2. Blainey, The. Causes Qf ~. p.56 
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Postwar Japanese political leaders may still be more concerned 
with domestic affairs than is warranted or desirable. as Kawasaki 
Ichiro has claimed, 1 but many more of them, and bureaucrats, 
business people, journalists, students and ordinary tourists are 
going abroad than in the prewar era, and are being made aware of 
the military and industrial resources, and the comparative self-
sufficiency of other nations. This, the outcome of the Pacific 
War, and the respect now accorded Japan because of its economic 
power and technological sophistication, must undoubtedly 
reinforce the evidence gathered over two-millennia that Japanese 
external aggression fails and peaceful co-existence and trade 
succeeds in advancing the interest, not just of a ruling clique, 
but all Japanese. 
The importance of the legacy of history should not be 
underestimated, and in the case of Japan's relations with the 
United States, it has undoubtedly caused misunderstandings and 
antagonism, given that the American historical experience 
justifies optimism over the outcome of political assertiveness 
and belligerency in international affairs; whereas Japan's 
justifies a fair degree of pessimism. This has led Japan to adopt 
foreign and defence policies which may be better suited to the 
coming century than will be those which have worked well for 
other states in and prior to this century. Thus, as the Gulf War 
of 1991 demonstrated: 
... it is becoming cheaper to destroy the opposition's maln 
1. Kawasaki, Japan Unrrasked 
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weapons of invasion and occupation, such as battle tanks, long-
range combat aircraft and large warships -- than to deploy them 
oneself. The result is to increase the attractiveness of non-
offensive (or non-provocative) defence strategies, based on the 
principle that all the activities of the military forces --
ranging from their size, structure, weapons and logistics to 
their training, manoeuvres and war games -- can be designed to 
provide an effective defence, but with virtually no offensive 
capability ... 
The Gulf War has demonstrated that the negotiation of mutual 
non-provocative defence strategies (including adequate 
verification) would be in tune with the technological 
'b'l't' 1 POSSl 1 1 .les. 
Japan's pursuit of a strictly non-offensive defence policy would 
be in keeping with the legacy of the nation's long history, and 
would therefore be agreeable to a majority of Japanese. It would 
not, perhaps, prove so agreeable or comprehensible to many 
Americans and others, as Richard Rosecrance suggests: 
Many have misunderstood the differences between Japan and 
America, believing that Japan is a youthful, smaller edition of 
the United States, a still not fully developed major power with 
political and economic interests that have yet to be defined on a 
world stage. Sooner or later, many feel. Japan too will become a 
world power with commensurate political and military interests. 
This is a misconception of the Japanese role in world affairs and 
a mistaken assimilation of a trading state to the military-
political realm. Even if, at some distant future time, Japan 
increased her defense expenditure to 2 percent of grass national 
product, she would not follow the United States and Soviet 
strategy in international politics or try to become the world's 
leading naval or military power. As a trading state it would not 
be in her interest to dominate the world, control the sea lanes 
to the Persian Gulf, or guarantee military access to markets in 
Europe of the western hemisphere. She depends upon open trading 
and commercial routes to produce entry for her goods. It is not 
the American model that Japan will ultimately follow. Rat4er. it 
is the Japanese model that America may ultimately follow. G 
1. Barnaby, "A lesson in defence from the Gulf", in The MeR Scientist, 16. 2. 91 
2. Rosecrance" The Rise Qf tOO Trading State" xi 
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Unlike their Meiji era predecessors at the turn of the last 
century, the Japanese of today have over one hundred years of 
their nation's interaction with the world to reflect upon and 
thereby gain insight into what path should be followed to advance 
the national interest into the twenty-first century. Universal 
literacy, a plethora of historical works and much enthusiasm for 
learning about themselves have now given Japanese the capacity, 
as never before, to examine how their nation fared during the 
almost two millennia that separated Queen Himiko of Yamatai and 
the Meiji Emperor, and during which it adopted various policies 
intended to address much the same issues as Japanese face today: 
how to preserve the sovereignty of the state, how best to govern 
it, how best to ensure economic growth and the livelihood of its 
people. 
For what was by far the greater part of those two millennia, 
Japan lived in peace with its neighbours, trading with them and 
growing in wealth. Very occasionally, in 663, 1592, and 1597, it 
sent armies abroad, but they all failed to secure their 
objectives, and those warriors who were not killed 1 returned . In 
haste to Japan. Overall. the recent wars against China, Russia, 
Germany and Western powers in the Asia-Pacific region cost Japan 
dearly in lives and money, and served only to prove that, when 
the modern Japan that emerged after 1868 chose to ignore the 
I legacy of history and to progressively move further down the path 
·1 
of territorial expansionism. it chose the wrong path. After 1945, 
Japan evidently chose to remain on the right path, to judge by 
,., its remarkable rise from humiliation, destruction and poverty to 
security, prosperity and prestige. 
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The path on which the allied occupation left Japan, and which 
has since been adhered to by the Japanese people, was that of 
civilian government and pacifism: specifically, to maintain a 
non-aggressive and, as far as possible, omni-directional foreign 
policy with primary emphasis on the establishment and maintenance 
of a flourishing overseas trade; and, a defence policy which, 
while allowing for re-armament, did not threaten other states by 
its inclusion of plainly offensive and long-range weaponry, or an 
independent forward deployment capability. 
The strong support of pacifism by the Japanese people today is 
not a postwar novelty, but a continuation and enhancement of 
prewar modes of thought and behaviour derived from, and sustained 
by, the legacy of history; theirs is a communal wisdom gained not 
only from events of this century, but from all the centuries 
stretching back to the Japanese military force dispatched abroad 
to suffer death and defeat at Paekchongang. 
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COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: PROS AND CONS 
There is no doubt that most Japanese~ and most of their 
neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, prefer to see Japan 
securing its prosperity, stability and sovereignty by way of 
Iii 
trade, investment and aid rather than by external aggression and 
expansionism. Despite rioting over "Japanese economic 
imperialism" in some South East Asian nations in the early 1970s, 
and official complaints over such things as Japan's failure to 
transfer technology and, most notably~ its unfair trade 
practices, the nations of Japan's own region which are recipients 
of Japanese economic aid have enjoyed economic growth rates in 
excess of those of most other nations, including in the late 
1970s and early 1980s when the world economy was in recession. 
This does not, however, mean that "Comprehensive Security" 
\" has been immune from criticism, some at least of which is 
justified. Implementation of the concept has led to Japan being~ 
I ~ , in absolute terms, the world's largest aid donor. In relative 
terms, its performance is less impressive: as a share of GNP, 
Japan's aid expenditure in 1988 ranked fourteenth among the 
eighteen members of the Development Assistance Committee. 1 The 
I'I 
I,I quality of Japanese aid is subject to greater criticism than that 
1., 
1. Ear Eastern Economic Review, 10.3.88, p.64 
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of many other nations, including that it "gives away less while 
I{ ~ lending more to developing countries than most donors, and makes 
I' 
loans on tougher terms ... Japan's aid is still heavily weighted 
I ~ in favour of infrastructure developments which often benefit the 
better-off at the expense of the very poor." 1 Moreover, even 
Japan's "soft" loans can become very "hard" when debtor nations 
are faced with an appreciating yen. 
A further complicating factor in Japan's pursuit of 
Iii comprehensive security is negative reaction in the United States 
to Japan's economic ascendancy, and America's relative decline, 
In part,icular in t,he Asia-Pacific region: "many congressmen and 
others think that more aid from Japan simply extends that 
r ~ country's trade". 2 This opinion is frequently shared by 
recipients of Japanese assistance, including members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations. 3 
Nevertheless, Muthiah Alagappa is of the opinion that Japanese 
support for economic development in the member-states of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations enhances regional 
security, not only because it is perceived by the ASEANs as less 
threatening than a military role for Japan in the region, but 
because the importance of economic development in maintaining 
I" 
their internal stability would be difficult to overestimate: 
Ii 
In the Philippines, the stability of the Aquino government and 
I'i 
1. The Ear EastBrn Economic Review, 18.3.88, p.64 
1., 2. Ear Eastern Economic Review, 10.3.88, p.69 
3. Alagappa, Japan's Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific, p.32 
I ~ 
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success in combating the serious communist insurgency threat 
will, to a considerable extent, be a function of economic reform, 
growth and development. In Malaysia, harmonious inter-ethnic 
relations, so vital to political stability, become much more 
difficult to achieve during periods of slow or negative economic 
growth. In Indonesia the legitimacy of the Suharto government and 
the dominance of the military in Indonesian politics are 
predicated upon promises of economic development and political 
stability. A prolonged downturn in its economy will raise serious 
questions about the viability of an island city state like 
Singapore. Vietnam's economy is in dire need of reform and 
external assistance. As many of these states can directly or 
indirectly affect the naval balance of power and safety of 
navigation in the region, it beh01ves Japan to adopt a positive 
approach to Asean in particular. 
It is fair to say that Japan's overseas trade, investment and 
aid, and the example its economic growth has set, have overall 
helped, rather than hindered, the global ascendancy of the free 
enterprise system, and "Comprehensive Security" has accordingly 
gained adherents among officials in the United States. Japan's 
foreign economic assistance may therefore also be considered as a 
form of political assistance in the management of its relations 
with the United States. However, an appreciation of the efficacy 
of Japan's comprehensive approach to security may be less evident 
during international crises which are perceived to threaten 
Western interests, for then Americans are apt to see Japan as 
shirking i t.s duty as a military ally (rather than a "part.ner", as 
Japanese would have it) by not contributing military personnel to 
serve, and possibly die, beside U.S. troops. 
Yet, in less emotionally heightened times, it is evident that 
"Comprehensive Security" ~ s.a is considered overall to be 
beneficial by American administrations, although no substitute 
1. Alagappa, ~ Political and Security Role in the Asia-:Pacific, pp.28-29 
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for what they regard as the minimal requirement for Japan to be 
I ~ capable of protecting sea lanes of communication up to 1,000 
I ~ nautical miles from the home islands, blockading the Soya, 
Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits and defending the home islands 
Ii 
against limited aggression. 
It is significant in terms of its future prospects that 
"Comprehensive Security" is an acceptable form of "long-range" 
national defence for the pacifist Japanese public, who would much 
rather see the country attempting to secure the passage of vital 
111 
commodities through ) for example, the Malacca Straits by way of 
I ~I: peaceful economic and developmental assistance to Singapore, 
III 
~ , 
I 
Malaysia and Indonesia, rather than the deployment of Ground SDF 
personnel, or the dispatch of a Japanese aircraft carrier, to 
Southeast Asia. 
~ 
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